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In this dissertation, I argue for a universal, absolutist form of pacifism.  In chapter 1, I 
note the various ways people have used and abused the terms “pacifism” and 
“violence,” and I argue that while “violence” should not be construed as broadly as 
many philosophers would like, “pacifism” (and therefore typologies of pacifism) ought 
to be construed broadly enough to allow for strictly interpersonal forms of pacifism—
that is, moral opposition to violence at the personal but not necessarily the political 
level.  In chapter 2, I argue against unitary conceptions of moral judgment; there are at 
least three distinct conceptions of how moral value applies to objects under evaluation 
(deontological, hypological, and evaluative).  I introduce the term “moral health” as a 
placeholder for any normative ethical theory the evaluative judgments of which 
function analogously to biological health in important ways.  In chapter 3, based on the 
moral health model, I posit and defend four evaluative moral judgments which jointly 
constitute a universal, absolutist form of pacifism which I call “moral health 
pacifism”—namely that violence is bad for everyone, there are alternatives to violence 
even in situations that appear to call for violence, becoming a person who can perform 
those alternatives well is very morally demanding, and there ought to be persons who 
can perform those alternatives.  In chapter 4, I present seven common objections to 




CHAPTER 1: Pacifism and Its Varieties 
I took two of the men and went around the flank…to outflank them and 
take them out.  Well, I got around to the side and pointed my M16 at 
them and this person turned around and just stared, and I froze, ‘cos it 
was a boy, I would say between the ages of twelve and fourteen.  When 
he turned at me and looked, all of a sudden he turned his whole body 
and pointed his automatic weapon at me, I just opened up, fired the 
whole twenty rounds right at the kid, and he just laid there.  I dropped 
my weapon and cried.  
(Keegan & Holmes, 257) 
Then I cautiously raised the upper half of my body into the tunnel until I 
was lying flat on my stomach.  When I felt comfortable, I placed my 
Smith Wesson .38-caliber snub-nose (sent to me by my father for tunnel 
work) beside the flashlight and switched on the light, illuminating the 
tunnel.  There, not more than 15 feet away, was a Viet Cong eating a 
handful of rice from a pouch on his lap.  We looked at each other for 
what seemed to be an eternity, but in fact, was probably only a few 
seconds.  Maybe it was the surprise of actually finding someone else 
there, or maybe it was just the absolute innocence of the situation, but 
neither of us reacted.  After a moment, he put his pouch of rice on the 
floor of the tunnel beside him, turned his back to me and slowly started 
crawling away.  I, in turn, switched off my flashlight, before slipping 
back into the lower tunnel and making my way back to the entrance.  
About 20 minutes later, we received word that another squad had killed 
a VC emerging from a tunnel 500 meters away.  I never doubted who 
that VC was.  To this day, I firmly believe that grunt and I could have 
ended the war sooner over a beer in Saigon than Henry Kissinger ever 
could by attending the peace talks.  
–Michael Kathman ‘Triangle Tunnel Rat’ (Grossman, 2) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Violence is messy.  Unfortunately, so is pacifism.  Some disagree.  Jenny 
Teichman points out that the term “pacifism” was coined in 1902 by a Frenchman 
attending an international peace conference who explained that he meant to refer to 
antiwarism (Teichman 1986, 1).  On this basis, Teichman insists the term refers solely 
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to antiwarist positions and not to positions morally opposed to all violence (Teichman 
1986, 3-4).  Richard Norman defines the term more narrowly as “the unconditional 
rejection of war” (Norman, 197).  Duane Cady, too, posits that pacifism is essentially 
antiwarist (Cady 2010, 17), though he includes opposition to all violence as a version of 
pacifism (Cady 2010, 64).  The historian Peter Brock also insists that pacifism is 
essentially antiwarism, arguing that pacifism should be kept distinct from concepts like 
nonviolence (Brock 2000, 54).  Elsewhere he considers Gandhi’s nonviolence and 
nonviolent resistance “a version of pacifism” (Brock 1998, 2).  The apparent 
discrepancy among those who insist on a restricted meaning of the term is telling.   
The ideas underpinning pacifism are far older than the term itself, as Teichman 
admits (Teichman 1986, 10).  As Peter Brock notes, the pre-history of pacifism likely 
begins at least two-and-a-half millennia ago with the Jain religion (Brock 1998, 1).1  
Jain leaders advocated ahimsa (a Sanskrit word meaning non-injury) to a radical 
degree; persons should avoid killing even the tiniest insects.  Some devout Jains carry 
brooms and sweep pathways as they walk to avoid trampling any creatures (Teichman 
2006, 153).  The earliest Buddhists advocated ahimsa as well, though less rigidly than 
Jains, and in both religions, the strictest adherence became obligatory only among 
monastic orders; consequently, pacifism in both religions became largely 
“vocationalized” (Brock 1998, 2).  One possible exception may be the Indian Emperor 
Asoka who, after bring repulsed at the carnage of a war he had conducted, went to 
                                                 
   
  
1
 Jainism may be much older than this.  See Bowker 2003. 
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great pains to make clear his disdain for and intention to avoid war and violence within 
his kingdom and in his dealings with neighboring states (Teichman 2006, 155). 
Aside from these ancient Eastern examples, pacifism does not appear in 
recorded history until the Christian era and largely remains within Christianity until 
fairly recently (Teichman 2006, 10).  Some historians maintain that the early church 
was largely pacifist in ideology though there is some dispute about this.2  From the end 
of the New Testament period to around the year 170 AD, there is no evidence of 
Christians serving the military (Bainton, 67-68; Cadoux, 97).  This does not establish 
whether the early church was pacifist, but it may be evidence that the matter was not 
in dispute during this period; this is understandable since military service of the period 
involved many police functions that Christians would not have found objectionable, 
and since the earliest Christians likely did not qualify for military service (Brock 1998, 
5).  Some third century Christian canons forbade Christian soldiers from killing even if 
they were ordered to do so (Bos & Forest, 43; Webster, 153).  If they did so, they were 
excluded from communion for a prescribed period (Bainton, 66).  Anyone who had 
killed privately or in battle was permanently barred from ordination into the clergy 
(Webster, 171).  Early in the Christian church, clergy were held to a much higher 
standard to avoid all violence and participation in warfare (Webster, 165ff).  Even 




 For defense of the pacifist view of the early church, see Bainton 1960 and Cadoux 1919; for 
criticism of this view see Kopel 2008a. 
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accidental killing could get a priest deposed (Webster, 170), and St. Nicholas of Myra 
(yes, that St. Nicholas) was nearly deposed for punching the heretic Arius in the face.3 
There are a handful of clear rejections of violence or military service in early 
church history.  The third century Christian writer Tertullian wrote, “Christ, in 
disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier” (Bainton, 73; Bos & Forest, 103).  A twenty-
one year old Maximilian appeared in a North African court (in what is now Algeria) in 
295 AD on account of refusing a summons to serve in the Roman army because, as 
Maximilian claimed, “I cannot serve.  I cannot commit a sin.  I am a Christian” (Brock 
1998, 7-8; Webster, 187).4  In the early to mid-fourth century, during the reign of the 
Roman Emperor Julian, a young soldier named Martin (later to become the Bishop of 
Tours in 370 AD) requested discharge from the military, saying, “I am the soldier of 
Christ: it is not lawful for me to fight,” even offering to stand in the next day’s battle 
holding nothing but a cross to prove he was not motivated by cowardice (Brock 1991, 
6; Hornus, 142-147; Webster, 187-188).  Similarly clear statements against violence 
and military service were made by Lactantius (tutor to Constantine’s son) and Origen 
(Bainton, 73-74; Brock 1972, 10-21).  But these instances appear to be islands in the 
midst of an ocean of Christian writers making less clear, more nuanced statements 
and, in the cases of Ambrose and Augustine, statements which consider war under 
certain conditions in some sense acceptable (Bainton, 89-93; Teichman 2006, 23). 




 See Harmon 2013 and “Nicholas the Wonderworker, Archbishop of Myra” 2008. 
4
 Whether Maximilian’s statement should be interpreted as an endorsement of pacifism is 
disputed.  See Brock 1994. 
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Clearer Christian positions rejecting war and violence come much later with the 
advent of Christian splinter groups.  Prior to the Reformation, pacifist Christian sects 
were scarce.  The Waldensians formed late in the twelfth century in Lyons in modern 
France and rejected war and the death penalty (Brock 1991, 9), as did the English 
Lollards, followers of John Wycliffe formed in the mid-fourteenth century (Lowe, 405-
406).  In fifteenth century Bohemia, the Czech Brethren, led by Petr Chelčický, taught 
that to take a life was a sin in every instance (Brock 1972, 35).  With the onslaught of 
the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, various Christian pacifist sects 
appear especially among the Anabaptists, such as the Swiss Brethren, the Mennonites, 
and the Hutterites, all of which object in varying degrees to participation in state or 
worldly affairs in part because of the violence therein (Brock 1998, 13-26).  Quakerism 
arose in seventeenth century England, separate from the Anabaptist movements; 
Quakerism was not immediately pacifist, but by the latter half of the seventeenth 
century the Quakers had declared they would never “fight a war against any man with 
outward weapons” (Brock 1998, 30).  Christian sectarian pacifism continued to rise and 
splinter, but the nineteenth century saw the emergence of civic pacifist organizations 
such as The Massachusetts Peace Society in 1815, The London Peace Society in 1816 
(Brock 1972, 378), The American Peace Society in 1828, and the New England 
Nonresistance Society in 1838, the latter of which was organized by William Lloyd 
Garrison, famous supporter of abolitionism and women’s suffrage (Brock 1968, 113ff).  
Teichman’s claim notwithstanding, the term “pacifism” has been used 
retroactively to refer to some or all of these historical movements and to positions 
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other than mere antiwarism.  The term has been used to describe Gandhian 
nonviolence (Lackey, 535).5  It has been used to refer to Tolstoyan nonresistance and 
the accompanying ascetic lifestyle (J. Lewis, 51), and the view that “I may not use 
violence to resist an attacker (or to protect innocents)” (Filice, 120).  It has even been 
used to describe persons who agree with Aquinas’s just war criteria and persons who 
hold that war was perhaps once morally justifiable but is no longer so (Sterba, 35; Cady 
2010, 70f).6  Albert Einstein used it to refer to opposition to force under any 
circumstances “except when confronted by an enemy who pursues the destruction of 
life as an end in itself” (Einstein 2005, 161), which Einstein held entailed support for 
the allies in World War II and the American development of a nuclear weapon (Einstein 
2007).  This is not to say that there is no room for criticism of the term’s use, but given 
the frequency with which the term is broadly used, it seems to me there is little to be 
gained at this point from playing gatekeeper.   
In fact, there are reasons to resist such gatekeeping.  To say that a person’s 
moral opposition to forms of violence other than warfare is only incidentally related to 
whether she is a pacifist seems mistaken; yet if the term refers solely to antiwarism, 
that is what follows.7  Admittedly, some pacifisms are strictly antiwarist and do not 




 In fact, Gandhian nonviolence has been treated by some social scientists as a paradigm case 
of pacifism; Gregory Elliot writes, “Gandhi’s precepts are probably the best available source for 
conceptualizing pacifism” (Elliot, 30). 
6
 Sterba’s use of the term was strongly resisted by some.  See Neu 2011 and Reitain 1994.  But 
if their criticisms are correct, it would also rule out “contingent pacifism” (See May 2011 and also Rawls, 
382), “technological pacifism,” “nuclear pacifism,” “ecological pacifism” (Cady 2010, 70-74), and 
certainly Bertrand Russell’s “relative pacifism” as pacifisms (Russell 1943).   
7
 As a matter of course I use the feminine “she” when a singular pronoun is called for.  I do not 
wish for this to suggest that I am ignoring the fact that issues of violence are significantly tied to issues 
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condemn all interpersonal violence.8  But some pacifists’ opposition to warfare stems 
from their moral opposition to violence.9  It seems strange to say that Quakers are 
pacifists only in virtue of morally opposing warfare, but not in virtue of their general 
“peace testimony” which includes opposition to any interpersonal violence or that 
Tolstoy’s opposition to all violence is not constitutive of Tolstoy’s pacifism.10  Further, 
there seem to be clear examples of pacifism that are not antiwarist.  One example is 
what Douglas Lackey calls “private pacifism”—the “pacifist who renounces violence in 
personal relations but condones the use of force in the political sphere” (Lackey, 536).  
Another example may be Mennonites who, while not condoning warfare, allow that 
violence may be in some sense permissible for states (Hershberger, 253).  And lastly, 
the tired objection to pacifism, “What would you do if someone threatened to harm 
your loved one?” would make little sense as an objection if “pacifism” were strictly an 
antiwarist position.11  
                                                                                                                                               
of gender or that there are gender stereotype issues latent within many of the cases of violence I will 
discuss throughout; my standard use of “she” and “her” is merely a stylistic grammatical preference.  
8
 Both Cochran and Reitan present positions in which war is never justified though self-
defensive killing is justified under certain conditions (Cochran 1996 and Retain 1994).  Both positions 
condemn war on the basis of the conditions under which any killing is justified. Consider also Bertrand 
Russell’s “relative pacifism” and Cady’s “technological pacifism” (Russell, 8; Cady 2010, 70).  Robert 
Holmes opposes killing in warfare because it involves commanding others to kill and killing on command 
(Holmes, 398). 
9
 Perhaps it is better, as Richard Routley suggests, to say that some pacifisms are 
“comprehensive” in that they oppose warfare and interpersonal violence (Routley 1984, 118); however, 
rather than calling other pacifisms non-comprehensive, Routley refers to them as “standard pacifism,” 
entailing that pacifist views about interpersonal violence are non-standard, which again relegates them 
to a secondary or fringe status. 
10
 Concerning Quaker “peace testimony,” See “A Declaration of the Harmless and Innocent 
People of God, called Quakers” 1660.  Concerning Tolstoy’s rejection of all violence, see Tolstoy 1902. 
11
 David Cochran responds to this objection on exactly these grounds—that because pacifism is 
essentially an antiwarist doctrine, objecting on the grounds of individual self-defense misses the point 
(D. Cochran 1996).  Further, John Howard Yoder understands the thrust of this objection to be that the 
interpersonal and warfare cases are analogous (Yoder 1974, 87ff).  Cochran is correct in the case of 
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 My aim is not to police the terminology police, nor to claim that the term is 
hopelessly stretched,12 but to point out that, for good or ill, pacifism is a big tent and 
the boundaries are fuzzy.  A broad definition like “opposition to war or violence” 
probably suffices (Dombrowski, 5).  Better, then, to organize the mess than to argue 
over who should be chucked out.  And there are good reasons for attempting to 
organize the mess.  Some pacifists agree on very little.  Some objections to pacifism 
apply to some forms but not others.  Thus, a typology of pacifisms may improve both 
internal and external analyses of pacifism. 
 I also have personal interests in offering a typology.  Restricting pacifism to 
antiwarism (and any typology based on that restriction) undermines the importance of 
pacifism’s relationship to interpersonal violence.  This is troublesome for pacifisms the 
primary (or sole) concern of which is interpersonal violence.  And it seems strange in 
view of the inextricable relationship between warfare and interpersonal violence.  As 
Noam Zohar observes, we cannot deal with the question of when a state may go to 
war without in some sense dealing with the question of when individual persons in 
one state may kill individual persons in another (Zohar, 606).  Likewise, Soran Reader 
points out that arguing that war can be justified amounts to the claim that some harm 
against particular persons is justifiable (Reader, 169-170).  Eric Reitan notes that 
                                                                                                                                               
pacifisms that are solely antiwarist and Yoder is correct that the objection sometimes rests on the 
assumption of analogy between warfare and interpersonal self-defense or defense of third parties 
under attack, but as I will show in Chapter 4, a great many persons have objected to pacifism using the 
interpersonal case because moral opposition to interpersonal violence is part and parcel of the pacifism 
to which they were objecting.  Cochran is right that pacifism need not include this tenet, but my point is 
it may. 
12
 I am not quite as pessimistic as David Cortright who writes, “The meaning of pacifism has 
been distorted beyond the point where it can be restored to the original intent,” and therefore, 
Cortright concludes, the term ought to be discarded altogether (Cortright, 334). 
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distinguishing between persons who collectively commit violence one day then declare 
themselves a state the next day and commit violence again seems at least on first 
glance to be absurd (Retain 1994, 118-119).  Adin Ballou writes with irony, “Verily 
there is magic in numbers!” as he finds no apparent qualitative difference between a 
small band of pirates raiding the high seas and Alexander the Great’s wars of conquest 
(Ballou 1845, 52).  I hold a view that predominantly concerns interpersonal violence, 
and I believe it is a type of pacifism; a proper understanding of the term and its types 
ought to leave room for such a view. 
 Further, the primary purview of pacifism, it seems to me, is not warfare but 
violence.13  Even pacifisms that are strictly antiwarist are antiwarist in virtue of some 
feature of the violence that occurs therein.14  There is some view a person holds 
regarding violence of a certain scope or type in virtue of which that person is a pacifist 
and other persons not holding that view are non-pacifists—perhaps the view that 
some scope or type of violence is bad, immoral, or unjustifiable.  Because violence is so 
central to pacifism, it is important to have a sufficiently clear conception of violence in 
order to categorize pacifisms properly.  In what follows, I aim to clarify what is meant 




 Cheyney Ryan misses the mark in claiming that opposition to killing is at the heart of pacifist 
opposition to warfare (Ryan 1983, 509).  Distinctions between “killing” and “violence” in discussion of 
pacifism seem sloppy, allowing for bizarre “pacifist” possibilities such as beating or torturing someone 
nearly to death.  The only motivation I can see to justify the distinction is the possibility of violence-less 
killing (for instance, poisoning someone in a painless way).  But this identifies a difficulty in defining 
violence, not pacifism. 
14
 Those who find this claim contentious might consider the possibility of a violence-less war--
for example, an utterly technological battle in which the only objects of damage were machines or 
technological infrastructure (Routley 1984, 129-130).  While there might still be good reason to oppose 
such a war, does it seem appropriate to call opponents of such a war “pacifists”?  Even if the answer is 
“yes,” I take it that the answer is less obvious in this case than in the case of violent warfare, which 
shows that “pacifism” is intuitively linked to “violence” in a way that it is not so linked to “war.” 
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by “violence” and survey many unhelpful uses and abuses of the term.  I will then 
survey several typologies of pacifism I think are flawed in significant ways.  I will 
present and defend my own typology of pacifism and conclude by outlining the way in 
which I intend to develop and defend my own version of pacifism.   
 
1.2 What is Violence? 
 “Violence” has suffered far more misuse and stretching than “pacifism.”  Some 
have used the term so broadly that it is difficult to imagine what would not count as 
violence.15  According to Vittorio Bufacchi, these are “comprehensive conceptions of 
violence” (heretofore “CCV”) as opposed to “minimalist conceptions of violence” 
which focus solely on excessive or destructive uses of physical force (Bufacchi 2005, 
197-198).  Despite counterintuitive applications of the term “violence,” CCV appear to 
have significant support among scholars.  CCV are certainly not without motivation.  
According to Bufacchi, defenders of CCV are likely inclined to define “violence” from 
the victims’ perspectives rather than the perpetrators’ or bystanders’ perspectives 
(Bufacchi 2005, 199).  Joseph Betz argues that part of the function of the term 
“violence” is to express the seriousness of a phenomenon about which people might 
otherwise be dismissive or inattentive because describing things as “violent” or 
“violence” entails they are particularly worthy of vehement condemnation (Betz, 341).  




 As some have pointed out, some views are so broad that violence seems little more than a 




According to Trudy Govier, CCV may be advantageous because minimalist conceptions 
allow critics to claim that violence can be remedied by mere “law and order” solutions 
while ignoring structural injustices that are antithetical to peace (Govier, 65).   
 Some CCV advocates have argued that “violence” should be understood as any 
violation of a person’s rights.16  According to Newton Garver, violence is etymologically 
linked to “violation,” violence violates persons, there are some rights that are essential 
to personhood—including the right to determine what one’s body does or what is 
done to it, and the right to make one’s own decisions—and thus violence is any 
violation of any such right (Garver, 257-258).  In one sense, this view of violence is not 
broad enough, entailing that violence cannot be committed against non-persons.  This 
would mean that the Oklahoma City man who in 2013 so severely abused a 10-week 
old puppy that the dog’s lip was severed and hanging from its face committed no 
violence.17  It would also mean that the last human on earth would be incapable of 
committing violence, even if she set about viciously destroying every animal or plant in 
her path.18  Both implications are clearly false.  But, in another sense, views like 
Garver’s are far too broad.  Acts such as doctors failing to inform patients of their 
medical conditions or filming persons without their permissions would constitute 
violence.  Furthermore, such a view seems to undermine the seriousness of important 
social causes such as domestic violence or studies of the connection between 




 See Galtung 1969, Garver 1968, Riga 1969, and Salmi 1993. 
  
17
 See Manwarren 2013.  On Garver’s account, the only way the man’s actions could have 
counted as violence is if ownership of the puppy was a right of some person, in which case, the man’s 
actions would count as violence against that person, but not against the puppy per se. 
18
 See Routley 1973. 
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masculinity and violence.19  Neither domestic violence nor studies of masculinity and 
violence concern mere violations of rights that involve no use of destructive or 
injurious physical force. 
 Some CCV advocates argue that “violence” is inherently evaluative or 
normative—that is, to call something violence entails that it is wrong, bad, immoral, 
etc.20  According to Joseph Betz, use of physical force for helpful or socially 
constructive purposes (as in the case of police officers doing what their jobs require of 
them) should be called “coercive force,” whereas “violence” is the use of physical force 
for harmful, destructive, illegitimate purposes (Betz, 346-347).  This view must be 
discarded for at least three reasons.  First, it makes violence unobservable.  Suppose I 
witness a beheading.  On this view, I cannot know whether that beheading is an act of 
violence without somehow obtaining additional information about the legitimacy or 
socially constructive or destructive purposes of the act.  I take it that anyone can 
recognize on sight that a beheading is, in the nature of the case, an act of violence.  
Second, on this view, the claim that “all violence is immoral” would be a tautology 
(Miller, 23), and thus, trivially true (Wyckoff, 340).  But “all violence is immoral” is not 
a trivial claim (just ask any pacifist), and it is not true by definition (just ask any non-
pacifist).  Third, on this view, legitimate or helpful uses of “coercive force” would 
constitute non-violence.  If I were to discover that the beheading I witnessed was a 
legitimate use of force by the state for the constructive social purpose of protecting 




 See for example Breines et al 2000, Wilson & Daly 1985, & Wiener 2004. 
20
 See Betz 1977; Garver 1968; Gray 1970; Nielsen 1981; Wolff 1969. 
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itself from an otherwise unstoppable criminal, it would follow that the state disposed 
of the criminal nonviolently.  This absurd consequence shows that moral evaluation 
does not follow from the mere use of the term (Bäck, 221). 
 Some CCV advocates argue that violence can be constituted by non-acts or 
committed by non-agents.21  According to Johann Galtung, mere structural or 
institutional injustice, in which there is no subject who is committing an act, counts as 
violence (Galtung, 170).  Garver agrees that phenomena like systemic oppression of 
the poor count as violence (Garver, 264).  Betz claims that damage caused by 
meteorological phenomena counts as violence (Betz, 343-344).  I can only conclude 
that this view stems from a failure to recognize non-literal uses of language.  Structural 
injustices and systemic oppression of the poor can be so severe and debilitating that it 
is as though the state killed or assaulted the poor.  A weatherman may describe the 
wind as “biting” cold; it does not follow that the wind has a mouth nor does it follow 
that the literal use of the term “biting” refers to an act that requires no mouth.  It 
simply evinces the pervasiveness of figurative language use.   
I believe this also explains why many CCV advocates argue that mere 
psychological harms constitute violence.22  The metaphorical comparison of violence 
to psychological harms such as verbal abuse is apt, but it does not follow that the 




 See Betz 1977; Galtung 1969; Garver 1968. 
22
 See Audi 1971, Bäck 2004, Bufacchi 2005, Coady 2008, and Garver 1968.  
14 
 
literal application of “violence” to such instances is appropriate.23   Govier analyses the 
inclination to call mere psychological harms violence in the following way: 
[Psychological abuses] are harmful, as harmful sometimes as physically 
violent actions, and reasonably judged in light of that harmfulness to be 
bad. Thus, to some, it seems appropriate to label them violent, which 
implies a broad definition of violence. The underlying argument here is 
by analogy: if X involves physical force and is harmful and deemed 
violent, and Y, involving non-physical force, is just as harmful as X, then 
Y should be deemed violent too. (Govier, 74) 
While Govier may correctly portray the rationale behind the position, she does not 
make it more plausible.  Two diseases may cause similar symptoms and degrees of 
harm in those infected; it does not follow that one disease is an instance of the other. 
 Some CCV advocates argue that violence can be committed by omission.24  
According to John Harris, an act of violence “occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted 
upon a person or persons by an agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have 
known), that his actions would result in the harm in question” (Harris 1980, 19).  
According to Bufacchi and Harris, this may occur not only when a person acts but also 
fails to act, such as burning food by not having turned off the stove (Bufacchi 2006, 
                                                 
   
  
23
 That this is a metaphorical use is highlighted by campaign ads launched in recent years aimed 
at increasing awareness of verbal abuse.  In one advertisement produced by the Juvenile Protection 
Association, a crying child is depicted as being strangled, not by a human hand, but by a collection of 
harmful words formed in the shape of a hand (Kid 1 “Verbal Abuse is Still Abuse” 2009).  In another 
advertisement produced by the Aware Helpline in Singapore, a man is pictured with his mouth wide 
open, an arm is protruding out of his mouth, and the fist at the end of the arm is making contact with a 
woman’s face (MacLeod 2008).  The thrust of the ads is to disabuse relevant persons of the notion that 
verbal abuse is somehow okay or at least not as bad as or excusable in comparison to physical abuse.  
The point of the ads is not that both constitute violence, but that both constitute abuse. 
24
 See Bufacchi 2006 and Harris 1980. 
15 
 
96).25  Harris’s definition is clearly too broad.  On this view, if I failed to carry out putrid 
garbage, resulting in my wife suffering nausea at the smell, I would have committed 
violence (which, again, undermines the importance of the term “domestic violence”).  
Further, this view entails that I commit violence at virtually every moment; I could 
always be doing something else that would prevent harm to someone—charity work 
perhaps—and I am aware that my failure to do so entails that some persons will suffer 
that otherwise would not have suffered had I engaged in those activities.  But this is 
true even if I do engage in a specific act of charity; I still fail to act in other charitable 
ways that benefit persons other than those I am currently helping.  On this view, it is 
quite impossible to be nonviolent or practice pacifism at all.  According to Harris, “A 
concept of violence must enable us to distinguish violent methods of dealing with 
people from methods that are not violence” (Harris 1980, 13).  Harris’s conception of 
violence fails on just this point (as does Bufacchi’s for the same reason). 
Despite their motivations and advantages, CCV, on the whole, constitute 
unhelpful misuses of the term “violence,” and, unlike “pacifism,” the stretches of the 
term are worth policing.  Hopefully, I have somewhat clarified what violence is not.  It 
is much harder to state exactly what violence is.  If violence is not what most CCV 
advocates claim, then it must be closer to what advocates of minimalist conceptions of 




 I concede we often attribute such incidents to what we fail to do, but in terms of identifying 
which event caused another, I take it this is just a sloppy use of language.  The food on the stove burned 
not because of what I failed to do, but because I did put food on the stove and turn up the heat to a 
level sufficient to burn food over a certain amount of time.  Suppose it was my intention to burn the 
food because I like burnt food; in that case, what caused the food to burn?  Not my failure to turn off 
the heat sooner because I never intended to do any such thing.  “Acts of omission” is in an important 
sense a misnomer.   
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violence claim—views that focus on the destructiveness of some acts of physical force.  
However, even minimalist conceptions of violence are not without problems.  Issues of 
distance, instrumentality, forcefulness, intention, and success all raise significant 
difficulties even for minimalist conceptions.  Is it an act of violence to program a bomb 
to detonate on Mars a million years from now?—and, if so, is it an act of violence now, 
when it detonates, or both?  Is it violence to poison someone secretly and painlessly?  
Is it an act of violence for a child who is completely incapable of causing any detectable 
damage or discomfort to kick someone?  Is it an act of violence if a gun in my hand 
malfunctions and accidentally discharges and kills people?  Is it an act of violence if an 
assassin fires a bullet at someone but misses or is it an act of violence to throw a 
punch that does not make contact?  Nearly any answer to such questions only raises 
more cases that are equally tricky.  Richard Routley astutely observes that “violence 
(like pain) is a partly quantitative matter” and thus “there is no sharp cut-off point at 
the bottom end of the scale with small amounts of violence greater than zero” 
(Routley 1984, 127).26  Thus, any “precise” definition of violence based on a minimalist 
conception of violence will likely involve arbitrary cut-off points.   
Despite these difficulties that do not allow for a precise definition of violence, 
there is at least one reason to prefer a minimalist conception of violence for present 
purposes.27  If, as I argued above, the primary purview of pacifism is some form of 
moral opposition to violence, then it is helpful to think of violence as essentially that to 




 As of 1983, Richard Routley goes by the name Richard Sylvan, though all the works I will be 
citing by this author were published under the name “Richard Routley.” 
27
 That is, one reason in addition to avoiding CCV’s bizarre attributions of “violence.” 
17 
 
which a pacifist qua pacifist is morally opposed.   I think Routley is correct that violence 
picks out some subclass of acts of physical force.  “Subclass” is significant because 
violence is clearly not synonymous with “force” despite several authors’ claims to the 
contrary.28  Opening a stubborn jar of jam or performing CPR are both acts of physical 
force, and perhaps might even be done violently, but neither is an act of violence.29  
Nevertheless, it seems the important distinction between pacifists and non-pacifists is 
this: there are certain conditions under which non-pacifists judge some acts of physical 
force to be morally good, right, justifiable, or excusable whereas pacifists judge those 
acts of physical force under those conditions to be morally bad, wrong, unjustifiable, 
or inexcusable.30  Thus, the concern of pacifism as a moral view about violence is the 
nature and character of00 such acts.  I will add to Routley’s definition that violence 
should be thought of as a subclass of acts of physical force that are in some sense 
injurious by design or intent.  I do not aim to posit this as a precise definition for which 
there are no troubling cases.  This definition though provides sufficient clarity for 
understanding what is at stake between pacifists and non-pacifists. 
 
 
                                                 
   
  
28
 See the following for interchangeable uses of “violence” and “force”: Cady 2010, 64; Carhart, 
1; Niebuhr 1928, 218; Teichman 1986, 4. Andrew Kelley also fails to recognize the important distinction 
between violence and force (Kelley, 222). 
29
 As John Harris points out, “even a cup of tea may be stirred violently.” (Harris 1974, 215)  The 
jar of jam example comes from Routley 1984, 119. 
30




1.3 A Typology of Pacifism 
Several authors present typologies of pacifism each with its own strengths and 
weaknesses.  In his book, Varieties of Pacifism, Peter Brock does not offer any means 
of categorizing pacifisms by ideological differences, but presents various pockets of 
pacifist adherents divided only by historical period (Brock 1998).  This is quite 
unhelpful in cases of one historical period in which there are a number of pacifists with 
significant ideological differences.  John Howard Yoder attempts to categorize 
pacifisms according to each pacifism’s rationale, motivation, and ideological context 
(Yoder 1992a).  As a result, Yoder lists as many as thirty distinct kinds of pacifism, a 
number far too numerous to be of much help in understanding basic ideological 
differences between pacifists.   
A somewhat more careful treatment is that of Daniel Dombrowski who posits 
three basic types of pacifism: “Nuclear pacifism”—the view that wars could be just 
“except when nuclear weapons and other weapons that killed, or threatened to kill, 
innocents came into play,” pacifism as an opposition to all warfare, and pacifism as an 
opposition to all violence (Dombrowski, 88).  In addition, Dombrowski says there are 
three different “modes of approach” by which one might hold each of the three 
views—that the view in question is permissible, obligatory, or supererogatory for a 
person to hold (Dombrowski, 89).   
Dombrowski’s typology is defective for at least two reasons.  First, separating 
“nuclear pacifism” in this way is arbitrary.  Any military weapons from any era can 
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result in the death of innocents.  Further, some might reject nuclear warfare not on 
the basis of non-combatant deaths, but on the basis of ecological damage (Cady 2010, 
74).  Second, Dombrowski’s use of the permissible/duty/supererogatory scheme is an 
oversimplification; as I will argue in Chapter 2, there are moral claims (and therefore 
possible types of pacifism) that do not fit into this scheme.31 
Duane Cady does not offer categories for pacifism, but presents pacifisms as a 
spectrum from most to least extreme (Cady 2010, 63).  Cady suggests that at the 
extreme end is “absolute pacifism”—the view that it is always wrong “for anyone to 
use force against another human being” (Cady 2010, 64), and at the least extreme end 
is “pragmatic pacifism”—the view that generally “war tends to promote not relieve 
human misery” (Cady 2010, 75).  Cady claims that pacifisms blur together along the 
spectrum partly because of the blurry nature of violence itself (Cady 2010, 66).  This 
may be true, but Cady’s spectrum is still unhelpful.  There is more than one spectrum 
along which pacifists might be placed.32  Cady’s spectrum does not allow that some 
pacifisms are vocational in nature—that participation in certain types of violence or 
warfare is in some sense bad or wrong for certain parties.  Further, Cady acknowledges 
a distinction between one’s position on interpersonal violence and one’s position on 
the legitimacy of warfare (Cady 2010, 66).  This difference in types of violence allows 




 In his defense, Dombrowski claims only to be categorizing types of Christian pacifism.  But 
given his imposition of deontological modes of approach onto the categories, it is not clear that he 
succeeds even in accomplishing this much. 
32
 Cady claims that his spectrum represents the shift “from principles of obligation independent 
of possible results to moral judgments based on anticipated consequences” (Cady 2010, 76).  As others 
have pointed out, Cady’s continuum does not appear to leave room for pacifisms based in virtue-based 
theories of ethics (Kelley, 220).  Even so, the spectrum should be discarded because a pacifist might be a 
pacifist in virtue of both concerns equally (a “pan-spectrum” pacifist). 
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for pacifisms that differ in kind rather than degree.  Cady’s spectrum, then, cannot 
accommodate different ways in which pacifisms might differ, and thus should be 
discarded altogether. 
Douglas Lackey suggests a simple fourfold division of pacifisms: The universal 
pacifist opposed to all killing, the universal pacifist opposed to all violence, the private 
pacifist opposed to personal self-defense but not opposed to state violence, and the 
antiwarist pacifist that opposes warfare but not personal self-defense (Lackey, 530).  
While Lackey’s inclusion of private pacifism is an improvement on previous systems, 
Lackey’s typology still does not allow for vocational forms of pacifism.33  Lackey also 
fails to distribute views about war and state violence across his categories consistently 
(since there are forms of state violence other than warfare) and strangely singles out 
the issue of self-defense despite there being other kinds of violence germane to 
pacifism such as violence committed in defense of third parties under attack.34 
Part of the flaw in all these typologies is the messiness of pacifism as such.  So 
far as I can tell, no typology will be utterly immune from this difficulty.  But I believe 
the previous attempts can be improved upon.  The most helpful starting point for 
organizing pacifisms comes, interestingly, from a staunch opponent of pacifism, Jan 
Narveson, who clarifies the issue of pacifism with two basic questions: how much 




 For example, Eastern Orthodox clergy are forbidden from warfare or killing in a way that the 
laity are not (Webster, 165ff).  Jain and Buddhist monks are also forbidden from military service and are 
not even allowed to be present on a battle field (Brock 1998, 1).  Other forms of pacifism are vocational 
or “two-tiered” (Brock 2000, 55). 
34
 Andrew Fiala seems to provide a careful typology of pacifism, but appears to add to and even 
change the criteria of categories throughout his analysis (Fiala 2014a).   
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violence should be opposed and who should be subject to this opposition (Narveson 
1965, 259-260)?  I believe these two criteria are all that are needed to create a simple 
yet accurate conceptual map of the views known as “pacifism.”   
The first criterion Narveson phrases in a strictly quantitative way (“how 
much?”), but I believe it should be phrased to include a qualitative distinction between 
types of violence: To how many types of violence does the moral opposition apply? 35  
Some pacifists morally oppose all types of violence; some morally oppose some types 
of violence.  The second criterion concerns the scope of persons who ought to refrain 
from violence: To whom does the moral opposition to (all or some) violence apply?  
Some pacifists hold that pacifism applies to everyone; some hold that pacifism applies 
to some.  From these two criteria come four types of pacifism: 
 




 The strictly quantitative formulation allows for the strange idea that a pacifist might be 
opposed to killing twelve people but not eleven or other arbitrary differences. 
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 One apparent weakness in my typology is that its categories do not exclude 
non-pacifist positions.  Nearly anyone falls in the non-universal, non-absolutist 
category, morally opposing some people committing some types of violence.  This will 
likely be a feature of any typology that attempts to be inclusive of all pacifist positions 
due to the broad use of the term.  My typology is not meant to test whether a given 
view is pacifist or non-pacifist; rather, it is intended to categorize a view given that it is 
pacifist.  Further, the inclusivity of my typology is a strength because it does not unduly 
exclude legitimately pacifist views, and it allows for a diverse set of doctrines to be 
simply and clearly categorized.  Another strength of my typology is that it does not 
specify the nature of the moral opposition to violence and therefore allows for a 
variety of normative ethical views that may underpin pacifism. 
 Universal absolutist pacifism would include such views as Leo Tolstoy’s.  Tolstoy 
advocates “non-resistance” which entails that no one’s evil actions should be resisted 
by coercion; this includes not only interpersonal relations but also all state institutions, 
since, as Tolstoy argues, the state is little more than a convoluted mechanism for 
committing violence (Tolstoy 1902, 47).  Many other forms of non-resistance such as 
that advocated by Adin Ballou, The New England Nonresistance Society, and many 
Mennonites also constitute forms of universal absolutist pacifism.36  Gandhi’s 




 See Ballou 2006 and The New England Nonresistance Society 1838.  Mennonites are 
somewhat difficult to categorize due to vague language in their confessions.  For example, all violence is 
spoken of as bad but state violence is spoken of as acceptable in some sense “outside the perfection of 
Christ” (Sattler 1527).  This might mean that Mennonite pacifism is a two-tier system where only some 
parties ought to refrain from violence, or it might mean that Mennonites have a nuanced view of 
normative value that is agent sensitive; consider, for example, Hershberger’s distinction in “levels” and 
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nonviolence likely fits in this category too.  His ahimsa [“nonviolence”] principle is 
meant to be absolute and apply to everyone despite his admission that some violence 
is necessary for life and unavoidable (Gandhi 2013, 443-444), and he admits that some 
people will be unable to practice ahimsa and therefore should choose violence as a 
second-best option (Gandhi 1948, 148). 
 Non-universal absolutist pacifism would include two-tiered systems of pacifism 
such as that of Eastern Orthodox clergy (Webster, 165ff)37 and Buddhist monastics 
(Brock 1998, 1) who are subject to a stricter ethical standard than the laity.  Personal 
pacifists such as Craig Ihara and Eric Reitan may be appropriately called non-universal 
absolutists; both posit a life of nonviolence as a moral ideal which only some persons 
might be duty bound to live.38  Some Quakers may be non-universal absolutist pacifists 
in virtue of opposing interpersonal violence and warfare but allowing for the exception 
of the “magistrate’s protection of the innocent”—i.e., the basic police and judicial 
function of the state (Penington 1863; Teichman 1986, 31). 
 Universal Non-absolutist pacifists would include strictly antiwarist pacifists who 
hold that no one ought to engage in warfare but allow violence in personal self-
defense or for defending third parties under attack.  The term also describes what 
Lackey refers to as “private pacifism”—the view that state violence is acceptable but 
                                                                                                                                               
use of the term “sub-Christian world” to describe the acceptability of state violence (Hershberger, 27, 
253).   
37
 The Orthodox case is somewhat tricky because the “upper” tier of the two-tiered system is 
intended to be a vocation by which one models adherence to the same ethical standard to which all 
Orthodox Christians are called (Webster, 180).  
38
 See Ihara 1978; Ihara 1988; Reitan 2000. 
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violence used in personal self-defense is not, which, according to Peter Brock, is the 
view of Martin Luther and Reinhold Niebuhr (Brock 1998, 3-4). 
 Non-universal Non-absolutist pacifism describes views such as just war 
pacifism—the view according to which “due to the stringent requirements of just war 
theory, only very rarely will participation in a massive use of lethal force in warfare be 
morally justified” (Sterba, 35-36).  Also among these views are what Cady calls 
“technological pacifism” and “ecological pacifism”—views according to which, while 
war may have been justifiable in the past, war is no longer justifiable due to the nature 
of modern weaponry and the kind or amount of damage it causes (Cady 2010, 70ff).   
  
1.4 Toward a Pacifism of Interpersonal Violence 
In what follows, I aim to develop and defend a version of pacifism the focus of 
which is interpersonal violence.  Strictly speaking, it is a universal absolutist pacifism—
a moral opposition to any persons committing any violence.  However, the pacifism I 
aim to develop is consistent with the fact that many persons who commit violence are 
neither blameworthy nor in breach of moral duty, and it is consistent with such claims 
as “there are persons who ought to commit violence.”    These puzzling features of my 
pacifism result from the complexities and nuances that permeate moral judgments—
complexities and nuances which, as I will argue, many ethical theorists fail to 
acknowledge.  In Chapter 2, I will argue that there are distinct forms of value 
judgments which permeate our moral language and are not reducible to one another.  
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I will argue that some kinds of moral judgments operate in ways analogous to 
biological health.  This analogy is advantageous because anyone in agreement with 
these analogues need not agree with my view of normative ethics to agree with the 
theses which constitute my version of pacifism.  In Chapter 3, based on the health 
analogy, I will present and defend the four theses that constitute my pacifist view.  In 
Chapter 4, I will consider seven common objections to pacifism and argue that all 





Chapter 2: Deweyan Normativity and Morality as Analogous to Health 
 In this chapter, I will summarize John Dewey’s work in his essay “Three 
Independent Factors in Morals.”  I will adapt Dewey’s position to argue that morality 
and moral language are not conceptually unitary or univocal; rather, there are three 
distinct conceptions of moral value that are not reducible to one another.  I will argue 
that moral claims can correspond to a sole conception and do not necessarily entail 
moral claims based on the other conceptions.  I will present a model for morality 
based on only one conception; however, I do not aim to spell out the precise goods 
and principles of such a morality.  I will instead present ten claims about biological 
health and argue that morality is analogous to health in at least these ten ways and 
present advantages to this model.  If it is plausible to conceive of morality according to 
the claims I present, then (in the next chapter), I will advance a version of pacifism 
based on the health analogy. 
 
2.1 Dewey’s Three Independent Factors in Morals 
 According to John Dewey, there are three independent factors in morals.  Each 
factor has a sound basis, the factors are not reducible to each other, and the factors 
are not reducible to a single commensurable principle.  These three factors are present 
in most if not all moral situations, and they are the source of moral conflict.  
Conventional moral theories typically err in that they presuppose that all morality can 
be reduced to only one of these factors (Dewey 1966, 199).  
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 Dewey identifies the three factors as the good, the right, and the virtuous.  By 
claiming that each has a sound basis, Dewey means that each factor originates from 
concrete experience.  The good arises in the appetites and desires of human beings.  
Human beings seek out certain ends, and by use of reason they determine the greatest 
means of fulfilling their appetites and desires.  People come to recognize which 
appetites and desires are most important.  Highly-ranked appetites and desires 
become values, and eventually, whatever can be described as the common thread 
between them becomes “the good.”   They are ends that ought to be sought because 
the achievement of those ends is highly valuable for the achiever relative to competing 
ends (Dewey 1966, 201).  
 The right originates differently.  When a person aims to fulfill her appetites and 
desires, she naturally (perhaps subconsciously) tries to bend others to cooperate in her 
“plan of life” in an attempt to achieve her ends (Dewey 1966, 201).  Her attempts to 
enlist others into her end-seeking will not necessarily be met with resistance.  
Cooperating in her plan of life will sometimes help others achieve their own ends.  
Eventually, people make demands on each other to the extent that those on whom the 
demands are made do not rebel, but recognize a certain set of demands as legitimate.  
From the perspective of the demander, these demands are rights; from the 
perspective of those expected to comply, the demands are duties.  This system of 
legitimate demands is the factor Dewey calls “the right.” 
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 Many philosophers acknowledge the good and the right and that there is a 
distinction between them (though some find the legitimacy of this distinction 
debatable), but Dewey argues that there is a third distinct factor in morals: the 
virtuous (Dewey 1966, 203).1  The virtuous refers to reactive attitudes persons 
manifest in response to the actions, thoughts, attitudes, or characters of others.  “We 
praise or blame the conduct of other people; we approve or disapprove, encourage or 
condemn, reward or punish” (Dewey 1966, 203).  Dewey is not referring to “virtue” in 
the sense of a disposition toward certain behaviors, attitudes, or emotions.  Dewey’s 
use of “virtuous” focuses not on the person who engages in certain behaviors or 
manifests certain attitudes, but the reactions of others to certain behaviors or 
attitudes.  For Dewey, then, “virtue” is that which elicits a positive reactive attitude in 
others, and “vice” is that which elicits a negative reactive attitude in others.  According 
to Dewey, these reactive attitudes are spontaneous, instinctive, and natural (Dewey 
1966, 203).  
 Why think that the three factors are independent?  Is it not the case that the 
right, as described by Dewey, is just a function of the good?  The demands made on 
each other are simply a means of achieving one’s personal ends; the only difference is 
that instead of considering the ends of one person, the ends of all persons in the group 
are being considered.  Dewey responds that this objection equivocates on the use of 
“good” and “end.”   








There is a difference in nature both in origin and in mode of operation, 
between an object which seems capable of satisfying desire and which 
is thereby a good, and an object which sets up a demand on our 
conduct which we must acknowledge. (Dewey 1966, 203)  
The demands a person makes on others do not acquire any moral weight 
merely in virtue of being means for that person’s ends.  Even if a certain demand on 
others would aid in a person’s achieving some good, it does not thereby and on that 
basis alone become a right.  As a mere demand, “it expresses power rather than right.  
To be right, it must be an acknowledged claim, having not the mere power of the 
claimant behind it, but the emotional and intellectual assent of the community” 
(Dewey 1930, 318).  Since demands that are functions of the good are not necessarily 
rights, the right is not a mere derivative of the good; the good and the right are 
independent. 
What about the virtuous?  Is it not merely a function of the good?   Perhaps 
people deliberate on the appropriate reactive attitudes to manifest and elicit in others 
as a means of achieving their desired ends.  Dewey rejects this possibility as well.  The 
reactive attitudes in question are so spontaneous and instinctive that they have 
nothing to do with the satisfaction of desires or appetites, nor with requirements 
toward others.  The reactive attitudes that for Dewey constitute “the virtuous” lack 
both the element of deliberation on means to achieve ends characteristic of the good 
and the element of social constraint characteristic of the right (Dewey 1930, 319).  
Because the good, the right, and the virtuous all have independent origins and 
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different modes of operations, they are not reducible to each other nor is there some 
natural hierarchy between them.   
 For Dewey, most normative moral theories fail to acknowledge the 
independence and respective sound bases of these three factors—that they are all 
irreducible features found intertwined within moral situations (Pappas, 459).  For 
Dewey, the moral life consists in navigating these three factors and in judging the 
situational importance of each.  Because of this complexity, the moral life is naturally 
fraught with conflict and tension. What is good from the viewpoint of desire is bad 
from the viewpoint of social requirements; what is bad from a personal point of view 
may be warmly recommended by public opinion.  Each conflict is real and sharp; the 
moral agent must attempt to reconcile opposing facts (Dewey 1966, 204).  
If Dewey is right, conventional moral theories fail because they explain such 
conflict as merely specious or apparent.  There is no genuine uncertainty in moral 
situations; people have simply made errors in judgment.  For theories sourced in the 
good, if something is good, then the right is simply a means to achieving the good.  If 
someone claims that something is right where that claim conflicts with achieving the 
good, that person is simply mistaken.  If something is bad, the virtuous is simply a 
matter of having some negative reactive attitude toward it.  If people have positive 
reactive attitudes toward something that is bad, then people are simply mistaken.  
Dewey rejects this as gross oversimplification; such assessments result from 
attachment to some unitary concept, and not from acknowledging moral situations as 
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they are.  “The result is an abyss between the involved realities of practice and the 
abstract forms of the system” (Dewey 1966, 204). 
For Dewey, there can be genuine conflict between the right and the virtuous, 
the right and the good, or the good and the virtuous.  Moral agents in real moral 
situations often find themselves forced to choose between complying with duty and 
achieving the good, between doing what is praiseworthy and doing what duty 
demands, or between achieving good and avoiding blame, etc.  And in this way, 
conventional moral theories “run counter to every empirical observation of fact” 
(Dewey 1966, 199).2 
 
2.2 Three Distinct Conceptions of Moral Normativity 
 Dewey aims to identify distinct moral stuffs extant in concrete situations and to 
explain the development and origins of those stuffs.  My aim is theoretical—to 




 For example, Dewey mentions the consumption of alcohol, under U. S. Prohibition, was a 
practice “officially and legally forbidden” yet was “the object of tolerance or of encouragement” (Dewey 
1966, 204).  It is tempting to resolve this conflict by claiming either that the U.S. legal code is in error 
and that prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages is not a legitimate demand that U.S. citizens 
can make of each other or that the prohibition is legitimate and thus the appropriate reactive attitude is 
one of disapproval.  Dewey’s point is that such resolution strategies evince that normative theorists are 
not so concerned with making concrete choices in concrete scenarios as much as with neat and tidy 
theories.  In fact, the law resulted from genuine social problems stemming from alcohol abuse in the 
nineteenth century (Von Drehle 2010; Rorabaugh 1981); that is, people found themselves illegitimately 
hindered from pursuing personal goods on account of alcohol consumption on the part of others.  Yet it 
was clear to many that not all alcohol consumption constitutes abuse and therefore does not seem 
equally worthy of scorn or reproach.  (Interestingly, many early temperance movements were not 
teetotaler movements.  See Temperance Movement 2003.)  For Dewey, the concrete situation some 
Prohibition-era Americans faced contained moral conflict that was not merely apparent. 
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distinguish ways in which morality is systematically envisaged.3  Dewey’s three 
independent factors are helpful because I believe each corresponds to a distinct way in 
which the function and application of moral value can be and is conceived.  Similar to 
Dewey’s claims, I claim that each conception has a sound basis, the three conceptions 
are not reducible to each other, and each can operate independently.  In what follows, 
I will present the three distinct conceptions, I will argue for their distinctness, I will 
briefly present some important differences between Dewey’s view and my own, I will 
present some advantages to this view, and I will conclude by connecting this view to 
my pacifist project. 
 By “conceptions” of morality, I mean distinct systematic applications of 
normativity all of which are moral in nature, distinct bases on which to form moral 
judgments, and distinct interpretations of moral claims.  By claiming that each 
conception has a sound basis, I mean that each is useful for analyzing moral facets of 
situations in ways the other two are not.  By claiming that they are not reducible to 
each other, I mean that the difference between the conceptions is not merely linguistic 
or descriptive.  By claiming that each can operate independently of the others, I mean 
that judgments formed on the basis of one conception are neither equivalent to nor do 




 Christine Tappolet and Alan Voizard offer an interesting taxonomy of philosophical endeavors 
related to normativity.  Hoping to “clear up” a lot of messy discussions, they offer five categories: (a) 
normative ontology (the relation between normativity and science, mental states, and social 
conventions), (b) normative semantics (the meaning and function of normative statements), (c) 
normative epistemology (whether and how we can know normative facts), (d) normative psychology 
(the intersection of normativity and psychology), and (e) substantive normative theory (determining 
what duties, values, or virtues there are).  I take my project here to be primarily one of normative 
semantics, though, as the authors admit, these divisions are not mutually exclusive and are likely 
mutually informative (Tappolet & Voizard, 235). 
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they necessarily entail judgments based on the other two conceptions.  These three 
claims constitute what I will call the “robust distinctness” of the three conceptions. 
 The conception to which Dewey’s “the good” corresponds I will refer to as the 
evaluative conception of morality (“ECM”).  ECM envisages morality as value 
maximization or disvalue minimization.  There is a good, there are means to bring 
about or increase that good, and a variety of things can be evaluated in relation to that 
good.  Some things may be intrinsically valuable inasmuch as they partly or wholly 
constitute some good, some things may be instrumentally valuable inasmuch as they 
are conducive to bringing about some good, and some things may be indicatively 
valuable inasmuch as they correlate with some good.  Emotions, attitudes, persons, 
states of affairs, institutions, dispositions—all of these (and more) may be the proper 
objects of ECM analysis and comparison.   
 The conception of morality to which the right corresponds I will refer to as the 
deontological conception of morality (“DCM”).   DCM envisages morality as legal or 
juridical in character.  There are rules, guidelines, or principles to which persons are 
amenable, and those rules divide the proper objects of DCM-evaluation into simple 
categories: obligatory (a person violates a rule to which she is amenable if she fails to 
x), permissible (a person does not violate a rule to which she is amenable whether she 
x-es or fails to x), or prohibited (a person violates a rule to which she is amenable if she 
x-es ).4  Typically, the appropriate objects of DCM-evaluation are actions, though 




  Perhaps there are other categories of evaluation within DCM, for example, “supererogatory” 
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arguably, other things like attitudes, dispositions, or even emotions might be treated 
as obligatory, permissible, or prohibited.   
  The conception of morality that corresponds to the virtuous I will refer to as 
the hypological conception of morality (“HCM”).5  HCM envisages morality as a matter 
of coupling objects with appropriate reactive attitudes.  There are a host of positive 
and negative reactive attitudes that seem moral in nature.  Positive reactive attitudes 
may include praise, admiration, esteem, approval, adoration, compassion, sympathy, 
and attraction.  Negative reactive attitudes may include disapproval, blame, contempt, 
horror, disgust, hatred, and aversion.  Perhaps there is a “middle” set of reactive 
attitudes such as indifference, mildness, and tolerance.  A variety of things might be 
the proper objects of evaluation for HCM.  Actions, practices, emotions, persons, and 
even states of affairs might evoke disgust, horror, hatred, compassion, adoration, or 
attraction.  
 So far I have only posited that there are three distinct conceptions of morality.  
But why think they are distinct rather than mere redescriptions of the same 
phenomena?  Why not think that there is a unitary, correct conception of moral value 
and one or more of these I have posited are simply misconceptions in need of 
                                                                                                                                               
or even “gratuitous” and “optional” (See McNamara 2006).  I think, though, that Dewey has already 
hinted at the explanation for why moral theorists introduce categories such as supererogatory—moral 
theories often conflate what are, in fact, independent factors in morals, and “supererogatory” is likely 
an attempt to explain solely in terms of DCM what properly belongs to a different conception of 
morality. 
5
  I borrow this term from Michael Zimmerman who says that judgments are hypological when 
they are an evaluation of the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of agents (Zimmerman, 554). I use 
the term more broadly to include other possible reactive attitudes.   
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reformulation or elimination?  There are at least four reasons to accept the robust 
distinctiveness of ECM, DCM, and HCM. 
 First, moral judgments corresponding to each conception can be made of the 
same scenario where any two judgments are neither reducible to nor mere 
redescriptions of the third.  Suppose Smith, Jones, and Williams are strolling through a 
park.  At some point during each person’s walk, each notices the same piece of litter 
on the ground.  Each person upon seeing the litter imagines the person who littered 
and judges that the litterer has done something immoral. 
 Smith thinks: “Some people just won’t follow the rules.  That person has a 
moral obligation to keep this park clean, but she littered anyway.  The litterer should 
be penalized or made to come back here and pick up this trash herself.” 
 Jones thinks: “Some people are disgusting—carelessly mucking up communal 
space so the rest of us have to live with their filth.  Shame on you, whoever you are, 
for having no sense of responsibility or reverence or pride in your community!” 
 Williams thinks: “Things sure would be healthier and prettier around here if 
this person hadn’t littered.  Too bad the litterer didn’t care about health and beauty 
enough to make a little more effort and not waste an opportunity to keep things 
great.” 
 Smith’s moral judgment is deontological, Jones’s is hypological, and Williams’s 
is evaluative.  Notice, no person’s judgment commits her to agreeing with the 
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judgment of the other two.  Smith might maintain that the litterer has done something 
immoral merely in virtue of having failed to keep a moral obligation; Smith may not 
think that any negative reactive attitude toward the litterer is appropriate or that 
anyone needs to take opportunities to maximize health and beauty.  For Smith, issuing 
moral judgments is like being traffic court judge—hear a case, assess whether a rule 
was broken, look up the appropriate penalty or demerits, and issue a sentence.  Jones 
might maintain that the litterer is worthy of scorn yet not think that there is a moral 
obligation not to litter or that anyone needs to take opportunities to maximize health 
and beauty.  For Jones, moral judgments are a matter of recognizing when others 
constrain (or fail to constrain) their behavior in accordance with the appropriate gut 
reactions of others.  Williams might maintain that the litterer wasted an opportunity to 
do good while disagreeing that there is any moral obligation not to litter or that the 
litterer is worthy of scorn.  For Williams, moral judgments are looking at ways in which 
goods have been maximized or minimized.  The fact that the three parties could 
disagree with the explication of the others’ judgments shows that their judgments are 
neither reducible to each other nor mutually entailing; yet each party’s particular 
judgment is constitutive of her judgment that the litterer did something immoral. 
 The second reason to accept the robust distinctiveness of ECM, HCM, and DCM 
is that moral discourse is permeated with moral judgments and moral language that 
correspond to one conception but not the other two.  Many authors treat moral uses 
of the term “ought” as inextricably linked to obligations or prohibitions; so, examples 
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of deontological moral judgments and uses of moral language need not be advanced.6  
At issue, then, is whether there are moral judgments and uses of moral language that 
are not deontological but strictly evaluative or hypological in nature.  There are. 
 Consider first some examples of strictly evaluative judgments and language.  
Moral judgments such as “Things ought not to be this way,” “It would be better if 
children never suffered,” and “The Holocaust should never have happened” are 
evaluative.  All three are moral judgments about states of affairs.  To say such states of 
affairs “ought not to be the case” does not necessarily entail a moral obligation on 
anyone’s part and therefore these judgments are not deontological.7  Such judgments 
might express a reactive attitude, but they need not; the straightforward 
interpretation is that the situation instantiates a certain moral disvalue, and it would 
be morally better if it instantiated less of that disvalue.  Thus, such judgments are 
evaluative.  
  Quite some time ago, a vandal spray-painted graffiti on my neighbor’s retaining 
wall; last I checked the graffiti was still there.  It occurred to me that “someone really 




 As Rosalind Hursthouse notes, terms like “right” and “wrong” are naturally associated with 
the deontological categories of obligation, permission, and prohibition (Hursthouse 1995, 630).  Bernard 
Williams appears to take for granted that a conflict between two moral judgments can only mean a 
“conflict of obligations” (B. Williams 1965, 108).  Even when acknowledging that certain values can 
conflict, Williams cashes this out solely in terms of the obligations generated by those values (B. 
Williams 1981).  Andrew Moore’s incompleteness and inconsistency objections against several non-
deontological moral theories seem to be riddled with the assumption that moral theory and moral 
language can only be understood deontologically (Moore 2007).  See also Beirlaen, 49-50. 
7
 For one thing, these might be states of affairs about which no one can do anything.  If one 
accepts the principle that “ought” in the moral sense implies “can” (a principle that, in my view, should 
be discarded altogether, but which many philosophers accept nonetheless), then such judgments do not 
entail obligations for anyone.  But this does not entail that they are not moral judgments.  Thus, some 
philosophers, such as Ralph Wedgwood, are mistaken when they assume that “oughts” which violate 
the ought-implies-can principle must be non-moral (Wedgwood 2009, 504). 
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ought to do something about that graffiti.”  I take that to be a moral judgment, but it is 
not clear to me that my neighbor has a moral obligation to remove the graffiti; and 
neither is it obvious that the vandal does (the vandal may now be deceased).  If I am 
correct, the original judgment does not entail that anyone specific has a moral 
obligation and is therefore not deontological, though it is a moral judgment.  Many 
cities specify the amount of time a resident may leave trashcans curbside before and 
after municipal waste collection.  Underlying such a law may be the moral judgment 
that beauty is a value and ought not to be minimized; but it seems bizarre to say 
persons are morally prohibited from placing trashcans curbside at 11:59am the day 
prior to collection as opposed to noon, and such a moral prohibition is the basis of the 
law.  Lastly, consider the judgment that persons ought to have certain traits like 
kindness or generosity.  It does not follow from this that persons necessarily have an 
obligation to be kind or generous (especially considering it is possible to be more or 
less kind and generous, and thus arbitrary precisely what amount of kindness or 
generosity a person is obligated to be). 
 Consider also cases of strictly hypological moral judgments.  In describing the 
spontaneity and non-deliberative nature of the virtuous, Dewey foresaw what 
psychologists have come to call “moral dumbfounding” in which subjects give moral 
judgments for which they cannot supply any supporting reasons (Haidt 2001, 817).  In 
many cases, even when reasons were supplied, they were formulated in a post hoc 
fashion (Haidt 2001, 822).  Subjects’ moral judgments were found to be affect-driven 
especially when presented with cases of wrongdoing that were isolated from issues of 
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harm (Haidt et al 1993).  Such moral judgments appear “suddenly and effortlessly in 
consciousness, with an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feeling of 
having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” 
(Greene & Haidt, 517). 
  Two noteworthy cases are incest and flag desecration.  Subjects were asked to 
respond to a one-time, consensual, incestuous encounter between adult siblings that 
could not result in a pregnancy; the majority of subjects condemned the act, but could 
not elaborate beyond “I don’t know, I can’t explain it.  I just know it’s wrong” (Haidt 
2001, 814).  As Jonathan Haidt and Matthew Hersh note, in most of the United States, 
incest is a felony even between consenting adults and step-relatives or adoptive 
relatives (Haidt & Hersh, 192).  The motivation for such statutes and for the subjects’ 
condemnation is based primarily (if not solely) in reactive attitudes and is therefore 
hypological.   
Condemnation of flag desecration is not as widespread but still prevalent.  My 
high school classmate was arrested outside a convenience store for using an American 
flag to wipe oil off his car’s dipstick.8  Why condemn someone for mundane use of 
what is apparently nothing but a certain pattern of colored fabrics?  In my classmate’s 
case, his actions deeply offended witnesses for whom the object is not mere fabric.  
But what if no one else saw?  When asked to assess a woman who found an old flag in 
her closet, no longer wanted it, cut the flag into pieces, and used the pieces as rags to 




 For media coverage of the event, see Brus & Beckloff 1995. 
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clean her bathroom (including the toilet), even among subjects who judged the 
incident to be harmless, a significant number still judged that she should be “stopped 
or punished” (Haidt et. al, 617ff). 
 Dan Kahan analyzes a particularly interesting case (Kahan, 66ff).  In August 
1988, Dennis Beldotti murdered Eugenia Haratsis, his female employee.  After 
murdering her, Beldotti sexually mutilated and took nude photographs of her body.  
Beldotti then stuffed the body into trash bags and called the police claiming to have 
found the body in this condition.  After being convicted and sentenced to life in prison 
without parole, Beldotti asked the Massachusetts court to surrender some of his 
possessions used as evidence in the trial to his representatives outside prison.  The 
items included sex toys, bondage paraphernalia, several torture-themed pornographic 
videos, and one plastic-encased photo of the victim.  The Massachusetts court denied 
Beldotti’s request.  The state attorney argued that the only place the items belonged 
was in the trash; the court agreed, saying that the items offended the most basic 
concepts of decency.9  
 Kahan argues (correctly I think) that the only basis for this judgment is moral 
emotion—namely disgust (Kahan, 67).  Given Beldotti’s life imprisonment and his 
request that the items be surrendered not to himself but to his representatives, 
consequential or duty-based rationales are insufficient bases for denying his request, 
and therefore deontological and evaluative judgments do not seem applicable.  Kahan 




 See Beldotti v. Commonwealth, 669 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996). 
41 
 
notes one exception.  The court stated that returning the items would be so offensive 
to basic decency that it would undermine public confidence in the justice system.  
Undermining public confidence is certainly a consequential concern (and therefore, 
perhaps, evaluative).  But why would public confidence be undermined?  Kahan argues 
that some of our moral judgments based on moral emotions are reactions to others’ 
failure to exhibit certain moral emotions.  (We are horrified by the fact that others are 
not horrified.)  Thus, the consequential judgment about public confidence only makes 
sense if returning the items warrants a certain negative reactive attitude and failing to 
have that negative reactive attitude also warrants a certain negative reactive attitude.  
In this case, even the evaluative judgment presupposes that the hypological judgments 
are more basic. 
 According to Kahan, moral emotions such as disgust are independent factors in 
appropriate civic condemnations of acts such as rape, child abuse, and torture (Kahan, 
64).  It is not enough to say that these acts are breaches of duty or harmful, it must 
additionally be said that they are outrageous and disgusting (Kahan, 65).  Similarly, Joel 
Feinberg argues that there are cases of “harmless wrongdoing” which present 
difficulties for systems of law based strictly on harm prevention (i.e. that all legal 
obligations stem from certain disvalue minimization); condemnations of indecency or 
obscenity may be difficult to justify on strictly deontological or evaluative grounds, yet 
nearly everyone thinks some indecent or obscene things should be restricted or 
prohibited (Feinberg 1973, 41).  I am by no means trying to conflate the law with 
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morality; the point is that some laws have bases in moral judgments, and some of 
those moral judgments are strictly (or at least primarily) hypological.10 
 The third reason to accept the robust distinctness of the three conceptions is 
that moral judgments can conflict.  By “conflict,” I mean that three conceptions allow 
for three different senses in which any given objection of moral evaluation can be 
morally “positive” or morally “negative.” Thus, judgments across conceptions can be 
said to match or mismatch; the same object may be correctly assessed positively on all 
three conceptions, or positively and negatively on different conceptions.  Recall the 
case of the litterer.  Perhaps the litterer did breach a moral obligation, but if she 
littered as an act of defiance toward some deeply corrupt local politician who had 
acquired a great deal of social capital by feigning concern over clean streets, her act 
may warrant praise (deontologically negative yet hypologically positive).   In virtue of 
national loyalties or contractual agreements, a state agent may be obligated to 
perform actions on behalf of the state which are negative-reactive-attitude worthy.  
Suppose a man, Rupert, had been present in the Whitechapel district of London in 
1888.  Suppose that Rupert by chance encountered Jack the Ripper during which time 
Jack was rather rude to Rupert.  Rupert, being an irascible thug, broke a leg off a chair 
and bludgeoned Jack to death.  Police later determined that Rupert’s victim is, in fact, 
Jack the Ripper (the serial killer for whom they have been searching).  Arguably, there 




 As James Gilligan points out, there are cultures the moral codes of which seem entirely 
hypological, or, to use Gilligan’s term, a “pure shame culture” (Gilligan 1975, 146).  The rules or laws of 
such cultures are codifications of how to secure the positive reactive attitudes and avoid negative 
reactive attitudes of others. 
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is a sense in which “Rupert ought to have murdered Jack the Ripper” is true and a 
sense in which “Rupert ought not to have murdered Jack the Ripper” is true given that 
each corresponds to a different conception.  
 Lastly, the fact that many normative ethical theories have been formulated 
primarily or solely on each of the three conceptions is some evidence for the veracity 
of each.  Kant construes all morality as a system of obligations, prohibitions, and 
permissions sourced in human reason; while he includes goodness (the good will) and 
one reactive attitude (reverence) in his system, these are mere functions of reason or 
byproducts of deontology.11  Some divine command theorists likewise construe 
morality as primarily deontological though sourced in God’s commands.12  Some 
contractarians argue that morality is a set of obligations generated by “mutually 
advantageous moral agreements” (Gauthier, 168); others argue that the obligations 
are generated by persons’ indebtedness to justify their actions to one another.13   Even 
Nietzsche argued that creditor-debtor relationships underpin our notions of morality 
as rule-keeping and the guilt associated with breaking those rules.14 
 Others disagree.  Utilitarians argue that morality is fundamentally a matter of 
value maximization—primarily pleasure.  While utilitarians recognize a system of 
obligations, that system is a mere function of more basic moral judgments that are 




 “Good will” seems to be Kant’s one evaluative concept (Kant, 393).  And reverence seems to 
be Kant’s one moral reactive attitude (Kant, 400-401). 
12
 For example, see Adams 1999. 
13
 See Scanlon 1998. 
14
 See sections 4, 5, and 6 of the second essay in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals 
(Kaufman & Hollingdale 1969). 
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essentially evaluative.  Aristotle’s ethics is similarly evaluative though Aristotle’s basic 
value maximization (human flourishing) generates a set of virtues humans ought to 
acquire rather than a set of obligations.15  Some forms of Buddhist ethics seem entirely 
evaluative, aimed solely at minimization of suffering and not having moral rules per se 
but sets of experience-tested suggested means for achieving that end (Velasquez, 
492). 
 Then there are normative systems that are hypological.  According to the 
ancient Confucian philosopher Mencius, human beings have natural moral “sprouts”—
natural moral inclinations toward certain reactions to certain stimuli.  Mencius’s 
famous example is that of hearing the cries of a child trapped in a well.  According to 
Mencius, an otherwise immoral person will still feel an initial flicker of compassion 
(Mencius, 2A6).  For Mencius, morality is a matter of cultivating and being guided by 
these “sprouts.”  Adam Smith argues that moral rules and virtues are ultimately 
sourced in the human sentiment of sympathy.16  Similarly, David Hume claims morality 
is sourced in human sentiments, primarily the approval and disapproval that humans 
naturally exhibit toward similar objects (Hume, 2.1.7.3).  Similarly to Hume and Smith, 
Patricia Churchland argues that morality is fundamentally a matter of sentiments and 
attitudes, which are more basic than any set of moral rules (Churchland, 163).  Overall, 




 As Hursthouse describes it, “virtue ethics takes certain areteic concepts (good [well], virtue) 
as basic rather than deontic ones (right, duty, obligation)” (Hursthouse 2001, 69). 
16
 See Fleischacker 2015 & Smith 1790. 
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“from a biological point of view, basic emotions are Mother Nature’s way of orienting 
us to do what we prudentially ought” (Churchland, 175).17   
 Clearly ethicists disagree about the most basic nature of morality.  I suspect any 
normative system could be categorized according to these three conceptions.  The fact 
that so many examples can be found for each conception suggests that each 
conception is indispensable to moral life.  The above four reasons are enough, I think, 
to support the view that the three conceptions are robustly distinct. 
  At this point, several important differences between Dewey’s position and 
mine are noteworthy.  First, Dewey’s moral factors are present in moral situations as a 
matter of fact.  For Dewey, there is little concern about whether others’ moral 
judgments are mistaken.  People simply have reactive attitudes, and I as a moral agent 
have to navigate the moral situation as it is.  My position concerns conceptions and 
judgments both of which can be mistaken.  People might make certain deontological, 
evaluative, or hypological judgments, but those judgments can be false.  Second, 
Dewey claims the moral life involves judging the factors’ situational hierarchy; for 
Dewey, then, no factor takes a priori primacy over the other two.  I, however, do not 
deny that one conception might take primacy over the others a priori.  Third, Dewey 
claims his three factors have independent origins.  I have not made this claim for my 
conceptions; on my view, all three conceptions may share an ultimate source (even if 




 Some psychologists argue that many reactive attitudes arise from danger or contamination 
avoidance mechanisms, but that such attitudes are eventually “moralized” and become the basis for 
many moral judgments (Rozin et all, 67). 
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they do not share an immediate source).  Further, my independence claim is not as 
pervasive as Dewey’s.  Correct judgments on one conception may be (at least in part) 
entailed or determined by correct judgments on other conceptions (we might come to 
know what our obligations are in virtue of knowing what value ought to be 
maximized); all I have argued is that this is not necessarily true in every case.  Lastly, 
Dewey argues that normative theories are guilty of moral oversimplification.  I have an 
analogous concern.  Normative theories tend either to treat one or more of the 
conceptions as simply mistaken attempts to get at the correct conception or as mere 
functions of the conception taken as primary.  I have argued that they err on both 
counts. 
 Accepting the robust distinctness of the three distinctions has advantages.  
First, the three distinctions illuminate some puzzling features of moral dilemmas.  
Some authors explicate moral dilemmas strictly in terms of conflicting obligations (B. 
Williams 1965, 108).18  Bernard Williams argues that many theories fail to account for 
the appropriateness of remorse, guilt, or regret that follows from whatever choice one 
makes when faced with a moral dilemma because those theories attempt to resolve 
dilemmas by identifying only one course of action as right (B. Williams 1965, 113).  
Williams describes that for which other theories fail to account as “moral remainder” 
(B. Williams 1965, 117).19  In cases of moral dilemmas, it seems a mistake to consider 




 Even in criticizing Williams, Philippa Foot does not seem to question Williams’s construal of 
“moral dilemmas” as equivalent to “conflicts of obligations,” but herself seems to construe “ought” only 
in terms of “right action” and then conflates that concept with “best morally speaking” (Foot, 44). 
19
 See also Hursthouse 1995, 619. 
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either decision “right” when regret, remorse, or guilt are appropriate hindsight 
reactions.   
According to Rosalind Hursthouse, much of the debate between utilitarians and 
deontologists concerning moral dilemmas stems partly from equivocating “morally 
right decisions” and “right moral decisions” (Hursthouse 1995, 623).  Even if there is a 
right moral decision to make given the options, it does not follow that either decision 
was morally right.  Hursthouse argues that such decisions are neither right nor wrong, 
but “tragic” (Hursthouse 2001, 72).  Martha Nussbaum also picks up this theme of 
“tragic” choices.  Moral analysis of dilemmas often involves oversimplification because 
only the “obvious” question is addressed: which of the two options ought one to pick?  
But, according to Nussbaum, there is another important question: Is either option 
morally acceptable (Nussbaum, 1006-1007)?  This is the “tragic question” which, 
according to Nussbaum, is indispensable to proper analysis of moral dilemmas. 
Hursthouse, Williams, and Nussbaum are correct in charging other theorists 
with oversimplification.  But none of them explores, normatively speaking, what it 
would take to underpin moral remainder or answers to tragic questions.  Part of the 
underpinning concerns distinct conceptions of moral value; that is, there are different 
kinds of moral judgments that can conflict, and thus, conflicts of obligations may not 
be the only or even the most important kind of moral conflict.  There may not be a 
resolution to any given dilemma that constitutes a match across the different 
conceptions of morality.   As Richard Routley argues, the best thing to do may be in 
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violation of one’s obligations, and this does not mean that one’s obligations are 
eliminated (Routley 1984, 124).20   
 A second advantage is insight into what Richard Routley calls “theory-saving 
devices” (Routley 1984, 124).  Routley criticizes theories that posit “prima facie 
principles” in an attempt to recognize the importance of consequentialist concerns.  
For Routley, such devices are mere ad hoc attempts to rescue a theory from the 
difficulties of moral dilemmas.  I prefer to say that various normative ethical theories 
employ “theory-saving devices” in an attempt to rescue a unitary conception from 
what are in fact competing conceptions of moral value.  As Andrew Fiala argues, 
utilitarians and other consequentialists use elaborate hypothetical scenarios to show 
that “at some point the numbers matter” (Fiala 2014b, 33).  Rather than admit this 
outright, some ethical theorists fabricate “prima facie principles”—principles that 
might be broken in just those cases where the numbers matter.  Likewise, elaborate 
scenarios may be used to show that at some point, duties matter, and interestingly, 
rule utilitarianism may very well be a theory-saving device that suggests many 
consequentialists recognize this.21   
An obvious case of a theory-saving device, I think, is deontologists’ addition of 
“supererogatory” to the action categories of obligatory, permissible, and prohibited—a 




 Despite a more nuanced analysis of Williams’s own “Jim, Pedro, and the natives” scenario 
(which I discuss extensively in Chapter 3), Routley, unfortunately, treats “ought” as a strictly 
deontological term. 
21
 See Hooker 2000.  Also, consider that John Stuart Mill argued for strict, inviolable individual 
rights as the best society ordered according to his own utilitarian principles (Mill & Mathias 2007). 
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term meant to describe actions that go “above and beyond the call of duty.”22  For 
instance, Ralph Wedgwood writes,  
Thus, one might express the fact that an act is supererogatory by saying, 
for example, ‘Ideally, we ought to give more than this, but no one will 
be entitled to blame us if we don't.’ In using the term ‘ought’ to indicate 
that it would be morally better to give more, one may be using it as a 
kind of moral ‘ought’, according to which what one ought to do is 
whatever is (a necessary component of) the morally best thing to do. 
(Wedgwood 2007, 131) 
Wedgwood describes what is best to do and other’s reactive attitudes to one’s failure 
to do the best in an attempt to distinguish some moral acts from those which persons 
are obligated to do.  Rather than forego a unitary conception of normativity, 
Wedgwood hopes to simply give the mysterious blob a name—“supererogatory”—as 
though a fancier deontological term will distract from two other factors present in his 
description that are clearly non-deontological.  Wedgwood is only one 
“supererogatory”-peddler among many.23  And their mistake, as Joel Feinberg puts it, 
is that they uncritically accept that the function of moral value is exhausted by models 
of “jural laws and institutional ‘house rules’” (Feinberg 1961, 276).  Recognizing the 




 Supererogatory is arguably not as tortured a “theory-saving device” as is “Kantian 
consequentialism” (Cummiskey 1990).  Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is likely 
also a theory-saving device. 
23
 To be fair, discussion of “supererogatory” acts began as J. O. Urmson’s attempt to correct 
oversimplification (Urmson 1958).  As many have noted, utilitarians seem guilty of eliminating 
categories such as “saint” or “hero” from moral discourse by means of equating right action with best 
action.  Interestingly, even some utilitarians attempt to employ a theory-saving device in light of this 
objection by splitting the concept of “right action” into two categories: obligatory and “optimific” 
(Attfield, 319).  Sadly, among Urmson’s critics are persons who simply take reducibility (and therefore 
oversimplification) for granted.  For example, Elizabeth Pybus writes in response to Urmson, “I cannot at 
the same time say that something is a moral ideal, and feel that I have no sort of obligation to pursue it” 
(Pybus, 195).  Not every un-ideal thing I do is a breach of duty.  I find it strange that philosophers have 
such trouble entertaining the notion that moral normativity may not be univocal. 
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distinct conceptions of moral value avoids the need to put bandages on the cuts and 
scrapes of moral oversimplification.  
 The most important advantage of the three conceptions is the capacity for 
more careful analysis of moral language and understanding of moral normativity.  
Common uses of moral language can be imprecise and ambiguous, and (as has been 
shown) is often oversimplified in strictly deontological analysis.  Terms like “good,” 
“bad,” “right,” “wrong,” “ought,” and “should” are not just multivocal but morally 
multivocal.  The three conceptions model is an improvement.  ECM, DCM, and HCM 
can be thought of as different evaluation devices—scales that provide specific moral 
measurements for appropriate objects of evaluation.  A scale based on ECM (“E-scale”) 
would be a continuum from top to bottom of maximal instantiation to maximal lack of 
some value.  An ECM-judgment, then, expresses some scale-reading that reflects a 
given object’s intrinsic, instrumental, or indicative relation to some good.  Positive or 
negative moral terms or expressions understood evaluatively entail that the object of 
evaluation is somewhere above or below the midpoint of the E-scale.  
A scale based on DCM (“D-scale”) would not have degrees but categories: 
obligatory, permissible, and prohibited.  A DCM-judgment is a judgment about into 
which of these categories the object of evaluation properly falls.   Positive moral terms 
or expressions understood deontologically likely place the object of evaluation in the 
“obligatory” or perhaps the “permissible” category.  Negative moral terms place 
objects of evaluation in the “prohibited” category.   
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A scale based on HCM (“H-scale”) would be a combination of categories and 
gradations.  The three major categories would be positive-reactive-attitude-worthy, 
“middle”-reactive-attitude-worthy, and negative-reactive-attitude-worthy.  Within the 
major categories, each distinct reactive attitude might be categorically separated from 
the others, but within each reactive attitude would be a continuum measuring the 
intensity of the attitude.  Positive, indifferent, or negative moral terms or expressions 
place the object in the appropriate major category, and a variety of things such as 
language, tone, or body language may indicate the degree of intensity. 
The scale metaphor helps vivify ways in which moral judgments can differ in 
kind and operate independently.  A moral judgment might register on one scale but 
not the others, and an object’s measurement on one scale does not necessarily entail 
measurements on the other two scales.  Further, the scales metaphor illustrates that 
even when moral judgments are expressed imprecisely, there is a fact of the matter 
about precisely where on the relevant scale the object of evaluation falls.   
The scales metaphor also illustrates that moral normativity is not unitary and 
ought-ness is not univocal.  Each conception can generate moral judgments that place 
moral onus on agents to do or to be something.  Straightforwardly, deontological 
normativity obligates (or prohibits).  Hypological and evaluative normativity can both 
govern action by giving persons reasons to act (Tappolet, 17-18).24  The more 




 I have used “can” here to leave open other ways in which evaluative and hypological 
judgments may be normative.  As Tappolet points out, normativity based on reasons to act assumes that 
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significant or abundant the reasons, the greater onus there is on a person to act.  In 
the case of hypological normativity, social cohesion, inclusion, and ostracism may be 
major operators in constraining or guiding a person’s behavior in light of hypological 
judgments.25  Evaluative normativity can more or less encumber someone to act in the 
face of the importance of a given value’s instantiation or a given disvalue’s reduction.  
Notice, both hypological and evaluative normativity differ from deontological 
normativity.  Moral “oughts” and “shoulds” even of the action-guiding variety come in 
at least three flavors.26 
 What has all this got to do with pacifism?  First, moral judgments are isolatable 
by type.  That is, a moral claim might correspond only to one of the three conceptions.  
And thus, the moral claims which constitute a version of pacifism may be of only one 
type.  Second, because moral judgments on one conception do not necessarily entail 
judgments on either of the other two conceptions, a pacifism the claims of which are 
of only one type is not by implication committed to moral judgments of other types.  
Third, because there are different kinds of moral normativity, a version of pacifism 
formulated on the basis of ECM or HCM can be morally action-guiding without 
entailing obligations.  Lastly, objections to pacifism might depend on the moral claims 
being of a certain type.  If a version of pacifism were formulated solely in terms of 
                                                                                                                                               
reason is the central normative concept.  Interestingly, normativity can be explained with ought-ness 
being the most basic normative concept (Tappolet, 14-17). 
25
 Consider, for example, Patrick Devlin’s defense of constraining acts even if purely private on 
the basis of the reactive attitudes of society (Devlin 1959). 
26
 These three types could be distinguished by the terms “dought” (deontological ought), 
“hought” (hypological ought), and “vought” (evaluative ought) (though this strikes me as one of those 
analytic-philosopher moves that makes even some analytic philosophers roll their eyes).  
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evaluative moral judgments, then it would be immune to objections that presuppose 
pacifist claims are or entail hypological or deontological claims. 
 
2.3 Evaluating Health 
  I aim to advance a pacifism the claims of which are based solely in ECM.  
However, I do not intend to identify the specific good or goods I take the E-scale to 
measure when advancing these claims.  If I did, anyone who does not share my 
conception of the good might dismiss my version of pacifism out of hand.  More 
importantly, all of the values on which the claims are based are not clear even to me.  I 
believe the claims that constitute my version of pacifism can be plausible for multiple 
conceptions of the supreme good or subsets of goods.  In order to make the claims 
interestingly thick, I will posit that an E-scale can be used to measure human biological 
health, and I will argue that health is analogous to morality in ten ways.  To be clear, I 
am not claiming that the evaluative good upon which my pacifist claims are based is 
biological health; I am claiming that whatever good they are based on functions 
similarly to biological health.  Inasmuch as someone concedes that the supreme good 
or some subset of moral goods is analogous to health in the ways I specify, the claims 
that constitute the pacifism I advance will be clear and plausible even if her conception 
of the good differs from mine. 
An E-scale could measure the biological health of humans.  By “health,” I mean 
the general condition of a human that includes vigor, vitality, freedom from ailment or 
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disease, soundness of body and mind, etc.  When measuring health on an E-scale, 
there are a variety of things which are the proper objects of evaluation: persons, 
actions, mental states, conditions, and states of affairs.  That is, claiming that these 
things are “healthy” is appropriate inasmuch as anything listed either instantiates, is 
conducive to, or is indicative of some degree of health.  So for any given E-scale 
measuring health (I will call it “E-h”), to say that X is located on the uppermost point of 
E-h is to say that X either instantiates, induces, or indicates health to a superlative 
degree; to say that X is located on the bottommost point of E-h is to say that X either 
instantiates, induces, or indicates being unhealthy to a superlative degree. 
 Persons instantiate health.  Healthy and unhealthy are things that persons can 
be.  And the ascription of either term also connotes some judgment of how healthy or 
unhealthy a person is.  A maximally unhealthy person is arguably near death on 
account of injury, disease, extreme old age, or wildly self-destructive behaviors.  A 
maximally healthy person is free of injury, disease, self-destructive habits, and also 
possesses vitality, vigor, and broad capacity for activity.  Given an E-scale that 
measures the health of persons (“E-hp”), on the whole, Olympians occupy a higher 
place on E-hp than persons who are morbidly obese; on the whole, someone who has 
just been shot multiple times in the chest occupies a place lower on E-hp than 
someone who has not been injured at all; on the whole, someone free of disease 
occupies a place on E-hp higher than someone in the final stages of terminal cancer; on 
the whole, a heroine-addict occupies a place on E-hp lower than a teetotaler.  A 
person’s level of health is comparable to any other person’s level of health, and a 
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person’s level of health is comparable to that same person’s level of health at some 
past or future time. 
 Actions can also be healthy or unhealthy.  Regular exercise is not only 
conducive to an increase in a person’s level of health, but the practice of regular 
exercise is also partly constitutive of that person’s healthiness.  Describing actions as 
either “healthy” or “unhealthy” often includes some connotation of how healthy or 
unhealthy an action is.  An action is maximally unhealthy when it is maximally 
detrimental to the health of the person who performs it.  An action is maximally 
healthy when it is maximally instantiative, conducive, or indicative of the healthiness 
of the person who performs it.  Given an E-scale that measures the healthiness of 
actions (“E-ha”), on the whole, exercising occupies a place on E-ha higher than 
overeating; on the whole, hand-washing occupies a place on E-ha higher than sharing 
needles with drug addicts; on the whole, visiting the doctor for a check-up occupies a 
place on E-ha higher than smoking; on the whole, eating vegetables occupies a place on 
E-ha higher than attempting suicide.  Actions are comparable to each other and to 
themselves at different times. 
 Mental states can also be healthy or unhealthy.  Thus, beliefs, feelings, 
attitudes, purposes, intentions, tendencies, traits, and dispositions are all measurable 
on E-h.  Given an E-scale that measures the healthiness of mental states (“E-hm”), on 
the whole, optimistic thoughts occupy a place on E-hm higher than suicidal thoughts; 
on the whole, feelings of depression occupy a place on E-hm lower than feelings of 
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contentment; on the whole, beliefs indicative of severe paranoia occupy a place on E-
hm lower than beliefs indicative of a reasonable assessment of one’s safety.   
 Conditions or circumstances can be healthy or unhealthy.  Pollution levels in air 
or water, access to adequate nutrition, opportunities for mobility and exercise, access 
to medical care, and other conditions can all appropriately be called “healthy” or 
“unhealthy”—where “healthy” and “unhealthy” describe whether such conditions are 
conducive a person’s health.  The actions, habits, and healthiness of other persons 
around us are conditions which are either healthy or unhealthy.  If a person’s friends 
are couch potatoes who eat donuts and drink soda excessively, and if having such 
friends is conducive to a person imitating those practices, then that person lives under 
unhealthy conditions.  An E-scale can measure the health of conditions (“E-hc”), where 
the uppermost part of the scale represents conditions most conducive to healthiness 
in persons and the bottommost part of the scale represents conditions most conducive 
to unhealthiness in persons. 
  States of affairs are healthy or unhealthy—where measuring the health of a 
state of affairs just is the sum measurement of all or a subset of all conditions, 
persons, their actions, and their mental states in the world at any given point in time.  
A state of affairs at the uppermost part of an E-scale measuring the health of states of 
affairs (“E-hs”) would be a world free from all disease, mental illness, injury, unhealthy 
foods, and full of vital, fit people, with broad capacities for activity.  A state of affairs 
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that would fall near the lowest portion of E-hs would, perhaps, be the Black Death 
pandemic in 14th century Europe.   
 Thus far, the E-scales I have described only represent static pictures of health.  
But health is dynamic and evolving.  A person’s healthiness or unhealthiness changes 
over time.  Given the acquisition or relinquishing of mental states, committing or 
refraining from certain acts, or experiencing change in health-evaluable conditions, a 
person can get healthier or unhealthier.  If a horizontal axis measuring time were 
added to E-hp, the trajectory of a person’s health could be graphed.  I will call such a 
graph E-hp × t.  Whether a person is getting healthier, unhealthier, or maintaining her 
level of health could be represented on E-hp × t by a positive, negative, or neutral 
trajectory. 
 The notion of “scale” or “measurement” should not be taken to conflate 
whether an object of health evaluation is in fact better or worse than another with our 
ability to discern that it is.  Smith may indeed occupy a position on E-hp higher than 
Jones even if no one is able to tell.  One action may be on the whole healthier than 
another even if no one ever learns this.  This distinction allows for the conception of 
commensurability between objects of heath-evaluation even if specific comparative 
relations between those objects seem puzzling or even counterintuitive.  If we 
consider average conduciveness to health, a certain action could be more or less 
healthy than a mental state, a certain condition could be more or less healthy than an 
action, etc.  It seems strange to say that brushing one’s teeth is either more, less, or 
58 
 
equally as healthy as eating vegetables, but there is a fact of the matter even if we will 
never know it.27   
This distinction may explain apparent cases of strange exceptions.  There might 
be persons who seem to suffer no detriment to their health despite, say, consuming 
large quantities of trans-unsaturated fats, or there might be persons who live near 
nuclear fallout zones that by all appearances are resistant to radioactive effects, or 
there might be persons who smoke heavily  but by all accounts suffer no ill effects.  
Folkloristic anecdotes of such cases abound.  But such cases do not disprove that 
nuclear fallout, excessive trans-fat consumption, and smoking are unhealthy on the 
whole.   A person’s healthiness or unhealthiness can be affected by a plethora of 
factors; measuring all factors that determine a person’s level of health may be beyond 
our ability to calculate.  Thus, persons who seem to be exceptions to the rules may, in 
fact, not be. 
I mean for E-scales to function as conceptual devices that record the way things 
are before and without considering whether and how a person might come to know 
the way things are.  But when making specific claims about scale readings for specific 
objects, whether things are as claimed and how this is known seem quickly conflated.  
This is why the qualifier “on the whole” is important.  If for all we know apparent 
exceptions are not exceptions at all, then for all we know they are exceptions indeed.    




 I am inclined to think that the only cases of incommensurability are between an object’s 
instantiative level of health and another object’s conduciveness to health.  If a person instantiates 
health and if eating vegetables is conducive to health, I am not sure there is a fact of the matter about 
whether a given person is healthier or unhealthier than the practice of eating vegetables. 
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In either case, apparent anomalies do not dissuade us from drawing general 
conclusions about the healthiness and unhealthiness of health-evaluable objects. 
 
2.4 Morality and Health 
 I will use the term “moral health” as a placeholder for a supreme morally 
intrinsic good (or perhaps a subset of moral goods).  Whatever good “moral health” 
represents, it functions analogously to biological health in at least ten ways.  I have a 
vague conception of the good for which I take “moral health” to be a placeholder, but I 
believe the points of analogy to biological health likely hold for conceptions of the 
good that differ from my own.28  By claiming that biological health and moral health 
are analogous, I mean that an E-scale that measures moral health (“E-mh”) functions 
similarly to E-h in at least the following ten ways, and therefore, moral judgments 
function similarly to judgments about biological health in these ten ways. 
 
2.4.1 Appropriate objects for moral health evaluation 
In the case of biological health, persons, mental states, actions, conditions, and 
states of affairs can all affect levels of healthiness or unhealthiness.  These same things 
(and perhaps more) are also the proper objects of moral health evaluation.  So, just as 




 Along the way I will assume particular objects instantiate the good as opposed to being 
merely instrumental to the good.  I do not mean for these assumptions to narrow the scope of moral 
goods for which “moral health” could be a place holder.  “Moral health” may represent conceptions of 
the good that assign instantiative, instrumental, and indicative relations to objects differently than I do.  
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there are E-scales that could measure the relationship of each of these objects to 
biological health, there are also E-scales that could measure the relationship of each of 
these objects to moral health.  For whatever good the term “moral health” represents, 
persons, mental states, actions, conditions, and states of affairs can be good or bad 
inasmuch as each of those objects is either positively or negatively instantiative of, 
conducive to, or indicative of that good. 
 
2.4.2 Moral health is gradational 
 “Healthy” is not a binary concept.  There are different levels of “healthy” with 
reference to biological health.  To say that a person is “healthy” involves the ascription 
of some degree of biological health to that person.  This is also true of moral health.  
Moral health is not categorical, but can differ in degree.  To say that a person is on the 
whole “morally healthy” entails that the person likely occupies a point above the 
midpoint of E-mhp, yet this is consistent with the claims that the person might be 
morally healthier or morally unhealthier.   
 
2.4.3 Moral health is holistic 
 Biological health is constituted by many things: freedom from injury and 
disease, vitality, capacity for activity, organ function, etc.  Each of these things is 
affected by a broad number of factors such as mental states, actions, conditions, and 
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states of affairs.  Each of these factors does not increase or decrease a person’s level 
of biological health in a fixed or isolated way, but combinations of these factors 
interact and affect each other’s effect on a person’s level of biological health.  While 
there is a fact of the matter about a mental state like optimism having an average level 
of conduciveness to health, the specific level of conduciveness for a given person will 
depend not only on other factors affecting that person’s health but also how those 
other factors affect and are affected by that optimism.  The factors that determine a 
person’s level of health form a system, and as such they operate at varying degrees of 
interdependency.  There are some combinations of measurements that are 
conceivable but are not nomologically possible.  For example, it is conceivable that a 
person is riddled with disease yet somehow being riddled with disease has absolutely 
no effect on organ function, but arguably there cannot, in fact, be such persons. 
The same is true of moral health.  A person’s position on E-mhp is determined 
by a broad number of factors that have varying levels of moral-health-conduciveness-
or-instantiation and each of which can affect the level of moral-health-conduciveness 
of other factors.  Further, these factors are interdependent and systemic.  Thus, while 
it is possible to conceive of strange combinations of good and bad in the same person 
(e.g., a person who has all and only morally healthy mental states yet commits all and 





2.4.4 Objects of moral health evaluation are intra-commensurable 
 Objects of biological health have comparative health levels.  Some actions are 
healthier than others; some mental states are unhealthier than others, etc.  The same 
is true of moral health.  Some actions are morally healthier than other actions, mental 
states can be more or less morally healthy than other mental states, a given condition 
can be morally healthier or unhealthier than another condition, and states of affairs 
can have comparative levels of moral health with other states of affairs.  Two persons 
may be “morally healthy” and yet occupy different points on E-mhp.  All objects that 
are moral-health-evaluable are intra-commensurable.  As in the case of biological 
health, the moral-health-conduciveness of one object type is commensurable with the 
moral-health-conduciveness of other object types.  So, there are some cases of inter-
commensurability between objects.  But I do not think that objects which are 
conducive to moral health are commensurable with objects that are instantiative of 
moral health.  I do not think an act of kindness’s moral-health-conduciveness can be 
morally better or worse than a given person’s moral-health-instantiation. 
 There are likely many moral health comparisons that hold true for various 
conceptions of the good.  On the whole, law-abiding school teachers are morally 
healthier than serial killers, and persons with significant degrees of self-discipline, 
moderation, and sobriety are morally healthier than persons who are reckless, over-
indulgent, and quarrelsome.  On the whole, acts of kindness are morally healthier than 
acts of cruelty, charity is morally healthier than theft, and sympathizing with a friend is 
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morally healthier than being rude to a stranger.  On the whole, thoughts of gratitude 
for a spouse’s strengths are morally healthier mental states than hatred towards one’s 
children, concern for a friend is morally healthier than plotting revenge, and thinking 
of ways to improve oneself is morally healthier than suicidal thoughts.  On the whole, 
being friends with law-abiding school teachers is a morally healthier condition than 
being friends with human traffickers.  On the whole, the state of affairs in which 
children are well cared for, well fed, and healthy is morally healthier than the state of 
affairs in which children are neglected, starved, and disease-ridden.  I have tried to 
avoid much specific description of what moral health looks like in hopes of leaving the 
placeholder as flexible as possible, but any theory that rejects any of the above 
comparisons is clearly not one I aim to accommodate. 
 
2.4.5 There are things which are, on the whole, morally healthy for anyone  
  In the case of biological health, there are actions, mental states, conditions, 
and states of affairs that are, generally speaking, healthy for anyone.  In the case of an 
action, this means that for any given person, on average, that person will be healthier 
having performed that action than she would have been had she not performed the 
action.  The same is true of moral health.  There are actions, mental states, conditions, 
and states of affairs that are, on the whole, morally healthy for anyone.   In the case of 
an action, performing it will have a positive effect on the performer’s moral health 
trajectory.  On a scale that measures a person’s moral health across time (“E-mhp x t”), 
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if the person performs the action at t1, there is a subsequent time t2 such that the 
slope of the trajectory from t1 to t2 is greater than it would have been had the person 
not performed the action at t1.  The temporal distance between t1 and t2 will vary; 
depending on the nature of the action, there will be some reasonable amount of time 
necessary for the action to have its effect.  To say that the action will have a positive 
effect on the person’s trajectory does not entail that the action will bring about a 
positive trajectory, nor does it entail that the action will positively affect everyone’s 
trajectory to the same degree.  A person’s moral health trajectory may be negative.  
But the performance of the action will bring about a greater slope than if the person 
had not performed the action.  In the case of biological health, there are actions like 
consumption of adequate nutrition or conditions like access to sanitary drinking water 
that are healthy for anyone.  I believe there are also examples in the case of moral 
health (though, what counts as a proper example may depend on the good or subset 
of goods that “moral health” is taken to represent). 
The qualifier “on the whole” is intended to allow for apparent exceptions.  The 
positive effect on a person’s trajectory could be indiscernibly slight, in which case the 
healthy-for-anyone-action (or other object of evaluation) would have no apparent 
effect.  There might also be genuine exceptions—cases where the healthy-for-anyone-
action may have, in fact, had no effect on a person’s moral health trajectory.  But as in 
the case of biological health, the possibility of a genuine exception does not disprove 
that certain things are morally healthy for anyone “on the whole.” 
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2.4.6 There are things which are, on the whole, morally unhealthy for anyone 
  Living in significant proximity to nuclear fallout, excessive trans-fat 
consumption, and smoking are things which are on the whole biologically unhealthy 
for anyone.  A person will be unhealthier with these actions and conditions than she 
would be without them.  The same is true of moral health.  Some objects of moral 
health evaluation are, on the whole, morally unhealthy for anyone.   The performance 
of an on-the-whole-morally-unhealthy-for-anyone action will have a negative effect on 
a person’s moral health trajectory.  Such an effect can be represented between two 
temporal points on E-mh x t.  The temporal distance between points will vary, and 
“morally unhealthy for anyone” entails neither that the resulting trajectory will be 
negative nor that the negative effect will be discernible.   And, again, “on the whole” 
allows for apparent and perhaps genuine exceptions.  
 The claims made in 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 allow for important descriptions of the 
moral health of states of affairs located near the top of a scale that measures the 
moral health of states of affairs (“E-mhs”).  Ideally morally healthy states of affairs are 
states of affairs that fall at or within a range near the top of E-mhs and which contain 
nothing which is on the whole morally unhealthy for anyone.  Even though all such 
states of affairs would contain nothing morally unhealthy for anyone, they may differ 
in their amounts of things morally healthy for anyone.  The exact point at which states 
of affairs become ideal or non-ideal is arbitrary.  Even so, there is some threshold on E-
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mhs above which states of affairs are ideally morally healthy if they do not contain 
anything morally-unhealthy-for-anyone.29  
 
2.4.7 Moral healthiness or unhealthiness is transmittable between persons 
 The biological health of one person can affect that of others.  Persons contract 
diseases from one another, and antibodies from one person can be used to cure 
diseases in other persons.  Moral health is analogous to biological health in that the 
moral health of one person can affect the moral health of others.  I have already 
implied as much in that persons can be a part of conditions and the conditions under 
which a person lives are factors that in part determine her level of moral health.  But 
making this point explicit is significant for three reasons. 
 First, our interactions and relationships with other persons are significant 
determiners of our biological healthiness or unhealthiness, and the same is true of 
moral health.  Perhaps the mechanisms of transmission are similar; just as diseases can 
be spread genetically, if there are genetic proclivities toward certain behaviors or 
mental states, then moral health can in that sense be transmitted genetically.  The 
more obvious mechanism by which moral health is affected between persons is 
influence.  In either case, this means that not only do my interactions with other 




 It is possible to conceive of states of affairs that contain morally-unhealthy things but which 
are so morally healthy otherwise that they are morally healthier than some ideally morally healthy state 
of affairs.  While conceivable, I am not convinced such states of affairs are nomologically possible.  In 
any case, they do not merit the description ideally morally healthy.  Human moral progress bears this 
out; persons do not merely attempt to add good things to the world, but to eradicate bad things. 
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persons constitute part of the conditions under which I live and thereby affect my level 
of moral health, but my interactions with others also affect the moral health of others.  
I can engage in interactions with others that could have positive, negative, or neutral 
effects on their moral health trajectories. 
 Second, certain kinds of trajectory effects are particularly worth pursuing or 
avoiding.  Especially significant are trajectory reorienting effects—for example, a case 
of a person with an overall negative moral health trajectory being affected in such a 
way that results in an overall positive trajectory.  I will refer to this as the “Scrooge 
Effect” after Charles Dickens’ character who seems to embody just such a case.  And 
the opposite effect is especially worth avoiding—a case of a person with an overall 
positive moral health trajectory being affected in such a way that results in an overall 
negative trajectory.  I will refer to this as the “Lucifer Effect” after the story of the 
angel who rebelled and “fell from heaven.”  It is particularly good when a Scrooge 
Effect occurs and particularly bad when a Lucifer Effect occurs.   
 Third, because persons can affect each other’s moral health, moral health can 
operate in a karmic fashion.  While our interactions with other persons can affect their 
levels of moral health, the effects we bring about in their levels of moral health can be 
partially constitutive of conditions under which we, in turn, live and thus affect our 
own moral health.  That is, there are a variety of ways in which the positive or negative 




2.4.8 Persons may have moral health limits 
Given that Smith occupies some point on E-hp at t1, while it is conceivable that 
Smith could occupy any other possible point on E-hp at t2, it is not nomologically 
possible.  The factors and the interdependency of those factors that determine Smith’s 
biological health at t1 will determine a limited range of possible t2 positions that Smith 
could, in fact, occupy.  In other words, it is not the case that from one moment to the 
next any person can become as healthy or as unhealthy as it is conceivably possible for 
that person to be. 
The same is true of moral health.  It is not the case that from one moment to 
the next any person can become as morally healthy or as morally unhealthy as it is 
conceivably possible for her to be.  The range of possible moment-to-moment 
positions on E-mhp a person can occupy is determined by the factors that determined 
her moral health at previous points.  Scrooge Effects and Lucifer Effects 
notwithstanding, persons have trajectory-limits.  For any given person, given the 
factors that determine her position on E-mhp at t1, there is a limited range of possible 
t2 positions for that person, and that person will not be able to occupy a position 
above or below that range.  Some persons’ trajectory-limits might be broader or 
narrower than others.  And if relevant factors persist, then a person might experience 
a more or less fixed upper or lower limit—a moral health trajectory “ceiling” or a moral 
health trajectory “floor.”  Factors that could create such ceilings and floors are not 
difficult to imagine.  Severe addictions or psychological compulsions, as long as they 
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persist, could create trajectory-ceilings; enjoying good mental health, being around 
positive influences, and practicing multiple healthy habits could jointly establish a 
trajectory-floor.   
In the case of biological health, there are actions or activities the performance 
of which requires a certain level of health.  The same is true of moral health.  There are 
actions and mental states the performance or acquisition of which requires a certain 
level of moral health.  If such actions and mental states are above a person’s moral 
health trajectory ceiling, then that person will not be able to perform those actions or 
have those mental states.  People say things like “I don’t think I can bring myself to 
forgive her,” where the person may acknowledge that forgiving is the nobler or better 
course of action.  There may be some subsequent point at which that person’s ceiling 
is higher, and her range of possible positions will include the level of moral health 
needed to forgive.  There are also actions or mental states the requisite level of moral 
health for which falls below a person’s moral health trajectory floor.  People say things 
like “I could never bring myself to do such a thing” in reference to some morally 
horrific act.  Due to moral health trajectory ceilings and floors, the person who “can’t 
bring herself to forgive” and the person who “can’t bring herself to do such a heinous 
thing” may be quite correct. 
As long as the conditions which determine trajectory-ceilings and floors persist, 
such actions or mental states will be unavailable.  And it could be the case that the 
conditions in question are outside a person’s control, or it may be the case that, for 
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the relevant factors which are under a person’s control, that person never will make 
the needed changes for her ceiling or floor to move higher or lower on E-mhp.  In such 
cases, persons might have permanent trajectory-limits, meaning that there are actions 
or mental states that will never be available for them to perform or have. 
Given the possibility of trajectory ceilings, it is possible for there to be actions 
which all persons ought to perform or mental states that all persons ought to acquire 
where such does not entail that any given person at any given time can, in fact, 
perform or acquire that action or mental state.  There could be actions a person ought 
to perform that she cannot, in fact, perform.  While there may be a number of reasons 
for her inability to do what she ought to do, one reason may be that she lacks the 
requisite level of moral health necessary to perform such an action.  Given the 
possibility of permanent trajectory ceilings, a person may be performing the most 
morally healthy actions available to her even if it is true that she ought (in an 
evaluative sense) to be doing even better. 
 
2.4.9 Persons can be ideally morally healthy 
 In the case of biological health, there are persons who embody exceptional 
levels of health—for example, Olympians or athletes who live “clean” in that they 
perform all and only actions conducive to or instantiative of biological health.   
Whereas it would be good if all persons enjoyed a higher level of biological health than 
they do, we would consider it a particularly excellent state of affairs if everyone 
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enjoyed the level of health embodied by such persons.  Thus, those persons who do 
instantiate such high levels of health embody an ideal level of health.  Not only are 
there such persons, but we consider it a good and beneficial thing that there are such 
persons.    
 The same is true of moral health.  There is some threshold on E-mhp above 
which persons are ideally morally healthy.  Ideally morally healthy persons can be 
exemplary, educational, and inspirational to others who recognize them as such.  If 
Smith is ideally morally healthy, then Smith is exemplary in that Smith’s moral 
healthiness is worthy of imitation; it would be a particularly excellent state of affairs if 
everyone occupied a similar position on E-mhp.
30  Smith’s level of moral health is 
educational in that Smith models in concrete ways a set of actions, mental states, and 
conditions that determine an ideal level of moral health.  Further, inasmuch as Smith is 
an ideally morally healthy person, Smith embodies one part of an ideally morally 
healthy state of affairs; part of Smith’s educational function is imparting a sense of 
what such states of affairs are like.  Smith is inspirational in that recognizing Smith’s 
ideal level of moral health may motivate others to aspire to greater levels of moral 




 This likely puts me at odds with Susan Wolf who argues that it would not be a good thing if 
everyone attained “moral sainthood” (Wolf, 420).  However, Wolf’s analysis seems heavily dependent 
on categorizing things such as talents, pursuits, practical skills, and even connoisseur-ship as “nonmoral 
virtues” (Wolf, 421).  I do not see why such characteristics should be considered non-moral.  My own 
vague conception of the good for which “moral health” is a placeholder certainly does not exclude such 
characteristics from the realm of moral value.  Thus, as far as I am concerned, the ideally morally 
healthy person has the “healthy, well-rounded, richly developed character” that Wolf seems to think 
“moral sainthood” excludes; and so, the ideally morally health person may be an excellent cook or oboe 
player, and such traits are not incidental but partly constitute her moral health. 
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health than they would have otherwise.  Even if imitators do not achieve Smith’s level, 
it is good to have imitated Smith’s level of moral health to whatever degree possible. 
 Because ideal moral health is represented by a range of positions on E-mhp, it is 
possible for some ideally morally healthy persons to be more or less morally healthy 
than other ideally morally healthy persons.  Interestingly, the set of factors that bring 
about ideal levels of moral health need not be identical for all persons who are ideally 
morally healthy; there are multiple ways the good might be maximized.  This means 
there are not only different levels of ideal moral health but also different ways of being 
ideally morally healthy.  Within the range of ideal moral health, there is room for style.  
Someone might be ideally morally healthy in virtue of exceeding courage for worthy 
purposes; someone else may be ideally morally healthy in virtue of compassion for the 
disenfranchised.  This, itself, is good for those who recognize persons of ideal moral 
health; the style of one ideally morally healthy person may be more feasible for me to 
imitate and generally more inspirational to me than the style of another.   
 Even persons who do not occupy the ideal moral health range on E-mhp can still 
play a similar role.  Just as there are ideally morally healthy persons, there may also be 
relatively ideally morally healthy persons.  That is, while Jones may not be ideally 
morally healthy, Jones may occupy a position on E-mhp considerably high relative to 
many people around her.  Jones is not a moral-health role model for everyone, but she 
can still be exemplary, educational, and inspirational to some.  In either case, the fact 
that it is good for there to be such persons—whether ideally or relatively ideally 
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morally health persons—means that it is also good for persons to aspire to become 
ideally or relatively ideally healthy persons.  It is good for persons to engage in actions 
or acquire mental states or secure conditions needed to aim their moral health 
trajectory at the ideal or relatively-ideal range.   
 
2.4.10 Facts about moral health can be normative 
 Self-assessments or specialist assessments of a person’s biological health can 
provide reasons for that person to act.  If Jones is currently performing actions which 
she learns are detrimental to her health, this gives her a reason to refrain from such 
actions.  If some act a1 is more conducive to Jones’s health than some other action a2, 
then Jones has a reason to perform a1 rather than a2.  Or if some state of affairs s1 
instantiates a greater degree of biological health than some other state of affairs s2, 
and Smith can perform actions that will likely bring about s1 rather than s2, then Smith 
has a reason to perform such actions.  In all these cases, the reasons are at least partly 
a function of the value of biological health—or perhaps how valuable biological health 
is to Smith.   
 The same is true of moral health.  Certain readings on E-mh can function 
normatively—they give a person a reason to act.  That reason will at least in part be a 
function of just how valuable the good measured by E-mh is.  Such reasons can place 
varying levels of “weight” or onus on a person to perform an act.  In this sense, 
evaluative normativity may function in a way similar to deontological normativity in 
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that just as being obligated to perform an act puts significant onus on the person who 
is obligated, the reason a person has to perform an act may be so “weighty” that it 
places significant onus on a person to act.  Of course, reasons for performing acts may 
be so “light” that they are easily defeasible, and being obligated to perform an act and 
having “weighty” evaluative-normative reasons for performing an act are not mutually 
exclusive.  Nevertheless, evaluative-normative onus to act may be significantly 
“weighty” without this entailing an obligation to act.   
Furthermore, given that the system of moral health as I have described it is 
purely evaluative, no mere evaluative claims about moral health entail an obligation 
always to act optimally—that is, an obligation always to opt for the available course of 
action that maximally produces or instantiates moral health or brings about the 
maximal possible positive affect on one’s own moral health trajectory.  In the case of 
actions, for example, all that can be said is that while it may be good to perform a1, it 
would be better to perform a2.  However, the reason for preferring a2 over a1 may be 
easily defeasible.  Or it may be the case that a2 is above a person’s trajectory-ceiling.  
Any number of factors may be relevant to why a person still opts for a1 rather than a2 
even if a2 is more conducive to moral health than a1. 
One possible factor worth mentioning is this.  Whether facts about moral 
health can be action-guiding for a person will in part depend upon that person’s ability 
to discern facts about moral health.  A person may be performing the most morally 
healthy act available to her according to her discerning capacity even if, in fact, there 
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are better actions available to her.  I take it that a person’s ability to discern facts 
about moral health is at least in part a function of that person’s level of moral health; 
that is, an effect of acquiring greater levels of moral health may be the development of 
greater discernment about moral health.  If that is true, then some persons may 
require the guidance of others more morally healthy than themselves in order to know 
how they should act, what mental states they ought to acquire, or what conditions 
they ought to try to secure for themselves. 
 
2.5 Advantages of the Moral Heath Model 
The first advantage of the moral health model is the ease with which evaluative 
judgments can be isolated from deontological or hypological judgments.  Claims about 
moral health or E-mh readings do not commit a person to any particular judgment 
about, say, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of a person or action or whether 
a particular action is obligatory, permissible, or prohibited.  The claim that some action 
is better than others or that some action is morally healthy leaves open whether the 
action is obligatory, permissible, or prohibited, and it leaves open whether the action 
is positive-reactive-attitude worthy or negative-reactive-attitude worthy.   
The second advantage of the moral health model is that it avoids the very 
problem Dewey raises against most normative theories—oversimplification by way of 
reducing the moral life to a single explanatory or commensurable principle.  Unlike 
Dewey, I believe moral health has primacy over the deontological or hypological 
76 
 
factors of moral life, and so I am not open to quite the degree of messiness Dewey is.  
But moral health as I have modeled it does not entail the reduction of all moral 
judgments to evaluative claims.  Consequently, it is compatible with the function of 
other additional forms of normativity.  Evaluative claims may be true of a person or 
her actions even if she is normatively bound by obligations or prohibitions that are 
sourced elsewhere—say in a social contract to which she is a party.   The moral health 
model allows for complex analyses like saying that Smith is meeting all of her 
obligations yet is not doing all she could to be all she could be, or that Smith is doing 
the best she can even though she ought to have done more in the past to empower 
herself to do and be more now, or that Smith is doing the best she can even though 
she ought to do even better even if a permanent moral health trajectory ceiling means 
she will never be able to do better.  These assessments leave open what reactive 
attitude might be appropriate; perhaps Smith is scorn-worthy on all counts, perhaps 
she is compassion-worthy on some but not others, or perhaps she is praiseworthy on 
all.  As Dewey argues, the moral life is complicated, and thus any systemization of 
value and value-judgments attempting to represent the moral life accurately must 
allow for such complications. 
 A third advantage of the moral health model is that it is compatible with 
multiple normative theories.  Moral health can stand for various consequentialist or 
virtue theoretic conceptions of the good, and it can stand for sub-values or sets of 
values.  This means that persons who do not share common conceptions of the good 
can nevertheless use and understand a common language about evaluative claims.  
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And while whether some evaluative claims are taken to be true depends upon what 
value or good a person understands moral health to represent, there is the possibility 
(a likely possibility, I believe) that some evaluative claims will be true across different 
values or goods. 
 A fourth advantage of the moral health model is that it captures some common 
sense judgments in a way that expresses those judgments more clearly.  When persons 
express judgments with phrases like “That’s wrong” or “that’s bad” or otherwise 
simple language, qualification is often needed to avoid confusion or misinterpretation.  
People using such phrases follow up with disclaimers like “I’m not saying she’s 
blameworthy” or “I’m not saying that the act is shameful.”  Expressing judgments in a 
way that isolates evaluative claims from hypological and deontological claims makes 
such disclaimers unnecessary.  And the model allows for precise ways of expressing 
multiple evaluative claims.  To say that act a1 occupies a position on E-mha higher than 
act a2 expresses something more precise than saying “Act a1 is good” and “Act a2 is 
good.”  And it leaves open how much higher a1 is on E-mha than a2. 
 In the next chapter, I will use the moral health model to posit and defend four 
claims that constitute my version of pacifism. 
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Chapter 3: Moral Health Pacifism 
 In this chapter, I will present a universal, absolutist version of pacifism based on 
the moral health model—a pacifism the tenets of which are solely evaluative (“moral 
health pacifism”).  While I aim to explain and defend these claims to an extent, I do not 
mean for the following to constitute a comprehensive defense of moral health 
pacifism.  My objective in this chapter is to present and explain four claims that jointly 
constitute moral health pacifism so that they are clear and plausible to someone who 
accepts the moral health model. 
 
3.1 Violence is morally unhealthy for everyone 
 The first claim is this: Committing an act of violence is, on the whole, morally 
unhealthy for everyone (“MHP1”).  In other words, committing an act of violence will 
have some negative affect on a person’s moral health trajectory.  The qualifier “on the 
whole” allows that the negative effect may be indiscernibly slight, and it allows that, 
for all we know, perhaps there are genuine exceptions.  Further, MHP1 is compatible 
with a case of a person being both morally healthy overall and a person who commits 
acts of violence even with relative frequency.  The only qualification MHP1 adds is that 
such a person is morally healthy overall or has a positively moral health trajectory in 
spite of those acts of violence and not because of them.  In what follows, I will survey 
reasons why violence is bad to show that MHP1 is plausible.  I will then consider and 
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address an objection to MHP1 from a virtue theoretic perspective and from a 
consequentialist perspective in turn.   
 
3.1.1 Why Violence is Bad 
Why is violence such a bad thing?  I will survey nine reasons why violence is bad 
advanced by various authors.  These reasons vary in situational-importance and some 
readers might not find some of them persuasive; but jointly they show that violence is 
likely to be morally unhealthy for everyone.  Some of these reasons hinge on whether 
the perpetrator or recipient of violence is in view.  In either case, the reasons still 
support the claim that committing violence is morally unhealthy for everyone. 
 First, violence is bad because it tends to be connected with injury, damage, and 
destruction.  This, according to Gerald MacCallum, is why we find violence to be 
“presumptively bad” (MacCallum, 113).  Particularly, violence against persons seems 
prima facie bad because, according to MacCallum, it damages, destroys, or violates 
“integrities” (MacCallum, 120).  Integrities are various parts operating as a system 
according to their own principles and inertias.  “The more harmoniously the parts are 
related to each other, the greater the integrity of the system because the easier it is to 
identify as one complete thing” (MacCallum, 121).  Both persons and persons’ bodies 
have integrities that can be violated, damaged, or destroyed, and the fact that violence 
constitutes a violation of a person’s integrity partly underlies the moral presumption 
against violence (MacCallum, 126). 
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 Second, violence is bad because of its tendency to inflict psychological injury.  
Suffering an act of violence can damage the victim’s sense of security and evoke a 
sense of fear that such an episode will occur again—instilling in the victim a social 
paranoia.  This can undermine the victim’s basic ability to trust others and lead to 
debilitating psychological maladies.  Victims of violence may even socially withdraw 
and experience depression (Bufacchi 2004, 173). 
Third, violence is bad because it fails to bring about what some have called 
“genuine peace.”  “Negative peace” refers to the mere absence of conflict.  Positive or 
genuine peace refers to a state of affairs where a number of conditions are present 
that establish a sort of relationship between potentially conflicting parties.  As Duane 
Cady argues, “violence cannot create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive 
peace because these conditions come from within individuals and groups by 
agreement and cooperation, not from the outside by force or threat” (Cady 2010, 
101).  According to Cady, violence is in the nature of the case inimical to the conditions 
that constitute genuine peace (Cady 2010, 53).  Violence is to the establishment of 
genuine peace what lying is to the establishment of trust. 
Fourth, violence is bad because it tends to result in more violence.  As Adin 
Ballou argues, “What puts it into the heart or the head of the assailed party to repel 
injury with injury?  It is like begetting its like: injury suggesting, prompting, and 
producing injury” (Ballou 2006, 81).  The fact that there are violent assailants creates 
the market for learning how to employ violence defensively.  Comparatively few 
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violent assailants bring it about that an exponentially larger group of persons aim to 
learn how to employ defensive violence.  Interestingly, if I use violence in defense 
against an assailant, I have now placed the assailant in a position of needing to defend 
herself against violence and thereby invite more violence.  If violence is bad for any of 
the other reasons I have mentioned, then the perpetuation of violence is also bad; and 
one thing that tends to perpetuate violence is violence itself. 
 Fifth, violence is bad because it restricts the freedom of the victim of violence 
in her choice set and her well-being at least for the duration of the injury suffered 
(Bufacchi 2004, 173).  That is, while a person is the recipient of violent action, her 
options are limited, and they are continually limited by whatever physical injuries that 
endure even after the violence occurs.   Inasmuch as freedom and a normal range of 
options are valuable, to the extent that violence restricts them, violence robs the 
victim of that value. 
 Sixth, violence is bad because suffering violence is, in a sense, insulting.  To be 
the victim of violence is to have one’s own vulnerabilities suddenly and vividly exposed 
to oneself.  This is also true when a person is the victim of a natural disaster, but it is 
peculiarly so in cases of being the victim of violence (Bufacchi 2004, 175).  James 
Gilligan remarks, “the most powerful way to shame anyone is by means of violence” 
(Gilligan 2003, 1163).  If human beings are in the nature of the case worthy of a certain 
mutual regard, and if that regard precludes being the recipient of violence, then being 
the victim of violence is degrading, dehumanizing, and humiliating (King, 482).  In the 
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case of suffering non-lethal violence, the victim has to live with the experience of that 
insult—with the awareness that others can subordinate her to their own power; the 
violence committed against her, in a sense, rubs her nose in her own social 
vulnerability.  “In many ways, the insult (the sense of vulnerability and powerlessness) 
hurts as much as the physical injury” (Bufacchi 2004, 174-175). 
 Seventh, violence is bad because of the psychologically damaging effects it can 
inflict on the perpetrator.  If the perpetrator of violence suffers regret or remorse over 
the act, she may experience some degree of self-alienation.  She may experience the 
paradox of having done something yet being averse to accepting that she is the kind of 
person who could have done such a thing.  If she experiences no remorse over what 
she has done, she may become hardened toward acts of violence such that future acts 
of violence are easier for her to commit.  Inasmuch as her act of violence insults or 
dehumanizes the recipient, she may develop a lower view not only of the recipient but 
of others she perceives to be similar to the recipient, which may wear away at what 
Albert Schweitzer calls “reverence for life” (Schweitzer, 315).  The perpetrator’s view 
of the value of others will in some sense be linked to her view of her own value.  If the 
victim is ultimately the proper object of a certain regard merely in virtue of being 
human (where such regard includes not being treated violently), then for a perpetrator 
to behave in a way contrary to that regard calls into question whether the perpetrator 
herself is the proper object of such regard merely in virtue of being human. That is, if 
the perpetrator is not compelled to approach other humans with a certain reverence, 
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then she also loses a sense that she, herself, is due a certain reverence merely in virtue 
of being human. 
Eighth, violence is bad because it is a kind of weakness.  Kuang-Ming Wu argues 
that violence tends to be an impetuous rather than thoughtful act (Wu, 10).  
Committing violence then tends to manifest a lack of deliberation or foresight.  Wu 
argues that if we are aware that violence has negative effects but we still opt for 
violence as a course of action, we manifest a lack of ability to find and implement 
better means of achieving the same ends or better ends altogether.  Violence is bad 
because it always entails some degree of loss; opting for violence then functionally 
constitutes a refusal or inability to devise win/win strategies (Wu, 11). 
Ninth, violence is bad because of its potential karmic-like effects.  Persons 
operating within a social context depend on their communities for opportunities, 
freedoms, and possibilities.  If I commit acts of violence against someone in my 
community, I have affected the victim’s opportunities, freedoms, and possibilities.  
Inasmuch as the victim also operates in a social context, the effect to her 
opportunities, freedoms and possibilities will affect those of others—which, in turn, to 
some degree affects my own.  The violent harm I inflict on others can constitute 
indirect harm to myself (Fortune, 185).  Inasmuch as “we are all caught in an 
inescapable network of mutuality” (King, 254), there is likely no potential victim of 
violence that will be completely isolated from a social web of which the perpetrator is 
also a part. 
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There may be other reasons why violence is bad, but I take these nine reasons 
to establish the plausibility of what some have called the “presumption against 
violence.”  Jack Lewis, while arguing against pacifism, asserts that “violence remains an 
evil, under all circumstances” (Lewis, 26).  Jan Narveson, also while arguing against 
pacifism, asserts that even non-pacifists accept the claim that “violence is evil,” saying 
“this is a view that every person with any pretentions to morality doubtless holds” 
(Narveson, 259).  Kai Nielsen, who takes for granted that pacifism is not a rationally 
defensible moral position, also accepts the claim, saying, “It should hardly be 
necessary to add that a humane person, who understands what it is to take the moral 
point of view, will deplore violence” (Nielsen, 23).  MHP1, then, is likely only to be 
challenged by someone who believes either that having a certain kind of disposition to 
commit violence may be beneficial to a person’s moral health, or by someone who 
thinks that committing certain types of violence will likely lead to a net gain in moral 
health.  I will consider each of these challenges in turn. 
 
3.1.2 Can There Be Virtue in Violence? 
 Rowland Stout argues that the presumption against violence is false. Those 
who adhere to the presumption against violence assume that even in cases where an 
act of violence may be morally justified, it is justified only in the sense that the 
goodness of the end for which the violence is employed outweighs the badness of the 
act itself; so, according to the presumption against violence, even when an act of 
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violence is morally justified, the act of violence remains bad as such.  Stout holds that 
those who adhere to the presumption against violence are mistaken on this point, and 
inasmuch as this point is inextricable from the presumption against violence, the 
presumption itself is false. 
 Stout argues that a certain disposition toward violence in certain circumstances 
counts as a virtue in Aristotle’s sense.  If Stout is right, then acts of violence committed 
in those circumstances that were a product of that disposition would not be bad as 
such, but rather would be virtuous acts.  Stout’s argument poses a problem for MHP1.  
I have claimed that according to MHP1, if a person is morally healthy overall yet 
commits acts of violence, that person is morally healthy in spite of those acts of 
violence rather than because of them.  This conflicts with Stout’s claim that there are 
acts that are virtuous qua violent.  Further, I have also formulated MHP1 in a way 
compatible with genuine exceptions; prima facie, this allows for Stout’s virtuous 
violence to count as genuine exceptions.  This option, however, is not open to me 
given my overall project.  Moral health pacifism depends on certain types of non-
violent acts being morally preferable to violent acts in precisely the kind of 
circumstances in which Stout holds some violent acts to be virtuous.  In this section, I 
will survey Stout’s argument and advance three reasons why Stout’s argument fails. 
 According to Stout, Aristotle’s notion of a virtuous person can be extended to 
persons who use retaliatory violence in a fight (Stout, 324).  Stout is not referring to 
the use of self-defensive violence where a person uses physical force solely to prevent 
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an attacker from doing harm (Stout, 327).  Stout refers to committing violence out of 
retaliation for violence done by an attacker (that is, violence justified by a backward-
looking reason) (Stout, 323).  This kind of retaliatory violence is appropriate within the 
normatively constituted social practice of fighting (Stout, 324).  Stout claims that 
having the disposition to commit such retaliatory violence in a fight earns you a 
valuable status—namely, that you are “a strong, serious person—to be respected and 
not to be messed with” (Stout, 329).  Stout mentions Norbertio Bobbio’s claim that 
meekness is a virtue and meekness entails the refusal to commit violence against 
anyone (Bobbio, 17).  Stout states that meekness in Bobbio’s sense is a vice (Stout, 
330).  It is a vice because if you fail to engage in retaliatory violence during a fight, “you 
identify yourself as a feeble person, a loser, a sap, a quitter—not someone to be taken 
seriously” (Stout, 329). 
   The disposition toward violence which Stout claims to be a virtue in an 
Aristotelian sense is an inclination “to violence in all and only those situations where 
that is the right response” (Stout, 330).  And while retaliatory violence may be justified 
within a fight, it may never be justifiable to be in a fight (Stout, 328).  Stout admits that 
“this might mean that in normal circumstances, [a virtuous disposition toward 
violence] is never applied” (Stout, 334).  Nevertheless, given that fighting back is a part 
of our ancestral history and given that through dominant social norms we are 
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encouraged from early ages to fight back (Stout, 332-333), acting on this sort of 
disposition is virtuous provided that one is in the relevant circumstances.1   
What circumstances might those be?  Under normal circumstances, if someone 
attacks you in a way that constitutes an invitation to fight, there will likely be a 
peaceful resolution, and you can depend upon state police and judicial institutions to 
settle the matter (Stout, 334).  And there are, Stout admits, “powerful countervailing 
social models” such as Christ who urges his followers not to fight back (Stout, 333).  So, 
by good use of Aristotelian practical wisdom, we may conclude that fighting back or 
being in a fight is never justified.   But, Stout writes, “equally it might turn out that 
practical wisdom recommends developing the disposition to fight back” (Stout, 334).2  
If you are facing circumstances where you are not protected from further attack and 
powerful people are out to get you, then “Wild West morality” may be practically wise 
(Stout, 334), in which case being too slow to fight back is a vice just as is being too 
quick to fight back (Stout, 329).  This is just to say that for persons in such 
circumstances, practical wisdom will recommend developing and acting on the 
disposition to fight back.  Therefore, a disposition toward committing retaliatory 
violence against the right people to the right degree in the right circumstances is a 




 Stout says it is important to recognize circumstantial differences because this enables a 
nuanced criticism of some violence—that if a person were virtuous, properly applying practical wisdom, 
“they would not apply [the disposition toward violence] here” (Stout, 335). 
  
2
 I am puzzled by Stout’s use of the term “equally” in this sentence.  Does Stout mean that 
there is as much evidence for fighting back as against it for practical wisdom to consider?  Does Stout 
mean any given person is as likely to inhabit circumstances that warrant a disposition to fight back as 
not?  Does Stout mean that for any social practice s with roots in our ancestral history, practical wisdom 
is as likely to recommend developing a disposition to s as it is to recommend not developing that 
disposition?  None of these interpretations seem to help Stout’s case. 
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virtue in Aristotle’s sense of virtue, and therefore, if a person were in the right 
circumstances, acts of violence committed under these conditions are virtuous acts. 
 The first reason for rejecting Stout’s position concerns Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean—that virtues can be conceived as midpoints on spectrums between the 
extremes of excess and deficiency.  According to Aristotle, not every action or feeling 
can be virtuous because not every action or feeling admits of a mean between 
extremes.  Aristotle mentions adultery, theft, and murder as specific actions that “in 
doing these things we can never be correct” (NE 1107a10-18).3  Aristotle warns that 
the doctrine of the mean cannot be applied to every feeling or action because the 
feeling or action in question may be vicious in the nature of the case.   Given that not 
every action has a mean, and given that Aristotle provides examples of actions that do 
not, then for any given act to be virtuous, its basis for being virtuous must not also be 
a basis for adultery, theft, and murder being virtuous.   
This elucidates how an act might fail to be virtuous for Aristotle.  Suppose some 
basis b has been posited as a justification for the claim that some act a is virtuous in 
Aristotle’s sense (or that some disposition to commit acts of type a toward the right 
people to the right degree and in the right circumstances is a virtue in Aristotle’s 
sense).  If it could be shown that b also justifies the claim that acts of adultery, theft, or 
murder might be virtuous, then it could be shown that b does not preclude adultery, 
theft, or murder from being virtuous; and therefore neither does b show that a might 




 This quote is taken from the Irwin translation of Nicomachean Ethics.  See Aristotle 1999. 
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be virtuous in Aristotle’s sense.  I believe this strategy can be used to show that Stout’s 
case for virtuous violence fails. 
 I take it that Stout’s basis for virtuous violence consists of four basic parts: (a) 
the act of retaliatory violence is a move within a social practice that is normatively 
constituted—namely, fighting, (b) the social practice of fighting has roots in our 
ancestral history, and we experience some form of encouragement to be disposed to 
commit acts of retaliatory violence when in a fight, (c) having this disposition toward 
fighting back and acting on it in the right circumstances secures a valuable reputation, 
and (d) there are circumstances in which practical wisdom recommends developing 
and acting on the disposition to commit retaliatory violence.  For Stout (a), (b), (c), and 
(d) jointly entail there is such a thing as an act of violence that is virtuous qua violent. 
 Could adultery, theft, or murder be justified on bases similar to that of (a), (b), 
(c), and (d)?  Consider adultery.  Within circumstances similar to those portrayed in the 
television series Mad Men, some acts of adultery seem virtuous on bases similar to 
that of (a), (b), (c), and (d).  Mad Men is set primarily in the 1960s at a fictional 
advertising agency located on Madison Avenue in New York City.  Some viewers find 
the excessive smoking, drinking (even while working), and rampant infidelity 
historically unbelievable and therefore an obvious case of artistic exaggeration.4  But 
others who were “there” attest that, if anything, these features of the show are 




 See Stephens 2010. 
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underplayed compared to the way it really was.5  The acts of adultery portrayed in the 
show are not mere acts of infidelity; they are portrayed as a significant and integral 
part of the careers, lifestyles, and culture the main male characters inhabit.6   They are 
portrayed as part of a normatively constituted practice with its own set of rules that 
are socially enforced.  There is considerable cultural encouragement for the main male 
characters to engage in the practice (and to learn to do it according to the rules).  For 
males who inhabit such circumstances, engaging in the practice of adultery earns them 
a valuable reputation within the environment—being successful, powerful, 
respectable, capable, and manly (in fact, some Mad Men characters are shunned by 
others in virtue of refusing to engage in these practices).  While the show is a work of 
fiction, the practice it depicts is not.  The practice of a certain class of males being 
expected to engage in sexual conquest has deep roots in history and perhaps even 
biology.7  Adultery, thus, meets Stout’s criteria for being a virtue. 




 See Altman 2009. 
6
 Aristotle may have an understanding of what constitutes adultery that differs from our own.  
Irwin suggests Aristotle understood it to be “the unjust use of a wife who justly belongs to another 
man” (Irwin in Aristotle 1999, 198).  But K. J. Dover’s research suggests adultery in ancient Greece 
meant “to seduce the wife, widowed mother, unmarried daughter, sister or niece of a citizen” (Dover, 
209).  This latter definition limits the number of cases of infidelity that would count as adultery more 
than the former definition.  Someone might object, then, that my Mad Men example is dependent on a 
contemporary understanding of adultery rather than on Aristotle’s.  The instances of infidelity on the 
show are so numerous that I am fairly confident at least one would count as adultery for Aristotle even 
under the more permissive definition and would be a case that the main male characters considered fair 
play within the norms of the practice.  But even if that were not the case, I could stipulate conditions 
slightly different than the ones from the show (call them the “Schmad Men” conditions) where the 
norms of the practice allowed for Aristotelian cases of adultery to be virtuous in Stout’s sense.  That 
may mean the conditions I describe are virtually nonexistent.  But if Stout can use circumstances he 
admits to be so abnormal that his alleged virtue might “never be applied,” then I do not see why I 
cannot also stipulate significantly abnormal conditions. 
7
 Concerning the historical roots, that sexual conquest (including extramarital affairs) is linked 
to male dominance across a variety of cultures is fairly well-documented. Steven Pinker notes, citing a 
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 What about theft?  Within an environment like a pirate ship during the golden 
age of piracy, it seems easy to imagine that theft could be virtuous given Stout’s 
criteria.  Thievery among pirates was a normatively constituted practice.   In several 
cases, there were codified rules regulating the practice.8  Pirates were encouraged to 
engage in the practice. 9  In fact, pirates who were timid during dangerous excursions 
were punished.10  Theft arguably has significant historical roots in view of raids 
between neighboring tribal societies, Viking pillaging, colonialism, powerful nations 
forcing other nations to pay tribute, and the general human tendency to aid in-group 
members at the expense of out-group members.11  Predation for gain is nothing new 
or novel (Pinker, 509).  And engaging in the practice would earn a pirate a valuable 
reputation—being a good in-group member by contributing effort to securing the 
                                                                                                                                               
plethora of studies and data, “In nonstate societies, dominant men have more wives, more girlfriends, 
and more affairs with other men’s wives.  In the six earliest empires … emperors often had thousands of 
wives and concubines, princes had hundreds, noblemen had dozens, upper-class men had up to a 
dozen, and middle-class men had three or four” (Pinker, 517-518).  See also Buss, 63-64.  Concerning the 
biological roots, Pinker writes, “in any species in which one sex can reproduce at a faster rate than the 
other, the participation of the slower-reproducing sex will be a scarce resource over which the faster-
reproducing sex competes” (See Pinker, 395-397).  According to David Buss, “the motivations for male 
infidelity are clear, since ancestral men who had extramarital affairs had the possibility of siring 
additional offspring and thereby gaining a reproductive advantage over their more loyal counterparts” 
(Buss, 154).  See also Symons, 143, 239. 
8
 A number of complete sets of pirate codes are extant, some of which make clear penal 
distinctions between stealing common property (that is, goods stolen during collective raids) and 
stealing between individual pirates (Bederman, 715-716).  Thus, there were norms that regulated what 
constituted piracy (joint-venture thievery) and intra-communal wrongdoing. 
9
 There are even extant codified incentive structures that specified greater shares of plunder to 
pirates who were the first to spot potential targets for theft (Leeson, 1074).   
10
 In the pirate code attributed to Captain George Lowther, “He that shall be found Guilty of 
Cowardice, in the Time of Engagement, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and Majority shall 
think fit” (Dow & Edmonds, 133). 
11
 It is baffling how serious out-group derogation can be easily fabricated under controlled 
conditions even among very similar persons.  One classic example took place at Robbers Cave State Park 
in Oklahoma where a sample of all white, middle-class, Protestant, two-parent, generally-well-behaved 
boys was separated into two groups and within days developed such intergroup animosity that they 
engaged in vandalism, theft, and violence against each other. See Sherif et al 1988. 
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livelihood of all group members.12  Theft, also, appears to meet Stout’s criteria for a 
virtue. 
 I do not wish to belabor the argument, but in view of hitmen-for-hire, political 
assassins, organized crime, and the mafia, it could likely be established that murder is 
also virtuous given Stout’s criteria.  As Stout says, given the circumstances in which 
most people live, practical wisdom may recommend never developing or acting on a 
disposition to commit adultery, theft, or murder.  Under normal circumstances, 
perhaps, as Stout says, such a “virtuous” disposition is never applied.  But if a person 
were in such circumstances, then it may turn out that practical wisdom recommends 
adultery, theft, or murder.  In the right circumstances, such acts may gain me a 
valuable reputation.  
 Of course, as noted before, Aristotle does not allow for virtuous acts of 
adultery, theft, or murder.  But the bases Stout posits for virtuous violence do allow for 
virtuous adultery, theft, and murder.  Therefore, they cannot establish that a 
disposition to retaliatory violence is virtuous in Aristotle’s sense.  This is the first way in 
which Stout’s argument fails.  Someone may object that the circumstances I refer to 
are outlandish, and it is a stretch to compare them to circumstances in which a person 
ought to engage in fighting.  But I believe the comparisons are appropriate.  Latent 
                                                 
   
  
12
 This is also evinced by the bonus system.  A pirate who showed incentive for theft would 
earn a reputation in the eyes of the captain and crew and on that basis earn the bonuses; possession of 
the items that constituted the bonus [for example, in one case, the motivated pirate was “entitled the 




within Stout’s argument is an assumption about the degree to which Aristotelian 
virtues are circumstantially relative.  Stout argues that given the fact that we live in 
“the cultured developed world” in which “the State will defend us and threaten 
potential attackers,” this might mean the virtuous disposition toward retaliatory 
violence is “never applied” (Stout, 334).  This opens the way for two startling 
possibilities: first, that virtuous persons develop dispositions even for circumstances 
they will never encounter simply because such dispositions would be virtuous were 
those circumstances ever encountered, or second, that virtues are so context-relative 
that sufficiently dissimilar circumstances will determine conflicting lists of virtues. 
 Neither possibility seems desirable, but both raise the same question: To what 
degree does Aristotle think the constitutive parts of eudaimonia (human flourishing) 
will vary by circumstance?  Even if Aristotle thinks the virtues are context-dependent 
to some degree, he would not concede the degree of relativity Stout’s position 
requires.  It is possible to imagine numerous circumstances in which normally bad acts 
(even acts with significant roots in human history and biology) would be 
advantageous—almost virtuously so.  It is not too difficult to imagine a Viking-like 
culture where, given domestic scarcity of goods, one’s willingness to rape or pillage 
could be so socially advantageous that those with a certain disposition to rape and 
pillage would out-flourish those without it.  However, for Aristotle, such an 
environment does not evince the context-relative moral value of raping or pillaging; 
rather, such acts being advantageous reveals the moral deficiency of that context.  If 
asked the question, “What if circumstances made the disposition to rape and pillage 
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conducive to flourishing?”, I take it that “Well, I suppose in those circumstances, 
raping and pillaging would be virtuous acts” is not the right answer.  Rather, if that is 
how things are, then things ought not to be that way.   
Aristotle does not envision the virtuous person living in a utopia inhabited only 
by other virtuous people.  And inasmuch as people ought to be virtuous but are not, 
then for Aristotle, pro tanto, things are not as they should be.  But Aristotle did not 
consider a society filled with all and only vicious persons or circumstances of extreme 
scarcity, oppression, or imminent danger appropriate venues for virtue.  There are 
circumstances in which the locus of moral deficiency is not in any given person lacking 
dispositions needed to thrive, but in the circumstances themselves that would enable 
such dispositions to be beneficial.  According to Aristotle, the natural progression of 
human development includes circumstances of families, then villages, and then the 
polis, and the polis is the environment in which virtues are possible.13  Circumstances 
that deviate significantly from that environment are not circumstances in which 
Aristotle’s virtue theory applies.   
Stout admits that under normal conditions, a person may very well be able to 
rely on state institutions, peaceful resolutions, and “turning the other cheek” to 
prevent and deter interference from would be attackers; but, Stout argues, if and 
when there are powerful people out to get you and if and when “Wild West morality” 
is applicable, then a disposition to fight back might be virtuous.  Trouble is, the “Wild 




 See The Politics, 1252a34 – 1252b27.  See Aristotle & Sinclair 1981. 
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West” is not an environment for determining Aristotelian virtues.14  Despite the 
appearance that some people thrive and do well in very un-polis-like circumstances, 
for Aristotle, such persons are not flourishing.  This means that either those 
circumstances constitute a pre-polis state of human development in which case more 
progress is required before the virtues are possible, or else the circumstances are 
simply deviant and thus, in an important sense, ought not to be.  The context Stout 
describes is surely of the deviant variety.  As Steven Pinker notes, “dominance is an 
adaptation to anarchy” (Pinker, 528).  For Aristotle, there are no such things as 
flourishing Mad Men, flourishing pirates, or flourishing Wild West fighters.  Such 
persons doing well reveals more about the moral nature of the context than the 
context does about the moral nature of those persons.   
The fact that Stout contrasts such circumstances with “normal” circumstances 
reveals a lack of connection in Stout’s position between Aristotle’s ethics and 
Aristotle’s politics.  If Stout’s disposition to fight back is only virtuous given 
circumstances which are admittedly abnormal, then Aristotle would likely say that 
persons ought not to inhabit such circumstances; they ought instead to alter existing 
circumstances or live somewhere else.  This means that even in the Wild West, 
persons should not develop Stout’s retaliatory tendencies, but, perhaps, whatever 




 Some cross-cultural and historical research shows that societies with comparably high 
homicide rates are characterized by the predominance of fights between men in public space (where 
observers can easily assess the retaliatory ability of the combatants) (Eisner 2008).  In light of this 
research, the circumstances in which Stout claims retaliatory violence is beneficial are not circumstances 
in which humans flourish (Eisner, 49). 
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dispositions would “tame” the “Wild” out of the “West.”  This is the second way 
Stout’s argument fails.  But I believe there is at least one more. 
Even if a person were so situated that it appears “Wild West morality” applies, 
is a disposition toward retaliatory violence the proper way to thrive?  Examples 
abound of persons who fared well in such circumstances in virtue of their lack of a 
disposition to fight back.  Thomas Chalkley notes that the 18th century Native-
Americans who inhabited Pennsylvania during the time of William Penn were “very 
barbarous in the destruction of the English inhabitants,” but did not attack Quakers 
who by reputation and practice offered no violent resistance to anyone (Chalkley, 59).  
Interestingly, Chalkley mentions reports of three Quaker deaths at the hands of Native 
Americans, which occurred only after those persons abandoned their Quaker practices 
and began visibly brandishing defensive weapons (Chalkley, 61ff).  In 1777, a group of 
Native-Americans entered into a Quaker meeting house with the intention of killing all 
those present, but killed no one; one of the Native-Americans explained to the 
Quakers, “When we saw you sitting with your door open, without weapons of defense, 
we had no disposition to hurt you” (Fry, 18).  Noah Worcester notes that in 1812, while 
others in Indiana were being harassed by Native American incursions, the Shakers 
(who adhered to pacifist principles similar to Quakers) also were never attacked; the 
Native Americans considered it a disgrace to harm a peaceable people (Ballou 2006, 
107).  In 1703, a band of Irish rebels were deterred from their intended attack upon a 
Moravian settlement by the obvious meekness (in Bobbio’s sense) of the Moravians 
(Ballou 2006, 107).  Jonathan Dymond writes that Quakers were similarly unharmed by 
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Irish rebels for the same reason (Dymond, 74-75).  These are but a few of dozens of 
similar examples. 
I admit that while I have attempted to present cases of stereotypical “Wild 
West” conditions and cases where there are powerful people “out to get you,” I have 
not presented cases of the normatively constituted practice of fighting that Stout 
describes.  The cases I mention bear more similarity to war, terror, or otherwise 
potential violent assaults that would not count as fights in Stout’s sense.15  But the 
cases I mention illustrate that a reputation for harmlessness can achieve the effect 
that Stout claims for the reputation for fighting back.  And in virtue of a reputation for 
harmlessness, the potential assailants were not even willing to make moves that 
constituted invitations to violent conflict.  That is, the potential assailants did not need 
to test whether the reputably harmless persons had a disposition to fight back to learn 
they were not to be messed with. 
I agree with Stout that fighting in many cultures is a normatively constituted 
practice.  But the very norms which govern the practice reveal the advantages of a 
reputation for harmlessness over fighting back.  Stout describes well the moves that 
might constitute invitations and accepting invitations to a fight.  But there are more 
rules governing fighting—namely, rules about who is the proper recipient of an 




 Arguably, though, the comparison is appropriate given that Stout connects the historical 
roots of fighting with primitive uses of spears, arrows, and traps (Stout, 333). 
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invitation to fight.  Boys are taught not to hit girls.16  Fit young males should not be 
fighting elderly, infirm males.  Physically or mentally disabled persons are off limits as 
potential opponents.  Perhaps others are ruled out as well.  But why are there such 
rules?  At least one reason why such persons are “out of bounds” is that the parties 
involved are unequal in ways that make the fight seem blatantly unfair—so unfair that 
it seems “low” or beneath the dignity of an aggressor to pick a fight with an “out of 
bounds” party.  In picking a fight with such persons, an aggressor does not acquire a 
reputation for being tough but for being cruel, immoral, criminal, or even cowardly.  
What makes these persons out-of-bounds in just this way?  One reason has to do with 
perceived harmlessness.  That is, in virtue of the perceived harmlessness of such 
persons, the person who makes a violent move in order to invite such parties to a fight 
has clearly violated the norms of fighting regardless of whether the out-of-bounds 
party makes a violent move to accept that invitation.   
“Perceived” is an important qualifier of “harmlessness.”  Any given girl, elderly 
person, or disabled person may be able to inflict harm equal to or greater than that 
which the would-be opponent could inflict.  But the perception of harmlessness is 




 Stout says without further comment, “fighting is taught to us all—boys and girls” (Stout, 333; 
emphasis mine).  This seems to me to ignore stark gender disparities concerning violence, such as the 
fact that the lion’s share of all violence is committed by fifteen-to-thirty-year-old men (Eisner 2009, 47; 
Pinker, 104).  More importantly, these disparities seem to be latent within the norms governing 
violence.  For example, the psychiatrist James Gilligan notes, “[men are] taught that there are many 
circumstances and situations in which one has to be violent in order to maintain one’s masculinity or 
sense of masculine sexual identity and adequacy, and in which a nonviolent man would be seen as 
impotent and emasculated, a coward, wimp, eunuch, boy, homosexual, or woman…Those who are 
socialized into the gender role of women under conditions of patriarchy, by contrast, are not allowed to 
be violent, nor are they shamed and considered sexually inadequate as women for being nonviolent; 
rather, they are more likely to be shamed and considered ‘unfeminine’ if they attempt to assume the 
male prerogative” (Gilligan 2003, 1166-1167). 
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attached to these parties in virtue of being the parties that they are—girls, elderly, or 
disabled—whether that perception is accurate or not.  Thus, hitting a disabled person 
violates the norms of fighting even if the disabled person in question is, in fact, well-
equipped to fight the aggressor.  And while such persons may have a reputation for 
being feeble, they do not have the saps/quitters/losers reputation Stout thinks is bad.  
Rather, it is in virtue of their perceived harmlessness that such persons have the not-
to-be-messed-with status that Stout finds valuable. 
The way in which their status functions is more valuable than gaining such a 
status by way of a disposition to fight back.  If I rely on a disposition for fighting back to 
secure a not-to-be-messed-with status, I am still fair game as a potential fighting 
partner to anyone who wants to test whether I have that disposition or who wants to 
test whether my prowess at fighting warrants that reputation.  Thus, my disposition to 
fight back may very well invite others to invite me to fight.  This is especially the case 
since a disposition toward retaliatory violence affords a person a not-to-be-messed-
with reputation only if one has at least a reputation (if not the ability) for employing 
violence with a degree of skill comparable or superior to that of would-be opponents.  
As Pinker notes, retaliation works as a deterrent only if one’s reputation for it involves 
“willingness to carry it out even when it is costly” (Pinker, 536).  But this reputation is 
precisely what some would-be fighters may want to put to the test; and if I ignore 
even one challenge or trespass, my policy of deterrence is no longer credible (Pinker, 
34).  Further, the fact that the retaliation needs to be costly is precisely why it will 
likely not be conducive to a person’s flourishing.   A person will have to engage in 
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violent conflicts that pose significant risk to her own safety and well-being.  It hardly 
makes sense to engage in activities in hopes of acquiring a not-to-be-messed-with 
reputation if those very acts involve being potentially injured to the point of no longer 
posing much threat to anyone. 
Perceived harmlessness works preventatively.  Even if a person has a 
disposition to fight back, if she falls within the category of perceived harmless persons, 
then anyone who attacks her in hopes of inviting her to fight has already broken the 
rules of fighting.  Thereby, the fight-inviter does not secure for the target a reputation 
for being a sap or loser, rather the fight-inviter secures a negative reputation for 
herself—dishonorable, cruel, cowardly, etc.  So, perceived harmlessness means that 
any attack from a would-be fighter is already a move against the would-be fighter’s 
own reputation or status.  Being in the harmless category means it is not in the would-
be fighters’ interests to attack in the first place.  This is not true in the case of someone 
who has a disposition to fight back but lacks perceived harmlessness. 
I take it the reputations of the Quakers and Moravians described above 
function similarly.  They fall within the class of persons perceived to be harmless.  The 
social norms underlying their perceived harmlessness are not the same as those 
underlying that of girls, elderly persons, or disabled persons.  But their status 
nevertheless renders them out of bounds to potential fighters.  Accordingly, even in 
the circumstances Stout describes, arguably practical wisdom recommends 
dispositions that make for a status as a person of perceived harmlessness.  Even in the 
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Wild West, retaliatory violence is not necessarily a virtue.  This is the third way in 
which Stout’s argument fails.   
Even in the circumstances in which Stout takes retaliatory violence to be 
virtuous, at least some of the nine reasons violence is bad I surveyed in 3.1.1 are still 
applicable, in which case the violent acts even of Stout’s virtuous retaliator are bad to 
that extent.  As Ballou and Tolstoy have argued, there are dispositions I could exhibit 
which would not only likely dissuade any would-be attackers, but those dispositions 
would to some extent function as moral correctives to morally deficient circumstances 
(Ballou 2006, 169-170; Tolstoy 1902, 217 – 218).  Inasmuch as a disposition to 
retaliatory violence fails to do as well, it should not be preferred to such dispositions. 
 
3.1.3 Can Violence Pay Off? 
 Some may object that MHP1 is weak.  MHP1 allows for exceptions, and there 
are plenty of exceptions.  There are, so the objection goes, types of cases where, on 
the whole, violence tends to pay off.  That is, even though an act of violence in that 
type of case would be morally unhealthy as such, committing violence in such cases is, 
on the whole, the correct decision inasmuch as violence in such cases appears to have 
the greatest chance of producing a net gain or securing the least loss of moral health.  
This might mean that the act of violence might result in a net positive effect on the 
moral health trajectory of the perpetrator, or that the act of violence may have a 
positive effect on the moral health of others immediately involved in the 
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circumstances in which the act is committed.  So, while MHP1 might establish a 
general presumption against violence, it does not provide any substantial reason not 
to commit violence in those specific case-types.  Those case-types, so the objection 
goes, are well-established, intuitive exceptions to the presumption against violence.  I 
believe all examples used to support this objection fall into at least one of the 
following four types. 
 Honor violence is violence committed in order to establish, maintain, or restore 
a sense of dignity or respectability.17  The practice of dueling was a means by which 
the offended party could ensure that “honor was satisfied.”18  The satisfaction of 
honor was typically determined by elaborately detailed, often codified sets of rules.19  
Another example is gang violence.  When a gang member violates norms taken to 
govern gangs, the offended party is honor bound to respond in certain ways.20  U.S. 
engagement of Britain in the War of 1812 was in part motivated by the sense that 
American’s honor had been insulted by the British.21  Another example is the stoning 
of Muslim women by their own brothers, fathers, and husbands if those women 




 Steven Pinker astutely observes that honor is “the strange commodity that exists because 
everyone believes that everyone else believes that it exists” (Pinker, 23). 
18
  See H. Cochran 1963. 
19
  For example, see Hamilton, 1-24, which presents the British Royal Code of Honor consisting 
of sixty rules, any violation of which allowed the opponent to refuse to recognize the violator “as a 
gentleman.” 
20
  See Horowitz and Schwartz 1974. 
21
  See Tucker 2006. 
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commit acts that dishonor the family such as marrying a man without the fathers’ 
consent.22 
 State violence is violence committed to serve state interest.  Here I mean to 
refer mainly to acts of violence committed in wars or by police forces.  But there are 
other acts of violence that would be rightly categorized as state violence—perhaps 
violence carried out by spies or non-military state agents to accomplish their assigned 
missions.  State executions and state-conducted acts of torture or violent interrogation 
would also be examples.23 
Self-defensive violence is violence committed in order to prevent injury to 
oneself when under attack or threat.  Assaulting a home intruder, mugger, or rapist 
would be examples of self-defensive violence.  Wars fought to fend off an invasion 
force would also be an example.  
Interventionist violence is violence committed in defense of a third-party who is 
under attack or threat.  Such could take place individually if, say, a person witnessed a 
mugging in progress and intervened violently or collectively if a state intervened 
violently in a war between two other nations.24 




 See McCoy 2014. 
23
 The vast majority of what I will cover and argue concerns non-state violence; I will explain 
the reason for inattention to state violence in 4.4.  But briefly I will here state that state violence is 
rarely presented in pure form; it is typically cast as a state level instance of honor violence, self-
defensive violence, or interventionist violence. 
24
 A rather important distinction in such cases is whether the party carrying out the assault is 
innocent (unintentionally harming or threatening the victim’s life or safety) or morally culpable.  See 
McMahan 1994 and Thomson 1991.   With the possible exception of a grizzly bear, throughout the 
dissertation I assume assailants are morally culpable. 
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The four case types are not mutually exclusive; state violence can be self-
defensive, acts of interventionist violence can also be acts of honor violence, etc.  The 
order in which I present them represents, I believe, the ranking of importance from 
least-to-greatest as kinds of cases alleged to be exceptions to the presumption against 
violence.  That is, interventionist violence is often assumed to settle decisively that 
there are clear exceptions to the presumption against violence, while cases of honor 
violence may provide exceptions but less clearly so. 
One important feature is shared by all four case types.  Acts of violence in all 
four cases have the appearance of being morally compelling.  In cases of each type, 
there appears to be an urgent or crucial need to do something to prevent a bad state 
of affairs or secure a good state of affairs, and, given the nature of the case, violence 
appears to be the obvious candidate for that something.   That is not to say that every 
token act of violence committed for honor, state, self-defense, or even intervention is, 
in fact, morally good, right, justifiable, or excusable.  Rather, given the nature of the 
case type, prima facie a person ought (in some sense) to commit violence.  I will call 
acts of violence committed on the basis of the apparent, urgent moral need to do so in 
one or more such case types morally compelling violence (heretofore, “MCV”).   
These case types constitute the critical point of disagreement between any 
given pacifist and her non-pacifist dialectical opponent.  That is, in some case of one or 
more of these types, the pacifist believes that MCV would be bad, wrong, unjustifiable, 
or inexcusable and the non-pacifist believes that MCV would be good, right, justifiable, 
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or excusable.  More importantly, within the pacifist/non-pacifist dialectic, the non-
pacifist holds that one or more of these case types serve as evidence against 
pacifism—the mere description of the case should make obvious that MCV would be 
good, right, justifiable, or excusable.25  And thus, the non-pacifist holds that such cases 
present pacifists with a dilemma:  What should a person so situated do?26   If the 
pacifist says the person should commit MCV, she thereby gives up pacifism.  If the 
pacifist says the person should not commit MCV, she recommends that the person 
should fail to do what is good, right, justifiable, or excusable (to fail to do what she 
seems most compelled to do for moral reasons given the stakes of the case).   
I will refer to cases of one or more of these types in which the person so 
situated has yet to commit or opt not to commit MCV as pacifist dilemmas.  This 
generic term can be modified to make clear which case type is under consideration: 
honor pacifist dilemmas (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit 
violence for the sake of honor), state pacifist dilemmas (cases in which a person seems 
morally compelled to commit violence for the sake of state interest), self-defensive 
pacifist dilemmas (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit 
violence to prevent harm to herself when under attack), and interventionist pacifist 
dilemmas (cases in which a person seems morally compelled to commit violence 
against an assailant to prevent harm to a third party victim). 




 For example, Cheyney Ryan writes, “All my adult life, when I’ve said I’m a pacifist, people 
respond: ‘What about self-defense?’ This is typically followed by a ‘Gotcha!’” (Ryan 2015, 17). 
26
 In the case of non-universal types of pacifism I mentioned in Chapter 1, this question 
assumes that the person so situated is one who falls within the class of persons who the pacifist believes 
are subject to a moral opposition to violence. 
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Some may object that MHP1 is uncompelling in view of pacifist dilemmas and 
the obvious need for MCV.   In the case of Albanian vendettas, failing to avenge 
oneself can result in economic hardship and public ridicule (Hasluck, 231 – 232), and 
the social ostracism that results can be crippling (Elster, 864).27  In the case of an active 
shooter on a school campus, a police officer firing sooner rather than later can make a 
difference in the number of lives saved.  In the case of a home invasion, whether I fire 
a gun or swing a bat at the intruder may determine whether I live out the night.  In the 
case of witnessing an attempted mugging or rape, whether I violently assault the 
mugger or rapist may determine whether the intended victim loses her property or her 
psychological well-being.  Given the stakes or urgency involved, why not commit 
violence in such cases?  Who could possibly find the person who did so blameworthy 
or bad or wrong?  In fact, it seems strange—perhaps even morally suspicious—to think 
a person would refuse on moral grounds to commit violence when so situated.  Even if 
MHP1 is true, within the category of pacifist dilemmas, that presumption against 
violence is so circumstantially weakened that it is negligible. 
What can a pacifist say about pacifist dilemmas?  I aim for the remaining claims 
that constitute moral health pacifism to address pacifist dilemmas and make clear 
what certain persons can do when situated in these four types of cases.  I will maintain 
that the practice of moral health pacifism involves refraining from violence even in 




 See also "Albanian blood feud," 2013. 
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pacifist dilemmas, and that even in pacifist dilemmas, the practice of moral health 
pacifism is morally better than MCV. 
 
3.2 There are Morally Healthier Alternatives 
 The second claim of moral health pacifism is this: Even in pacifist dilemmas, on 
the whole, there are alternative courses of action that occupy positions on E-mha (an 
evaluative scale measuring actions) higher than MCV (“MHP2”).  That is, generally 
speaking, for any given act of MCV, there is some alternative action that is not an act 
of violence that is morally healthier.  I will call such actions pacifist alternatives.  To be 
a pacifist alternative, an action must be either by intent or character an attempt to do 
something in response to the morally compelling nature of pacifist dilemmas.  And 
either by intent or character, they are attempts to do more than MCV—to prevent a 
greater degree of moral unhealthiness or to secure a greater degree of moral 
healthiness.   
 MHP2, as stated, is weaker than it appears.  I have maintained that the qualifier 
“on the whole” allows for the possibility of genuine exceptions and that moral health 
claims can be satisfied by E-mh readings which are indiscernibly slight.  Further, if a 
pacifist alternative prevented as much bad or secured as much good as an act of MCV, 
then it is morally healthier merely in virtue of not being an act of violence (that is, not 
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being bad for the nine reasons listed in defense of MHP1).28  I admit MHP2 as stated is 
weak in these ways.  But I believe that characteristically, pacifist alternatives are 
significantly morally healthier than their violent counterparts, and I aim to argue to 
that end.   
In this section, I will present five ways in which pacifist alternatives are morally 
healthier than MCV.  Before this, two things should be noted.  First, there is an 
important difference between MCV and pacifist alternatives.  MCV are all acts of the 
same type—acts of violence.  While that term does not tell us whether the act in 
question was kicking, shooting, stabbing, etc., violence as a type of act is defined 
tightly enough to be a handy or quick option to fulfill the need to do something in 
pacifist dilemmas.  Pacifist alternatives are not formulaic in this way.  Many types of 
acts might count as pacifist alternatives.  Thus, pacifist alternatives constitute a much 
harder category of action to characterize.  The ways in which they are morally 
healthier will give some indication of their character; but more than this, I intend to 
present a significant number of examples that, I hope, will clarify their nature.   
Secondly, in some instances I will defend MHP2 by claiming that pacifist 
alternatives are more likely than MCV to have some morally preferable feature.  
Baldly, this is an empirical claim about relative frequencies.  If there were a 
representative sample S1 of acts of MCV and a representative sample S2 of pacifist 




 So, given ceteris paribus or mutatis mutandis clauses, pacifist alternatives will always be 
morally healthier than acts of MCV.  But MHP2 is also consistent with the claim (which contains no such 
clauses) that any given act of MCV may be morally healthier than any given pacifist alternative. 
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alternatives relevantly comparable to the acts in S1, then the occurrence of some 
feature f would be relatively more frequent in S2 than in S1.  I stand by that claim.  But 
this is data I do not have, and I foresee several daunting obstacles to conducting such 
an analysis.29  Nevertheless, I believe I can make plausible these comparative claims 
using features characteristic of the acts in question. 
 
3.2.1 Pacifist Alternatives Avoid the Badness of Violence as such 
 Pacifist alternatives are more likely than MCV to avoid the negative effects of 
violence.  According to Bufacchi, violence is bad because it restricts the freedom of the 
victim, it results in psychological damage of the victim, and it humiliates the victim by 
vividly exposing to the victim her own vulnerabilities.  In pacifist dilemmas, MCV 
advocates hope to restrict the freedom of the perpetrator and for good reason.  But if 
there were a way to prevent the perpetrator from committing violence while also 
respecting the perpetrator’s freedom, then such would be better given Bufacchi’s 
account of the badness of violence.  Pacifist alternatives engage perpetrators in a way 




 Assembling S1 and S2 would require clearer criteria for “morally compelling.”  Formulating 
those criteria involves issues that still plague self-defense debates.  Must violence be morally compelling 
in fact or will a person’s justified belief that it is morally compelling suffice?  According to objectivist 
theories of self-defense, the person’s justified belief is not sufficient to justify violence (Thomson 1991, 
295).  According to subjectivist theories, it is (Greenawalt, 1903).  There also is the issue of imminence.  
How temporally near does an attack have to be for an act of violence to be morally compelling?  For 
example, if a battered wife kills her physically abusive husband in his sleep, is that an act of self-
defense? And if so, was she morally compelled to do it (Baron, 228)?  What if someone threatens to 
harm my loved ones a year from now?  If I attack that person now, is it interventionist violence, and 
even so, is the attack morally compelling?  Assembling S2 would be particularly difficult not only 
because of the need to give clear criteria for pacifist alternatives, but as I will argue throughout, 
examples of MCV are abundant whereas the practice of pacifist alternatives is both difficult and rare.  I 
doubt whether a sufficient sample size could be achieved for S2. 
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that neither psychologically damages nor humiliates the perpetrator, yet still aims to 
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts of violence.  Rather than humiliate, 
some pacifist alternatives seek to restore a violent perpetrator to a level of dignified 
self-awareness such that even the perpetrator is distanced from the thought of 
committing violence.  
 Pacifist alternatives do not merely aim to restrain violence and prevent injury; 
some pacifist alternatives aim at resolutions conducive to what I referred to before as 
“genuine peace.”  To establish conditions of genuine peace in a community, there 
likely need to be changes both in the violent perpetrator and the person who would 
opt for pacifist alternatives.  If the practice of pacifist alternatives were conducive to 
the establishment of such conditions, then pacifist alternatives are of more value than 
MCV inasmuch as violence cannot in the nature of the case establish genuine peace.  A 
commitment to pacifist alternatives avoids the character weakness which Wu argues 
accompanies violence—that is as long as the pacifist alternatives employed do not 
bear any of the same defects which Wu argues are had by violence.   
And some pacifist alternatives avoid perpetuating violence unlike MCV.  If I 
commit MCV, say, in self-defense, the person I assault now has a reason also to 
commit an act of violence in self-defense.  Admittedly, some MCV can decisively end a 
violent conflict (a lethal or debilitating assault, for example), and even having some 
apparent preparedness to commit MCV may deter attacks.  But such deterrents are 
ineffective against an attacker who believes she can employ violence more effectively 
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or more ruthlessly than her target.   Pacifist alternatives do not enter into the contest 
of violent posturing in the first place, but attempt to remove any apparent need for 
posturing on either party’s part. 
Further, pacifist alternatives avoid the various degrading effects of violence.  
The person who opts for pacifist alternatives does not have to become a perpetrator 
of violence to engage a perpetrator of violence.  One who employs pacifist alternatives 
will not suffer any self-alienation on account of acts she may commit in pursuit of a 
worthy goal.  She need not behave as a degrader or a dehumanizer nor does she 
accept the self-and-others-degradation being promulgated by the violent perpetrator.  
Pacifist alternatives communicate to the violent perpetrator what Dorothy Samuel 
calls “an absolute rejection of thing-dom” (Samuel, 35).  Inasmuch as the person who 
employs a pacifist alternative refuses to behave as a victim or a mere thing, the violent 
perpetrator does not confront a mere thing, but a living, feeling person.  In some 
cases, this compels the violent perpetrator to cease being a violent perpetrator and 
instead to behave in kind (Samuel, 40).  Pacifist alternatives seek not to degrade or 
dehumanize, but rather to dignify both the one who employs them and the violent 
perpetrator against whose violence the pacifist alternatives are employed, thus 
increasing mutual reverence for life.  In this way the degrading effects of violence are 





3.2.2 Pacifist Alternatives lead to Less Death and Injury 
 Pacifist alternatives lead to less death or injury than MCV.  Whether this is true 
may depend upon the truth values of counterfactuals that are unknowable.  Suppose a 
police officer shoots a perpetrator she reasonably believes is in the middle of an 
attempt to kill hostages.  How much death and injury did the police officer prevent?  In 
a sense this is unclear without comparing the case to the instance in which the same 
officer similarly situated does not shoot and allows the perpetrator to act in which 
case it will be evident how much death and injury the perpetrator would have caused 
had the officer not shot and comparing it to the case in which the same officer 
similarly situated does not shoot but employs a pacifist alternative.  But since neither 
comparative case actually happened, precise answers are speculative at best.  Rather 
than defending speculations that favor the pacifist alternative counterfactual, I will 
present two cases where pacifist alternatives were used and no death or injury 
occurred. 
 Edward Richards was a relief worker living amongst the Kurds and Turks in 
West Persia in 1917.  On one occasion he encountered a man brandishing a gun in 
public.  The obviously intoxicated man was running amuck and endangering people 
nearby.  Richards had access to guns and several places from which he could have 
taken aim and shot the drunken gun-wielder undetected.  Rather than shoot, Richards 
approached the man unarmed and extended his hand, offering to shake hands as a 
sign of friendship.  The drunken gun-wielder saluted Richards and handed over the 
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gun.  The next day, after sobering up, the gun-wielder found Richards and apologized 
profusely.  “Throughout this entire affair,” writes Richards, “no one was killed or even 
injured” (Richards, 626-627).   
Terry Dobson recalls riding on a train near Tokyo when a large, drunken man 
entered.  As soon as the man entered the train, he screamed at passengers and 
attempted to punch and kick some of them.  Dobson was young, in good shape, and 
had been studying martial arts for years.  He was confident he could decisively 
neutralize the threat by use of force.  Dobson stood up and taunted the drunk to 
approach him.  The drunk took the bait and headed for Dobson.  Before the two men 
met, an elderly gentleman on the train shouted at the drunk, “Hey! Come here and 
talk to me.”  The old man patted the empty seat next to him invitingly.  The drunk 
approached the old man and bellowed back, “Why should I talk to you?”  The old man 
asked the drunk what he had been drinking.  The drunk admitted to drinking sake.  The 
old man told the drunk how much he, too, enjoyed drinking sake in his garden with his 
wife every evening.  The old man then asked about the drunk’s family.  The drunk 
noticeably softened and began to sob.  He explained to the old man how his wife had 
died, how he no longer had a job or a home, and how ashamed he felt.  The old man 
asked the drunk about his troubles.  Dobson got off at the next stop as the drunk was 
still pouring his heart out, and the old man offering sympathetic looks and words of 
comfort.  Dobson writes of the incident, “what I had wanted to do with muscle had 
been accomplished with kind words” (Dobson, 190).   
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Arguably, though, Dobson is mistaken.  The kind words of the old man actually 
achieved more than Dobson would have done through force.  Dobson might have 
injured the drunk and risked injuring himself and bystanders in the process.  True, 
Dobson’s skillful use of martial arts may have prevented greater injury to bystanders, 
but the old man’s kind words prevented unintended injury to bystanders that might 
have resulted from Dobson’s attack, injury to the drunk himself, and quelled the 
drunk’s desire to injure.  Richard’s friendly handshake and the old man’s kind words 
both show that pacifist alternatives can prevent death or injury. 
 
3.2.3 Pacifist Alternatives lead to Scrooge Effects 
Pacifist alternatives are more likely than MCV to produce Scrooge Effects on 
the violent perpetrator.30  The previous two anecdotes suggest that the violent 
perpetrators experienced Scrooge Effects as a result of the interactions.  There are 
many more examples.  I offer the following three. 
 In the late seventeenth century, while travelling down a road, Leonard Fell was 
confronted by a robber.  The robber, brandishing a pistol, threatened to kill Fell if Fell 
did not hand over his money and horse.  Fell surrendered both.  The robber holstered 
his gun to sort out the booty, and Fell began to warn and admonish the robber 
severely about the error of his ways and told the robber it was not too late to change.  




 “Scrooge Effects”, as I described them in Chapter 2, are meant to parallel what many pacifists 
and nonviolence advocates have called “transforming power” (Apsey 2012 & Retain 2000) and perhaps 
the interpersonal aspects of what Andrew Fiala calls “transformational pacifism” (Fiala 2014).  
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The robber, surprised by Fell’s gall, became enraged at what he perceived to be Fell’s 
audacious hypocrisy.  The robber called Fell a “cowardly dog,” pointing out that Fell 
had simply forfeited his money and horse, failing to “pluck up” the courage to engage 
in self-defense, yet Fell dared to preach to the robber about moral shortcomings.  The 
robber in his rage drew his pistol at Fell.  Fell responded calmly that he would not risk 
his life to save his money or horse, but he would risk his life to save the robber from 
wrongdoing.  The robber, conscience-stricken by Fell’s response, returned Fell’s things 
and said, “If you are such a man as that, I will take neither your money nor your horse” 
(L. Hodgkin, 427).31 
 Ballou records an incident between two university students in which one of 
them felt quite insulted by the other.  The insulted student, being a Southerner 
accustomed to Southern honor codes, demanded satisfaction.  The offending student 
gave assurance that he intended no offense or injury, but if he could clearly be shown 
in the wrong, he would gladly make ample reparations; but he refused to engage in a 
duel with a friend.  The Southerner “boiled over with chivalrous indignation” and 
“discharged a volley of reproachful epithets, and threatened to chastise” his friend for 
being such a coward.  The offending student responded calmly and fearlessly, 
explaining that the two had been good friends thus far, he intended to continue to be 
friendly toward the Southerner, and that talk of dueling, violence, reproaches, and 
insults was behavior quite unworthy of the man he knew to be his friend.  The 




 See also Webb 1884. 
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Southerner instantly blushed with shame and responded, “I have spoken and acted 
like a fool; can you forgive me?” (Ballou 2006, 88). 
 Whether these are instances of Scrooge Effects is debatable.  The violent 
perpetrators’ responses are consistent with moral health trajectories that continued to 
decline, and the perpetrators’ initial acts may be consistent with positive trajectories.  I 
take it though that prima facie the Scrooge Effect interpretation is the most plausible, 
and that the pacifist alternatives in these instances characterize types of acts that are 
more likely to produce that effect than if the parties in question had committed MCV.  
Many pacifist alternatives are attempts to create change within the perpetrator.  As 
Mary Crane puts it while suggesting nonviolent ways to resist attempted rape, “change 
created in the heart and mind of the opponent…is more likely to be of a permanent 
nature” (Crane, 9). 
 
3.2.4 Pacifist Alternatives Address the Causes of Violence Directly 
Pacifist alternatives, unlike their violent counterparts, directly address the 
causes of violence; and this is a superior way to counter acts of violence.  MCV as a 
category presupposes there are circumstances where violence has been made 
(perhaps) necessary due to others’ violent or potentially violent acts.  That there are 
persons who behave in ways that make a violent response morally compelling is taken 
as a given.  MCV fails to embody the judgment that things ought not to be this way.  
There ought not to be violent assailants in the first place. 
117 
 
In the case of self-defensive violence, interventionist violence, and some honor 
violence, MCV is designed to prevent, restrain, or incapacitate acts of violence.  MCV 
does not, however, neutralize or supplant violent intentions, tendencies, or their 
causes.  In other words, MCV presupposes that the prevention of there being violent 
assailants (and thus the prevention of that which gives rise to the need for MCV) is no 
longer an option.   
The difference between the two is analogous to caging a wild animal 
(restraining the animal’s wild behaviors) versus taming an animal (dispelling the 
animal’s wildness).  Pacifist alternatives are also designed to prevent, restrain, or 
incapacitate violent acts, but by directly addressing and dispelling the underlying 
causes of violence.  If MCV succeeds, the outcome is a violent perpetrator who is 
“caged.”  If pacifist alternatives succeed, the outcome is a person who is no longer 
violent.  There are at least two ways in which pacifist alternatives bring about this 
outcome.  
 James Gilligan argues that the basic cause of violence is shame (Gilligan 2001, 
29ff).32  That is, a person feels such an acute lack of the respect and esteem from 
others, that the harmfulness of such feelings of humiliation is overwhelming.33  To 




 See also Gilligan 1997.  Gilligan uses the term “shame” quite broadly to include “feelings of 
being slighted, insulted, disrespected, dishonored, disgraced, disdained, slandered, treated with 
contempt, ridiculed, teased, taunted, mocked, rejected, defeated, subjected to indignity or ignominy; 
feelings of inferiority, inadequacy; feelings of being weak, ugly, a failure, ‘losing face,’ bring treated as if 
you were insignificant, unimportant or worthless” (Gilligan 2001, 30). 
33
 What then are the causes of such acute feelings of shame?  Gilligan argues that the causes 
are basically social: income inequality, lack of opportunity and upward mobility, lack of education and 
employment.  Gilligan argues that there are strong positive correlations between a society’s rate of 
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protect the self from being overwhelmed, a person commits acts of violence.34  Those 
acts of violence offer the perpetrator a facsimile of the social regard she is lacking 
(Gilligan 2001, 36).35  When she threatens or commits violence, her victim is fearful 
and at her mercy.  The victim listens acutely to the perpetrator and cowers at the 
power the perpetrator has assumed.  This gives the perpetrator some sense of being 
respected and respectable.  It is not the same kind which she is lacking, but a kind that 
diminishes the intensity of her shame, thus preventing her from being overwhelmed 
(Gilligan 1997, 111). 
 MCV is less likely than pacifist alternatives to dispel the shame causing a 
perpetrator’s violence.  Violence is in the nature of the case degrading or 
dehumanizing to the victim.  Acts of MCV, however morally compelling they may be, 
are acts of violence.  As such, MCV shames the recipient.  Even if they incapacitate or 
restrain the perpetrator, they can only serve to increase or compound the 
perpetrator’s shame—the shame which is at the root of the perpetrator’s aggressive 
acts of violence.  At best, MCV treats the symptoms but not the disease.  And really it 
is worse; even when MCV lessens the symptoms, it does so in a way that allows the 
                                                                                                                                               
violence and the degree to which such social problems are present in that society (Gilligan 2001, 38-49).   
Gilligan’s evidence suggests that in order to address the causes of violence directly, pacifist alternatives 
can also consist of acts that are preemptive of violent conflicts—acts of mercy, charity, kindness, and 
compassion.  Such acts can serve to reduce the potential for violence in the communities in which they 
are performed.   
34
 Gilligan is careful to point out that shame is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
committing violence (since there are ample cases of shamed persons who are not violent) (Gilligan 
2003, 1165). 
35
 I should make clear that Gilligan’s use of shame is entirely social; violent persons do not 
disregard themselves, rather they feel unduly disregarded by others.  It is important to clarify that 
Gilligan does not argue that violence stems from lack of self-esteem, and thus, Gilligan’s analysis is 
compatible with the various studies that struggle to establish definite positive or negative correlations 
between violence and self-esteem (Bushman & Baumeister 2002; Salmivalli 2001).   
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pathogen to thrive.36  Therefore, even if MCV restrains a perpetrator’s immediate 
violence, it is likely to make a perpetrator even more violent in the long run.37   
 Pacifist alternatives treat the disease—the cause of violence within the 
perpetrator.  Pacifist alternatives prevent or restrain a perpetrator’s acts of violence by 
addressing the shame from which the violent intentions and tendencies stem.  Pacifist 
alternatives do not give the violent perpetrator the counterfeit dignity or respect her 
acts of violence are designed to achieve.  Pacifist alternatives give the perpetrator the 
real thing—the social capital which she is lacking and the lack of which has brought 
about her shame.  In the case of the two university students, the offending student 
told his Southern friend that hurling reproaches and demanding duels was behavior 
unworthy of him.  In the case of the Tokyo train drunkard, rather than compounding 
the shame over various plights underlying the drunk’s violence, the old man spoke 
compassionately to the drunk as though he were speaking to anyone whom he valued.  
Edward Richards made a gesture of friendship to a threatening and angry gun-wielder.  
The gun-wielder’s return and profuse apology suggests that Richards’ gesture helped 
him recognize that such behavior was beneath him.   




 Gilligan refers to shame as the “pathogen” which causes violence, and a pathogen which can 
be transferred from person to person (Gilligan 1997, 103-105).  In my system, then, it could be said that 
shaming is a process by which moral unhealthiness is transmitted like a contagion.  (Concerning the 
contagiousness of emotions, see also Pinker, 575-576.) 
  
37
 On reviewing his extensive work with prisoners, Gilligan observes, “the more violent an 
inmate was, the more severely he would be punished, and the more severely he was punished, the 
more violent he would become” (Gilligan 2001, 17). 
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 Consider also the case of Antoinette Tuff.  Tuff was a bookkeeper for the 
Ronald E. McNair Learning Academy, an elementary school in Decatur, Georgia.  On 
August 20, 2013, Michael Brandon Hill, a 20-year-old mentally ill male, entered the 
front office of the school carrying an AK-47 and approached Tuff.  Hill told Tuff, “We 
are all going to die today.”  Hill demanded that Tuff call the police and the media.  
After talking with a 911 operator, Hill left the front office to shoot at police officers 
assembled outside.  Tuff, still in the front office, called out to Hill: "Sweetheart, come 
back in here.  Bullets don't have no names. And those bullets gonna kill me and you. I 
need you to come back in here and it's gonna be you and me and we will work this 
thing out."  Hill complied, returned to the front office, slumped in a chair, and calmly 
said that he felt badly about his life; he was off his medication and knew he should 
have gone to the hospital instead of the school.  Hill mentioned suicide, and Tuff 
quickly interjected, “No. You don't want that. You gonna be okay. I thought the same 
thing. You know, I tried to commit suicide last year after my husband left me, but look 
at me now. I'm still working and everything is okay.”  Hill was convinced the police 
would shoot him.  Tuff offered to help Hill surrender so that they would not hurt him.  
Hill placed his weapon on a desk and laid down.  Tuff told Hill, “It's gonna be all right, 
sweetheart. I just want you to know that I love you, though, okay? And I'm proud of 
you. That's a good thing that you're just giving up and don't worry about it. We all go 
through something in life.”  The police entered the school, apprehended Hill, and Tuff 
and eight hundred elementary school children survived the ordeal without injury.38 




 Tuff consistently related to Hill in value-conferring ways.  Coaxing him back into 
the building communicated to him that his safety was worth someone’s concern.  
Discouraging him from suicide and relating her own experiences communicated that 
Hill was worth her encouragement and worthy of trusting him with her own 
experiences.  Tuff told Hill she was proud of him for resolving the situation without any 
further violence.  Tuff illustrates that pacifist alternatives combat the cause of violence 
by conferring to violent perpetrators a sense of dignity and value—the very dignity and 
value that they lack and the lack of which underlies their having become violent 
perpetrators. 
 But pacifist alternatives address the cause of violence in another way.  Consider 
the following cases.  In early twentieth century Britain, Muriel Lester was leading an 
anti-war activist meeting when a mob violently disrupted the gathering.  Lester calmly 
approached the leader of the mob and gestured to take his arm in the traditional 
manner in which a lady would receive proper escort from a male.  The mob leader 
quickly complied and took her arm.  She walked the mob leader out of the meeting 
hall and across the street, which also quelled the violent energy of the rest of the mob 
who, after witnessing the act, dispersed without further incident (Samuel, 22).   
 During the 1970’s, the police of Louisville, Kentucky implemented new 
techniques during crisis intervention calls.  Whereas they would once burst onto a 
scene with weapons drawn, they developed techniques to break the tension and avoid 
                                                                                                                                               
   
  
38
  See Blake 2014 and Cornish 2013. 
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any officer injury.  In one instance, the police entered an apartment in which a 
husband and wife were clearly in the midst of an altercation.  Rather than violently 
engage the husband, one officer calmly took off his hat and asked the husband, “Mind 
if I smoke?  Some people don’t like the smell of cigars” (Samuel, 62).  The husband 
suddenly shifted his frame of mind from abuser to hospitable host.  All the techniques 
were similarly designed to throw a violent scenario out of focus.  Upon implementing 
this new approach, police responded to twelve hundred crisis calls without a single 
officer being injured.   
 Consider an event in the life of Angie O’Gorman who relates a case of 
attempted assault and perhaps even rape. 
I was awakened late one night several years ago by a man kicking open 
the door to my bedroom.  The house was empty.  The phone was 
downstairs.  He was somewhat verbally abusive as he walked over to 
my bed.  I could not find his eyes in the darkness but could see the 
outline of his form.  As I lay there, feeling a fear and vulnerability I had 
never before experienced, several thoughts rushed through my head: 
First, the uselessness of screaming.  Second, the fallacy of thinking 
safety depends on having a gun hidden under one’s pillow.  Somehow I 
could not imagine this man standing patiently while I reached under my 
pillow for my gun.  I believe the third thought saved my life.  I realized 
with some clarity that either he and I made it through this situation 
safely—together—or we would both be damaged.  Our safety was 
connected.  If he raped me, I would be hurt both physically and 
emotionally, and he would be hurt as well.  If he went to prison, the 
damage would be greater.  That thought disarmed me.  It also released 
me from paralysis and a desire to lash out.  It freed me from fear’s 
control over my ability to respond even though I still had feelings of 
fear.  I found myself acting out of concern for the safety of us both, 
reacting with firmness but with little hostility in my voice.  I asked him 
what time it was.  He answered.  That was a good sign.  I commented 
that his watch and the clock on my night table had different times.  His 
said 2:30, mine said 2:45.  I had just set mine.  I hoped his watch wasn’t 
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broken.  When had he last set it?  He answered.  I answered.  The time 
seemed endless. When the atmosphere began to calm a little, I asked 
him how he had gotten into the house.  He’d broken through the glass 
in the back door.  I told him that presented me with a problem: I did not 
have the money to buy new glass.  He talked about some financial 
difficulties of his own.  We talked until we were no longer strangers and 
I felt safe to ask him to leave.  He didn’t want to; he said he had no 
place to go.  Knowing I did not have the physical power to force him 
out, I told him firmly but respectfully, as equal to equal, that I would 
give him a clean set of sheets, but he would have to make his own bed 
downstairs.  He went downstairs, and I sat up in bed, wide awake and 
shaking for the rest of the night.  The next morning we ate breakfast 
together and he left. (O’Gorman, 242-246) 
 In another case, an older woman was walking down a city street carrying bags 
full of shopping.  She noticed that men were walking behind her quickly enough to 
catch up to her.  Once they were near, they began to surround her.  She was confident 
they meant to attack.  Before either of them could touch her, she looked at both and 
grinned, thrusting out her shopping bags.  She shouted that she was so glad they came 
along because she was starting to feel nervous walking alone on the street and her 
bags were becoming very heavy.  She asked them, “Would you please help me?”  The 
men seemed instinctively to take the bags from her and walked her home as she 
cheerily thanked them for their kindness (Gish, 20). 
These four cases illustrate the previous means by which violence is combatted.  
In each case, arguably, the perpetrator was dignified—related to in a way that 
conferred the social capital the perpetrator was lacking.  But the examples illustrate 
another way in which pacifist alternatives combat violence.  Violent conflicts are 
instances of a script.  Persons have conceptual representations of stereotyped event 
sequences—“scripts”—and these scripts are activated when persons involved expect 
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events to unfold in a way sufficiently similar to that stereotype (Abelson 1981, 715).  In 
violent conflicts, perpetrators are engaged in acting through that script. Within that 
script, there is some room for variety and improvisation, but there are definite limits; 
that is, there are only certain types or a limited number of obstacles or “errors” that a 
script can overcome (Abelson 1981, 724).  If the person with whom the violent 
perpetrator is interacting does not react or respond within that range of variety, then 
the scripted intentions and actions of a violent perpetrator are not prompted.  By 
playing the part well, so to speak, the violent perpetrator can compel the victim to 
engage in those scripted responses.  And so it is easy for the victim to give the violent 
perpetrator the kind of responses demanded by the script unwittingly, and therefore, 
it is easy for the victim to allow the violent-conflict script to control the scenario.  The 
victim responds to the perpetrator with flight, fight, posturing, or submission—the last 
of which gives the counterfeit respect the perpetrator is looking for (Grossman, 5-6).   
However, the victim need not allow the violent-conflict script to control the 
scenario.  There are what Robert Abelson calls “distractions”—events “of sufficient 
salience or importance to interrupt script action” (Abelson 1981, 724).  One type of 
distraction, I believe, could be a script-change.  The victim could initiate a different 
script altogether—one the responses and actions of which are incompatible with the 
violent-conflict script.  This would involve committing an action that is, first, an error 
outside the violent-conflict script’s range for variety, thus violating the violent-conflict 
script’s “internal coherence” (Abelson 1981, 726), and, second, an invitation to a 
different script.  If the victim initiates such a script compellingly enough, it may, in 
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turn, become quite easy for the perpetrator to play along with the new script rather 
than continue trying to enact the violent-conflict script. 
 This is not as metaphorical as it sounds.  Humans often experience interactions 
with people where the flow of those interactions is second nature.39  Upon reaching 
adulthood, many of us have been thoroughly habituated in various interaction-types.  
We know how to play out basic small talk interactions, meal time interactions, 
guest/host interactions, work-related interactions, etc.  In fact, inasmuch as we have 
participated in those interaction-types a considerable number of times, we have, in a 
sense, rehearsed them in preparation for future occurrences of those interactions.  
This rehearsal is important because it ensures we will not have to think much about 
the proper response at any given time because we can produce proper responses 
instinctively or spontaneously.40  This is what the violent perpetrator is counting on.41  
If the violent perpetrator initiates the violent-conflict interaction compellingly enough, 
then the victim will instinctively produce the responses needed for the interaction to 
occur more or less as the perpetrator predicts.   
 Pacifist alternatives involve both a refusal to accept the script initiated by the 
violent perpetrator and an initiation of a different script altogether, prompting the 




 See Abelson 1976. 
40
 In fact, responses can be produced in such an autopilot fashion that we can confuse 
responses within the same family of script prompts, for example, responding “Thanks, you too” to 
someone who wishes us a happy birthday. 
41
 In the case of confrontations with fellow humans, our tendency to flee, fight, posture, or 
submit may be due more to nature than nurture (Grossman, 7f).  But these responses can be reinforced 
by enculturation, and more importantly to my argument, these scripted responses (whether that script 
is written neurologically or socially) operate amidst a host of other scripts that function similarly even if 
those other scripts are primarily or solely social rather than neurological. 
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perpetrator’s instinctive responses to some non-violent script.  In so doing, the violent 
intentions of the perpetrator are, in a sense, “turned off” or set aside, and a new set of 
intentions and instincts are “turned on.”  A person committed to the implementation 
of such pacifist alternatives, in effect, refuses to be “infected by the weaknesses of any 
attacker” (Samuel, 38), but instead aims to infect the attacker with moral healthiness 
by way of enacting a script in which the would-be perpetrator plays a far more 
dignified role than that of a violent perpetrator.42  Inasmuch as pacifist alternatives 
dispel or supplant violent intentions and confer lost dignity and respect, they do more 
to reduce violence than MCV.  Therefore, pacifist alternatives are morally healthier 
than acts of MCV. 
 
3.2.5 Pacifist Alternatives do not Legitimate or Enable Perpetrators 
Pacifist alternatives, unlike their violent counterparts, neither legitimate 
violence nor enable the violent perpetrator.  Consider some examples.  In his critique 




 There is perhaps another mechanism by which pacifist alternatives directly address 
underlying causes of violence.  Alan Fiske and Philip Tetlock argue that social relationships are governed 
by four separate relational models, two of which are communal sharing (relational models of family, 
tribe, and community) and equality matching (relational models that govern fairness and perhaps 
contractual agreements).  In most cultures, the moral significance, valuation, and motivational strength 
of the communal sharing model outweigh the equality matching model (Fiske & Tetlock, 278).  It is a 
myth that violence stems from lack of moral motivation; rather, a great deal of violence is motivated by 
what the perpetrator sees as moral concerns (Pinker, 83-84; Black, 34).  Inasmuch as violent 
perpetrators feel shamed, their actions likely fall within the equality matching model—the model within 
which tit-for-tat or justice for unfair treatment is appropriate (Fiske & Tetlock, 258).  Pacifist alternatives 
are largely characteristic of the communal sharing model, and therefore have greater moral significance 
and motivational strength.  Inasmuch as they motivate a would-be perpetrator to give up framing the 
interaction according to the equality matching model and adopt the communal sharing frame, they 
create social interactions in which even the would-be perpetrator can see that violence (even morally 
motivated violence) is inappropriate.  MCV, on the other hand, represents acceptance (or, more 
accurately, acquiescence) of the perpetrator’s equality matching frame. 
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of utilitarianism, Bernard Williams presents the following hypothetical scenario (Smart 
& Williams, 98 - 99).  Jim is a botanist on a research expedition in South America.  The 
country in which he is conducting research is politically volatile.  Jim stumbles into a 
small village where a captain of military forces loyal to the government is holding 
natives hostage because he suspects they are rebels.  The captain notices Jim and 
involves him in the hostage scenario.  There are twenty natives along a wall, and 
several members of the captain’s regiment are holding them at gunpoint.  The captain 
hands Jim a gun and gives Jim a choice: either Jim kills one of the natives and the 
captain will free the other nineteen, or else the captain will order his men to kill all 
twenty.  Jim lacks the skills necessary to shoot his way out of the scenario.  The captain 
seems quite resolved, and even the natives begin to implore Jim to comply and kill one 
of them.   
Consider a similar example.  In the movie The Dark Knight, there is a scene in 
which The Joker, a psychopathic criminal, conducts “a social experiment.”  There are 
two ferries: one carrying commuters and the other transferring prisoners.  With the 
boats in sight of each other, the Joker disables the engines.  The Joker tells both sets of 
passengers both boats have been rigged with explosives.  On the commuter ferry, 
there is a device that will detonate the bomb on the prisoners’ ferry.  On the prisoners’ 
ferry, there is a device that will detonate the commuter ferry’s bomb.  If the prisoners 
choose to use their detonator, the Joker will let the prisoners live, and likewise for the 
commuters.  If neither detonator is activated within a time limit, the Joker will 
detonate both bombs.  The commuter ferry decides to put the decision to a vote.  It 
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turns out the majority of the commuters are in favor of using their detonator.  Just as 
the results are announced, they realize a significant amount of time has passed 
without blowing up; the prisoners have not decided to blow up the commuters.  This 
causes hesitation among the commuters.  On the prisoners’ boat, a large, intimidating 
inmate approaches the prison warden who has possession of the detonator.  The 
inmate calmly and quietly tells the warden,  
You don’t want to die, but you don’t know how to take a life.  Give it to 
me; these men would kill you, and take it anyway. Give it to me. You 
can tell 'em I took it by force. Give it to me, and I'll do what you shoulda 
did ten minutes ago. (Nolan 2008) 
The bewildered warden slowly hands the detonator to the prisoner who immediately 
throws the detonator out the ferry window into the water.  In the end, the commuter 
boat never uses their detonator to blow up the prisoners, and the Joker is 
apprehended before he can blow up both ferries. 
 In both scenarios, the perpetrators (the captain and The Joker) claim that the 
targets (Jim and the ferry passengers) already inhabit circumstances in which it is 
certain there are only the possible outcomes the perpetrators claim.  But, in fact, 
whether they are the only possible outcomes is not at all certain.  There are numerous 
imaginable outcomes to both scenarios other than those the perpetrators mention.  
So, in making this claim, the perpetrators assume a certain role—that of assuming the 
power to control and dictate the circumstances, options, and outcomes to the targets.  
However, the claim is presented to the targets in such a way that the targets appear 
not to have the chance either to question the perpetrators’ legitimacy to assume that 
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power or to consider the targets’ own role in granting the perpetrators that power.  
Thus, participating according to the terms as dictated in a sense skips this 
consideration. 
For Jim to choose to shoot one native to save nineteen would be tacit 
acceptance of the terms the captain dictated; it would imply an agreement to play a 
game constructed by the captain.  For Jim to shoot the one enables the captain to play 
the role of situation-dictator.  (Arguably, Jim would also enable the captain to continue 
to initiate such games in the future.)  It would validate the terms and the captain as 
dictator of those terms in a way that refusing to shoot (or even taking the gun in the 
first place) would not.  The prisoner’s act of throwing the detonator out the ferry 
window indicated not only a refusal to accept The Joker’s terms and the legitimacy of 
the Joker to dictate such terms, but also a refusal to act in any way that might 
constitute participation in The Joker’s perpetrator script.  Using the detonator would 
be, in a sense, choosing to play the Joker’s game and would validate the game in a way 
that refusing to play does not.  If we engage perpetrators according to the terms they 
dictate, we enable them to be term-dictators, and we allow them to make us 
participants in terms that ought not to be the case and perpetrators of acts we would 
otherwise not commit.  The prisoner’s act of throwing the detonator out the window 
signifies that to participate would concede more to a perpetrator than just the 
possible death of the commuter ferry passengers.  Much more.43  




 And in a significant moral sense, the act does not concede the commuters’ deaths.  The 
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 There are examples of this refusal-to-legitimate outside bizarre fictional cases.  
Consider when someone asks childish, inane questions or engages in petty insults.  
One standard response is: “I’m not even going to dignify that with a response.”  Of 
course, this phrase may merely be an assertion of one’s own moral superiority and 
thus little more than smugness.  But I take it there are occasions upon which the most 
appropriate thing to do is not to respond in any way that validates the prompt or 
prompter.  Perhaps any direct response would be on par with the prompt and thus 
would involve a tacit bestowal of more credit or value than ought to be given to such 
prompts or prompters.44  To do so would cheapen the responder.  A similar rationale 
underlies the belief that we should not negotiate with terrorists.  Even to begin to 
negotiate with terrorists concedes too much; it legitimizes the terrorists’ means and 
methods and gives a tacit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the terrorists’ 
organization as a political entity.45  Even if terrorists can make good on threats and do 
real damage, to negotiate with them concedes too much and perhaps taints the one 
                                                                                                                                               
prisoner likely recognized that throwing the detonator out the window did not eliminate the possibility 
that the commuters might die by The Joker’s hand.  But since the act constituted a refusal to accept The 
Joker’s terms, it constituted a rejection that those passengers ought to die according to The Joker’s 
terms.  Philosophers who hold there is no significant moral difference between killing and letting die fail 
to appreciate the significance of such actions.  The prisoner did not let passengers die; his act 
constituted a refusal to accept that their death was his to allow or disallow. 
44
 Interestingly, even some forms of honor violence acknowledge this dynamic.  In the case of 
dueling, only members of a certain social status were eligible to duel.  To accept a duel-challenge would 
be an acknowledgement of the challenger’s eligibility and thus social status.  A duel could be 
(honorably) refused on the grounds of refusing to acknowledge the challenger’s social status.  In other 
words, refusing a duel challenge may signal that the challenger lacks the social capital to purchase the 
right to make the challenge.  See Allen and Reed 2006. 
45
 Harmonie Toros argues that certain methods of negotiation may transform terrorists, causing 
them to forego their means and methods (Toros 2008).  But Toros’s point is that not all forms of 
negotiation constitute legitimizing terrorists qua terrorists, and therefore, her argument is compatible 
with my own.  
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willing to negotiate inasmuch as it is what Thomas Merton calls “collaboration with 
evil” (Merton, 40). 
 Pacifist dilemmas are relevantly similar to the cases above.  In the cases of 
honor, self-defensive, and interventionist dilemmas, there is an initiator.  Someone is 
(at least partly) responsible for placing us in the situation where we are morally 
compelled to commit violence.  There is a person who makes an assault on our honor, 
our life or well-being, or the life or well-being of some third party.  That initiator has, in 
effect, invited us to play a game—a game where each player has conflicting goals and 
seems to have a fixed set of options to accomplish her goal at the expense of the other 
person’s goal; and assuming the stakes or circumstances are as the initiator has 
dictated, the best option appears to be violence.  Granted, there are those who take 
up that invitation to play the game who have worthy goals to play for.  They aim to 
prevent themselves or their family from suffering socially-imposed consequences of 
dishonor.  They aim to prevent their own deaths.  They aim to prevent some third 
party from being harmed.  They aim to prevent the initiator from causing whatever 
harm or damage is intended.  But in an evaluative sense, there is something wrong 
with the game itself.  Sometimes when things go too far and we have a sense of 
tragedy over what we feel compelled to do, we ask questions like, “Why did it have to 
come to this?”  We have a strong sense that there is something bad about the fact that 
it has “come to this.”  I believe what we are expressing is that such states of affairs 




 Acts of MCV legitimize the initiator’s violence by overlooking the moral 
importance of the point of invitation to the game.  Of course, when a person finds 
herself in pacifist dilemma, it does not seem as though she received an invitation.  
Terms are not always laid out as carefully as the captain’s or The Joker’s.  Rather, in 
pacifist dilemmas, the game initiator often performs some act that presupposes both 
parties are already playing the game.  But the point of invitation is key to the issue of 
legitimacy.  To commit MCV is to accept the invitation.  And so, MCV concedes 
altogether that the state of affairs that ought not to obtain has obtained, that the kind 
of game that should not be played is being played, and that it has “come to this.”  As a 
result, legitimacy is granted to the game and the initiator.   
 The question of legitimacy is often skipped because it is so often assumed there 
are no other options but to win or lose according to the initiator’s terms, and it is also 
assumed that refusing to commit MCV entails accepting loss under those terms, 
resigning the achievement of ends which make the need to commit violence so 
morally compelling in the first place.  John Lewis criticizes pacifism on these grounds, 
equating the refusal to commit MCV with an attempt to “contract out of the situation” 
(Lewis, 37-38).  This is short-sighted.  Pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than 
acts of MCV because by design they constitute a refusal to contract into the 
“situation”—that is, the terms the perpetrator attempts to dictate.46  The violent 




 As Hannah Arendt notes, “power is never the property of an individual…When we say of 
somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of 
people” (Arendt, 44).  Arendt’s point concerns political power, but it is quite applicable to pacifist 
dilemmas.  Non-pacifists advocating MCV fail to address the question of whether violent perpetrators 
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perpetrator is the one who, in effect, claims that the only options for the target are to 
commit MCV or allow the perpetrator to carry out her will; and the perpetrator does 
so in a way that gives the target the impression there never was a chance to refuse 
those terms.  By criticizing pacifists for attempting to “contract out of the situation,” 
Lewis has, in effect, conceded that the perpetrator is always right.47 
Pacifist alternatives are responses to such situations as they are and not as the 
perpetrator attempts to dictate them to be.  Consider an example involving a young 
bank trainee.  An armed robber approached her and slid a classic bank robbery note 
across her teller counter.  He had a gun cradled under his arm but plainly visible to her.  
Upon reading the note, she spontaneously burst out, “You can’t do that, it’s against 
the law” (Samuel, 33-34).  The crook stood befuddled.  What could he possibly do if 
she would not even entertain the idea of playing his game?  The robber simply turned 
and ran out of the bank.  Not only did the young woman not give the robber any 
money, but she did not even entertain that the person across from her had legitimate 
place to assume such a role and dictate such terms. 
                                                                                                                                               
ought to be empowered to control the scenario or limit the targets options in the first place.  The violent 
perpetrator can only maintain control for as long as the target is willing to cooperate according to the 
violent perpetrator’s terms.  From the perspective of moral health pacifism, non-pacifist MCV advocates 
hand over power too easily. 
47
 Psychologist Robert Abelson points out that for scripted behavior to occur, there are three 
conditions: first, the individual must recognize the script, second, the individual must be presented with 
a context that evokes the script, and most importantly, and third, the individual must enter the script 
(Abelson 1981, 719).  Lewis ignores this third condition—that it is up to a person whether to participate 
in a script (Abelson 1976, 42-43).  I am contending here that pacifist alternatives are better than MCV 
because violent-conflict scripts do not merit (in an evaluative sense) participation, acts of MCV 
constitute participation, and pacifist alternatives do not. 
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Williams’ Jim-and-the-Natives case is interesting in this regard because of its 
eerie similarity to a real world case.  In 1987, farmers living in the La India region of 
Columbia were confronted by a military captain.  The captain issued them an 
ultimatum: either join his ranks and engage in killing suspected rebels, or he would 
take their refusal to join as proof they themselves were rebels, in which case he would 
kill them.  One farmer responded to the captain more or less by pointing out that the 
captain’s ultimatum was a false dichotomy.  He spoke on behalf of the group and 
refused to select either option the captain presented, and then chided the captain for 
the captain’s obvious moral failure.  Interestingly, the situation resolved peacefully 
(Lederach, 13-16). 
Pacifist alternatives aim to prevent harm and save lives.  But pacifist 
alternatives can do something more than their violent counterparts: they can avoid 
legitimizing violence, legitimizing the terms initiated by violent perpetrators, and 
legitimizing violent perpetrators qua violent perpetrators.  Thereby, these pacifist 
alternatives are more effective than their violent counterparts at ensuring that states 
of affairs that ought not to obtain do not, in fact, obtain.  I maintain that in virtue of 
having some or all of the above five features, pacifist alternatives are more morally 






3.3 Pacifist Alternatives require Moral Healthiness 
 The third claim of moral health pacifism is this: Pacifist alternatives, on the 
whole, have prerequisite levels of moral health (“MHP3”).  The previous claim, MHP2, 
is worded to focus on actions that constitute pacifist alternatives in isolation from the 
persons that might perform those actions.  MHP3 concerns the relation between 
pacifist alternatives and persons that might perform them.  While there may be (on 
the whole) a pacifist alternative (action) in any given pacifist dilemma, it is not the case 
that any given person could perform that pacifist alternative. 
MHP3 entails that persons who lack the prerequisite level of moral health will 
not be able to perform certain pacifist alternatives.  Prima facie, this is a weak claim.  
The same could be said of telling the truth or refraining from murder.  I intend MHP3 
to convey something more robust.  Not all pacifist alternatives will have the same level 
of prerequisite moral health, but, on the whole, pacifist alternatives have prerequisite 
levels of moral health that are higher than the levels required by acts of MCV.   
Further, meeting the level requirements may be insufficient.  Recall that a 
person’s location on E-mhp is determined by a broad range of factors.  While a certain 
location on E-mhp indicates the overall moral health of a person, it alone does not 
indicate the combination of factors determining that location.  To make effective use 
of pacifist alternatives to violence, in many cases a person needs not only a certain 
level of moral health, but a certain combination of moral health determining factors.  
To defend MHP3, I will present five cases of pacifist alternatives which represent the 
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demanding nature of pacifist alternatives on agents who perform them, I will identify 
some common elements included in the moral health required to perform pacifist 
alternatives, and I will briefly consider the agent-centered nature of moral health 
pacifism given MHP3. 
 
3.3.1 Five Cases of Pacifist Alternatives 
 Case 1: Gladys Aylward was conducting relief work in China in the 1930’s; she 
was authorized by a provincial governor in northern China to enforce a new law 
forbidding foot-binding for young girls.48  Once, the governor summoned her to come 
to the prison during a riot.  Though her work was unrelated to prisons, she went.  
Upon arrival, she learned the riot was beyond the guards’ control.  The officials were 
convinced Aylward could stop the riot.  Apparently, when Aylward had explained her 
presence to locals as religious missionary work, many took her to claim supernatural 
abilities.  This is, of course, not what she meant.  But every officer present expected 
her to go in and stop the riot.   
She entered the prison courtyard where cages lined the wall.  There were 
bloodied carcasses on the ground, some prisoners in the throes of altercations, and 
one prisoner holding an ax, chasing several others; in all, fifty or sixty men were 
involved.  She commandingly approached the ax-wielder and demanded he give it to 




 Concerning the practice of foot-binding, see Ebrey, 160-161. 
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her.  All the prisoners were stunned.  He complied, and she demanded they form a line 
in front of her (which they did), scolded them, and demanded an explanation.   
The prisoners only ate if relatives sent food to the prison.  Prisoners were 
allowed an ax for an hour a day to cut whatever food they were sent.  If no food was 
sent to a prisoner, he sat in his cage and watched the others eat.  No one was certain 
how the riot started.  Prisoners had argued about who got the ax first, others joined 
the dispute, a riot ensued, and eventually all prisoners managed to get out of their 
cages.  The prisoners explained how bleak their conditions were.  She told them she 
would speak to the governor but that they had better have their “mess” cleaned 
before he entered the prison.  When she approached the governor, he was beaming 
with gratitude for Aylward’s success.  Irately, she told the governor the riot was his 
fault given the conditions under which he expected the prisoners to live.  She 
demanded the governor give the prisoners a means of labor and employment while in 
prison so they could earn enough money to buy food and regain some self-respect 
(Burgess 1996).49   
 Case 2: According to Flavius Josephus, Pilate, procurator of Judea, introduced 
Caesar’s effigies into Jerusalem.  The Jews took this as a violation of their religious laws 
concerning idols.  Multitudes of Jews travelled to see Pilate and spent days imploring 
him to remove the images.  Pilate refused on the grounds that removing the images 
would injure Caesar’s rule.  On the sixth day of the ordeal, the Jews again pled for the 




 Aylward’s life story is depicted in the film The Inn of the Sixth Happiness (Robson 1958). 
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images to be removed.  Pilate ordered soldiers to surround the Jews and threatened 
the Jews with death unless they ceased their requests.  The Jews threw themselves on 
the ground, showing their necks.  They said they were willing to die rather than see 
their laws transgressed.  Pilate was jarred by their commitment to their laws and 
promptly commanded that the images be removed.50 
 Case 3: Nineteenth century abolitionist, pacifist, and New England Non-
Resistance Society member Henry C. Wright once engaged in a conversation about 
non-resistance in a Philadelphia hotel.  A military officer overheard Wright’s 
conversation and was enraged by Wright’s position.  The officer approached Wright 
and struck him.  Wright took no notice of being hit and continued the conversation.  
The officer hit him a second time with the same result.  The officer hit him a third time 
so hard that Wright was knocked down.  Recovering himself and visibly injured, Wright 
took the officer’s hand and said, “I feel no unkindness towards you, and hope soon to 
see you at my house.”  At dawn the next morning, the officer came to Wright’s house, 
explaining to Wright he had been in agony all night.  The officer was convinced Wright 
would become violent when attacked, but Wright did not.  The officer was conscience-
stricken by this and begged Wright’s forgiveness (Ballou 2006, 134-135). 
 Case 4: Consider the case of a Czech couple who owned an inn.  As they slept 
one night, the wife was awakened by the sight of a man with a knife approaching the 
bed.  She spoke calmly to him, “You can kill us, but first let me make you a cup of 




 See Josephus’s Antiquities 18:3:1. 
139 
 
coffee.”  The man put away his weapon, accepted her offer, and lost all his violent 
intentions (Aukerman, 18).  
Case 5: Once, a man was at a bus station.  As he came out of the station, a man 
approached him with a gun and muttered something about money.  The man ignored 
the gun and exclaimed, “It’s cold! Why don’t you take my jacket?”  The man proceeded 
to put his jacket around the gunman, but before the gunman could respond, the man 
continued, “I was just going for something to eat.  Why don’t you join me?”  The man 
later offered the gunman money, but the gunman refused to accept it (Samuel, 89-90).
  
3.3.2 The Demanding Nature of Pacifist Alternatives 
 The above five cases illustrate how prerequisite moral health levels for 
performing pacifist alternatives can be relatively stringent.  Pacifist alternatives do not 
all require the same level of moral health, and perhaps some pacifist alternatives can 
be performed with a lowered degree of effectiveness by persons with lower moral 
health levels.  Generally, though, pacifist alternatives require demanding levels of 
moral health comprised of certain factors.  This is so for at least four reasons. 
 First, pacifist alternatives are alternatives to MCV.  Because pacifist dilemmas 
are cases where the stakes are high or the sense of urgency to do something is great, 
they require agents to pull from at-the-ready resources.  There is no time for careful 
deliberation or option weighing.  The person in a pacifist dilemma must act in a way 
that requires little of either.  Whatever action the person performs will likely be a 
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product of that person’s non-deliberative functions (instincts, second-nature, etc.).  
Violence in such cases is thought to be just such a response—visceral, instinctive, or at 
least ingrained.   
Performing pacifist alternatives effectively requires such actions to be second-
nature for the persons.  The sense of urgency is a function of the situation, not the 
actions being performed.  The stakes of the situation compel the person to respond 
somehow.  To perform a pacifist alternative, a person must have engaged in activities 
prior to encountering a pacifist dilemma that allowed pacifist alternatives not only to 
be an at-the-ready resource, but an at-the-ready resource that dominates other 
visceral responses to pacifist dilemmas. 
Second, consider the reactions illustrated in the above five cases and the kinds 
of preparation they might require.  In Case 4 and Case 5 (and perhaps Case 3), the 
targets reacted to the violent perpetrators with hospitality.  The hospitality likely 
undercut the violent intentions of the perpetrators for a couple of reasons.  The show 
of hospitality likely enacted a script-change, and the perpetrator instinctively reacted 
as a guest rather than a perpetrator.  The show of hospitality conferred social value on 
the perpetrator—“you are worth regarding as a guest whom I have the honor to 
host.”51  In any event, a hospitable gesture was an at-the-ready response for such 
persons in urgent situations in which other persons may have instinctively committed 
acts of self-defensive violence.   




 Underlying the script change may also be a switch from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum 
game which changes the incentives for violence (Pinker, 76). 
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In Case 1, Aylward’s response to the prison riot involved sympathy and 
compassion.  Arguably, Aylward’s reaction involved a script-change that prompted 
prisoners’ intuitive response to an authority figure against which they would not be 
inclined to rebel—perhaps a mother.  But additionally, Aylward’s actions characterize 
the prisoners as fellow persons of whom better ought to be expected and who ought 
to expect better of themselves.  Asking the prisoners to explain and offering to speak 
to the governor validated the prisoners’ experiences and plight, thus conferring social 
value.  Aylward’s handling of the situation expresses a sense of tragedy about the 
prisoners’ actions and conditions—a sense that things ought not to be this way and 
even the prisoners know this.  Aylward’s resources of sympathy and compassion had 
to be not only at-the-ready, but more at-the-ready than the instinct to commit MCV. 
In Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3, the (potential) targets evinced some degree of 
fearlessness or control over fear.  All three targets were in situations that involved 
threats to their safety.  Some of the prisoners may have turned their violent energies 
onto Aylward.  For all the Jews knew, Pilate may have ordered their beheading.  And 
the military officer inflicted bodily harm on Wright.  Perhaps all the targets were 
simply not afraid.  Or if they were afraid, they were not as motivated by fear of threat 
to protect themselves as they were motivated by other things—pity, compassion, 
commitment to principle, etc.  Such fearlessness allowed them to resist the 
perpetrators’ attempts to dictate or control the situation.  Fearlessness “breaks down” 
such scenarios inasmuch as it obstructs the perpetrators’ violent script (Samuel, 40). 
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The use of pacifist alternatives does not always prevent harm.  Some 
perpetrators may not be swayed by compassion or hospitality and will attack.  But 
willingness to suffer may also be a pacifist alternative.  In Case 2, Pilate and the Jews 
had incompatible goals.  Pilate’s power over the Jews consisted in nothing more than 
his threat to commit violence against them.  If the Jews were undeterred by violent 
threat, what more could Pilate do?  He could have had them killed anyway, but that is 
not what he wanted.  If they would not yield to his request under threat of death, then 
he could not win the conflict.  The Jews’ willingness to suffer prevented them from 
having to suffer.  In Case 3, Wright’s willingness to suffer injury is what deterred the 
violent perpetrator.52  In both cases, the Jews and Wright had to be in some sense 
more inclined to suffer attack than to commit acts of MCV. 
Some may object that there are violent perpetrators whose lone goal is the 
infliction of injury or death; such perpetrators are disanalogous to Pilate and the 
military officer, and thus, willingness to suffer is useless against them.  First, it is not 
clear this is true.  The perpetrator who merely wishes to injure may still be moved by 
how apparently unmoved the target is by threat of injury or death.  Secondly, this 
objection also applies to MCV.  If a person commits MCV, she has already risked death 
or injury inasmuch as she has initiated (or accepted the perpetrator’s initiation of) a 




 Willingness to suffer attack is recommended by both Ballou and Gandhi as the alternative 
superior to interventionist violence.  Concerning cases of third parties under attack, Ballou writes, “one 
may nobly throw his body as a temporary barrier between the destroyer and his helpless victim, 
choosing to die in that position, rather than be a passive spectator” (Ballou 2006, 4).  Gandhi was 
convinced that interposing oneself between the perpetrator and victim and willingly receiving attack 
without retaliation would sway the perpetrator: “I give you my promise that the whole of the violence 
will be expended on you and [the victim] will be left unscathed” (Gandhi 2013, 443). 
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violent conflict with a perpetrator bent on killing or injuring her.  If she would 
inevitably suffer severe injury or death after having expressed a willingness to suffer, 
there is no guarantee she would have avoided such had she committed MCV.  The 
relevant question concerns counterfactual probabilities: would she have been more 
likely to avoid injury and death had she committed an act of MCV?  Again, I cannot 
refer to statistical data to defend my position here, but I maintain that on the whole 
she will fare better using pacifist alternatives for all the reasons mentioned in defense 
of MHP2. 
The point remains that pacifist alternatives require persons to develop 
tendencies toward act-types which are likely not instinctive for most persons, 
especially not in pacifist dilemmas.  Pacifist alternatives may require of persons a 
tendency to offer hospitality, compassion, or sympathy even to violent perpetrators.53  
Pacifist alternatives may require of persons fearlessness and willingness to suffer even 
under lethal threat.  These responses are likely not enculturated in most persons and 
may even require overcoming one’s instinctive tendencies to perform them effectively. 
Third, part of the preparation required to perform pacifist alternatives 
effectively may be significant changes to a person’s moral judgment-making 




 John Lewis writes, “Very many pacifists, perhaps most, would lose their pacifism in an instant 
if anything they seriously valued were threatened by violence” (J. Lewis, 62).  Sadly, I think Lewis is 
probably right.  But, of course, what any given person who professes pacifism would do in such a case 
does not entail that pacifism is false, only that she is unwilling or unable to practice it.  But, more 
importantly, Lewis has inadvertently detected that pacifism (at least the moral health kind) requires 
significant changes to what one values.  According to St. Maximus the Confessor, it likely requires the 
renunciation of possessions and the ability to value money and positions significantly less than people 
(Merton, 37-38).   
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tendencies.  Various theories based primarily in DCM are predicated on notions of 
rights, indebtedness, duties, penal codes, merit, etc.  The habit of making judgments 
on these bases can create a strong tendency toward thinking, as Henry Hodgkin 
describes, there are people toward whom we ought to be hard-hearted, “closing the 
channels of pity toward them” (H. Hodgkin, 39).  The tendency toward judgments of 
these kinds, then, can serve as a significant obstacle to performing pacifist alternatives 
in pacifist dilemmas.  Being quick to perceive people as rule-breakers and assess what 
they are owed, deserve, or have merited can easily lead to the judgment that 
perpetrators do not deserve compassion, sympathy, or hospitality.  Thus, tendencies 
toward primarily deontological judgments can be inimical to developing the second 
nature required to perform pacifist alternatives effectively.54  One’s hypological 
judgments likely also need to be retrained if one tends to see wrongdoers as primarily 
the appropriate objects of contempt or rage.  The effective use of pacifist alternatives 
requires habituating oneself away from moral judgments that are acutely 
condemnatory or censorious of parties at fault. 
Fourth, pacifist alternatives require overcoming psychological social distance.  
Generally, persons have a strong natural resistance to using lethal violence against 
other humans (Grossman, 4).  One factor that allows some persons to overcome that 




 In this respect, moral health pacifism is of the variety which Angelo Corlett claims “denies the 
importance of punishment and its key underlying concepts” (Corlett, 947).  I am basically arguing that 
moral health pacifists must become persons who relinquish all claims to the role of interpersonal 
punishers.   This makes moral health pacifism particularly demanding in view of evidence that persons’ 
decisions are often driven by concerns of merit and desert even when they report strong concern for 
mere deterrence (Carlsmith et al 2002). 
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resistance is psychological distance between the subject and object of violence.  There 
is a strong connection between one’s ability to engage in destructive, aggressive 
behaviors and emotional withdrawal from the object of those behaviors (Fromm, 123).  
Persons who commit acts of MCV likely need the presence of moral and social distance 
between themselves and perpetrators (Grossman, 160ff).55  But inasmuch as persons 
identify with perpetrators and are not emotionally withdrawn from the perpetrators, 
they will be less able to overcome that natural resistance (Grossman, 169).   
However, there are ways persons can develop that psychological distance over 
time.  If there is sufficient social input to form perpetrator stereotypes, and if a 
stereotype has features which generate psychological distance between the person 
and others the stereotype represents, then there is already psychological distance 
between the person and potential perpetrators before and without having actually 
encountered such persons.56  Reacting to perpetrators with compassion, sympathy, or 
hospitality likely requires the ability to identify with them.  Thus, to perform pacifist 
alternatives that rely on such reactions, a person will likely have to cultivate in herself 




 Even Locke compares violent aggressors to “wild savage beasts” when justifying violence 
against such persons (Locke, §11). 
56
 Such a process suggests how psychological distance may causally contribute to their having 
become perpetrators which in turn reinforces the psychological distance.  The psychological distance 
may motivate behaviors which fail to confer social value on persons who appear to resemble the 
stereotype.  The failure to be valued creates shame in certain persons.  Such shamed persons seek some 
substitute for respect by way of violence.  Such persons act as perpetrators and provide more fodder for 
the formation of perpetrator stereotypes.  This psychological distance may constitute a form of 
ostracism or social exclusion the experience of which has been shown to correlative positively with 
aggression (Warburton et al 2006). 
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the ability to identify with persons toward whom she may previously have developed 
psychological distance.57   
Summarily, the effective use of pacifist alternatives likely requires significant 
commitment and preparation.  Some may object by claiming that pacifist alternatives 
could be employed as a ruse or trickery to deflect violent intentions and not as 
genuine expressions of, say, hospitality, in which case pacifist alternatives do not seem 
terribly demanding.  However, even feigned hospitality may not come easily for many 
people in pacifist dilemmas, and thus would still require preparation.  If one were to go 
to the trouble of preparing to have feigned hospitality at-the-ready, why not prepare 
to offer genuine hospitality?  More to the point, though, genuine expressions of 
hospitality are more effective as pacifist alternatives than insincere ones.  It is the 
genuineness that partly contributes to the effective script change and undercuts 
violent intentions.  And being able to offer genuine hospitality to persons who, from 
deontological and hypological points of view, do not deserve it and deserve much 








 Some research shows that engaging in a variety of activities all of which constitute identifying 
with members of outgroups and other races can reduce various types of subconscious biases a person 




3.3.3 Pacifist Alternatives, Ceilings, and Agent Assessment 
 The nature of pacifist alternatives entails that moral health pacifism is agent-
centered in important ways.  Even if pacifist alternatives are morally healthier than 
acts of MCV, it does not follow that any given person in a pacifist dilemma can perform 
a pacifist alternative rather than an act of MCV.  Given that pacifist alternatives have 
demanding prerequisite levels of moral health, pacifist alternatives are not options 
open to everyone—perhaps not even to most persons.  Recall that the conditions 
which determine a person’s location on E-mhp at t1 also determine that person’s moral 
health ceiling and floor at t2; if ceiling relevant conditions persist, ceilings can be 
permanent.  This means there may be persons for whom the effective use of pacifist 
alternatives to violence is simply not an option and never will be; their trajectories will 
never be sufficiently positively oriented to meet the level of moral health required to 
perform pacifist alternatives at some future point. 
 Even if there are acts which are morally healthier, a person’s act may be the 
most morally healthy action available to her; she is doing the best she can.58  Given 
that the claims of moral health pacifism are strictly evaluative in nature, they do not 
necessarily entail D-scale or H-scale readings of a person who commits MCV.  Moral 




 Thus, moral health pacifism is consistent with the claim that MCV is choice-worthy.  As Ralph 
Wedgwood explains, “The degree to which an option is (all things considered) a good thing for you to do 
now is the same as the degree to which it is appropriate or fitting for you to choose to perform that 
option now…Choiceworthiness is not a kind of absolute goodness…it is both agent-relative and time-
relative” (Wedgwood 2009, 502). 
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health pacifism does not entail that the person who commits MCV is blameworthy.59  
It does not entail that any given person who performs a pacifist alternative is more 
praiseworthy than any given person who performs MCV.  It does not entail that any 
given person is obligated to orient her moral health trajectory toward pacifist 
alternative prerequisite levels.  This lack of obligation is consistent with the claim that 
everyone ought (in the evaluative sense) to have positively-oriented moral health 
trajectories.  Moral health pacifism entails that some acts are morally better than acts 
of MCV, and it takes morally better people to perform them.  So, moral health pacifism 
allows that having committed acts of MCV, a person may have done the best she could 
(in an evaluative sense), she may have done the right thing (in a deontological sense), 
and she may be praiseworthy for having done so (in a hypological sense), even if such 
states of affairs ought not to be the case and conceivably there are better things to be 
done (in an evaluative sense).   
 Interestingly, it also does not follow from moral health pacifism that a person 
with the requisite moral health to perform some pacifist alternatives will be able to 
perform any possible pacifist alternative.  Not all moral health pacifists will be able to 
do what Gladys Aylward did (not even if they were similarly situated).  The fact that 
different combinations of factors can comprise a person’s level and trajectory of moral 
health suggests that certain pacifist alternatives may be options only for persons with 
certain combinations of factors but not others.  This means that within moral health 




 This point does not originate with me.  In 1916, John Wright Buckham, for example, points 
out that pacifism does not entail that soldiers ought to be condemned or scorned nor does it deny that 
they may behave nobly and admirably (Buckham, 89). 
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pacifism and the use of pacifist alternatives there is room for style.  Two persons 
similarly situated both with levels of moral health sufficient for the use of some pacifist 
alternatives may be inclined to act in two different ways, and perhaps neither could 
have acted in the way the other did, though both persons acted in ways evaluatively 
better than MCV. 
 
3.4 Pacifists are ideally or relatively-ideally morally healthy persons 
 The final claim of moral health pacifism is this: Persons who acquire pacifist 
alternative prerequisite moral health levels and who perform pacifist alternatives in 
pacifist dilemmas are ideally or relatively-ideally morally healthy persons, and there 
ought to be such persons (“MHP4”).  Basically, there ought to be moral health 
pacifists.  There is something good about there being such persons, or if there are no 
such persons, it would be better if there were such persons because such persons are 
morally valuable.60   
A moral health pacifist engages in behaviors or practices that prepare her to 
make at-the-ready use of pacifist alternatives in pacifist dilemmas.  If, through the 
relevant behaviors and practices, a person acquired a moral health level that enabled 
her to perform virtually any pacifist alternative, arguably such a person would be 
ideally morally healthy.  Whether such a person is ideally morally healthy may be a 




 Craig Ihara points out that the fact that some who are considered saintly (Buddha and Christ) 
are also considered pacifists suggests some agreement that there is something morally preferable about 
the renunciation of violence as a way of life (Ihara 1978, 369-370). 
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spurious claim to some, and some might insist that there are no such persons.  The 
claim that such a person is ideally morally healthy is not critical to my case.  It is 
enough that such a person is relatively-ideally morally healthy.  And, more importantly, 
such a person is relatively-ideally morally healthy in virtue of her moral health 
pacifism. 
 If a moral health pacifist is relatively-ideally morally healthy, her pacifist 
practices are exemplary and worthy of imitation.  She is educational in that she models 
in concrete ways actions, habits, attitudes, and traits that constitute relatively-ideal 
moral health.  And to that degree she embodies an ideally healthy state of affairs.  She 
gives others a clearer idea of what an ideally morally healthy state of affairs would be 
like.  She may also be inspirational; she shows that such ideal levels of moral health are 
achievable.  This can motivate observers to aspire to greater levels of moral health 
than they would have otherwise in order to imitate her pacifist practices. 
 In describing the different ways in which pacifist alternatives are morally 
healthier than MCV, I have suggested explanations for how pacifist alternatives work.  
But these explanations are not exhaustive.  There are likely a variety of reasons why 
pacifist alternatives do what they do.  I suspect some will remain skeptical whether 
pacifist alternatives really work.  If there were a person practicing moral health 
pacifism, she would show that exhaustive explanations of how pacifist alternatives 
work are unnecessary for being justified in believing that, in fact, they do work.  So, 
even if my suggested explanations are false or if I cannot understand how or why 
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pacifist alternatives work, in view of the moral health pacifist’s life and example, I can 
still be motivated to aspire to greater levels of moral health and thus to less violent 
ways to behave than I otherwise would have.  For at least this reason, there ought to 
be moral health pacifists.  There is at least one more reason. 
 Recall that in pacifist dilemmas a great deal might be at stake.  In cases of 
honor violence, there are many things on the line.  Failing to commit honor violence 
could be devastating to children’s futures or a family’s economic stability and freedom 
of movement.  In cases of self-defensive violence, a person’s life, bodily integrity, or 
psychological integrity may be at stake.  In cases of interventionist violence, the life or 
bodily integrity of some third party under attack is at stake.  In all these cases, if such 
persons commit acts of MCV, those persons may be doing as well as they can do given 
their moral health levels and trajectory orientations.  Persons in such situations may 
do something honorable and praiseworthy. They may have even done the right or 
permissible thing given their deontological constraints.  And they may have brought 
about desirable states of affairs—prevented significant loss of life, loss of psychological 
integrity, injury, etc.   
But it remains the case that such states of affairs ought not to obtain.  Even if 
some persons in some circumstances ought to commit violence, it ought not to be the 
case that persons ought to commit violence.  It ought not to be the case that anyone 
commits acts of self-defensive, interventionist, or honor violence because it ought not 
to be the case that anyone should have to.  Acts of MCV may bring about desirable 
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states of affairs, but they represent a resignation to the fact that there are states of 
affairs in which persons should have to act in this way.  MCV in the nature of the case 
cannot prevent such states of affairs from obtaining.  Moral health pacifists engage in 
behaviors and practices that do prevent such states of affairs from obtaining.  Given 
that it would be better if states of affairs which make acts of violence seem morally 
compelling did not obtain, there ought to be moral health pacifists. 
Someone might object that since moral health levels can be determined by 
different combinations of factors, then conceivably there could be relatively-ideally 
morally healthy persons who are not moral health pacifists—that is, they could still 
commit acts of violence.  Such persons would still be imitable, educational, and 
inspirational.  Inasmuch as such persons were relatively-ideally morally healthy and 
not pacifists, their non-adherence to pacifism would be imitable. 
In reply to this objection, I must point out that relatively-ideally morally healthy 
persons are not imitable in every respect.  There may be factors present that are 
detrimental to their overall moral health level.  If those persons are relatively-ideally 
morally healthy, they are so in spite of those factors and not because of them.  Such 
persons are imitable only in the sense that the moral-health-conducive features which 
they embody are imitable.  Many people consider Martin Luther King Jr. to be a moral 
exemplar and for that reason we ought to imitate his relentless pursuit of social 
justice; but no one is suggesting that because Martin Luther King Jr. is a moral 
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exemplar, we ought to imitate his plagiarism or infidelity.61  Consider also the 
possibility of an Olympic athlete who smokes.  That athlete is relatively ideally 
biologically healthy despite her smoking rather than because of it.  She is imitable to 
the extent that the features which contribute to her relatively-ideal level of biological 
health are imitable.  This would be true even if her smoking brought about other 
health-conducive effect such as forming friendships with other smokers where such 
friendships contributed to her mental health.  Acts of MCV are analogous to smoking 
in this way. 
Moral health pacifists who are relatively-ideally morally healthy persons are 
imitable in virtue of their pacifist practices.  And if there are other persons who are 
comparably morally healthy but who commit MCV, they too are imitable, but they are 
not imitable in virtue of committing MCV.62  Persons who commit no other violence 
than MCV may be imitable to significantly less morally healthy persons—say, persons 
who are generally violent.  But the acts of MCV are not imitable, rather the fact that 
such relatively-ideally morally healthy persons are less violent is imitable.   
Summarily, I have argued that violence is morally unhealthy for everyone, there 
are better alternatives, these alternatives are hard to perform, but that someone 
ought to perform them.  These four claims constitute moral health pacifism.  And 
these four claims are normative in that they give persons moral reasons to act.  The 
moral health pacifist is a person who acts in light of these or similar claims.  In light of 




 See Stone 2013. 
  
62
 Though, such persons may be imitable in virtue of doing that which is choice-worthy. 
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the badness of violence, she judges pacifist alternatives to be options morally 
preferable to MCV.  But to perform pacifist alternatives, she must renounce violence 
and engage in behaviors and practices that will supplant violence as her at-the-ready 
option with pacifist alternatives.  That is, she will have to engage in behaviors and 
practices that positively orient her moral health trajectory so that she acquires the 
requisite levels of moral health for performing pacifist alternatives.  She is someone 
who aspires to ideal or relatively-ideal levels of moral health by her renunciation of 
violence and her cultivation and practice of pacifist alternatives.  She sees pacifist 
dilemmas and violent perpetrators as indicative of a moral health disease.  They 
indicate the presence of crippling shame within the perpetrators and disruption of 




Chapter 4: Objections & Replies 
 I began in Chapter 1 by arguing that given the history of its use, “pacifism” 
is best understood inclusively whereas “violence” is best understood minimally—
that is, according to a minimalist conception where violence is understood to refer 
generally to destructive uses of physical force. Accordingly, pacifisms are best 
understood as (a) universal absolutist (everyone ought not to commit any 
violence), (b) universal non-absolutist (everyone ought not to commit some types 
of violence), (c) non-universal absolutist (some persons ought not to commit any 
violence), and (d) non-universal non-absolutist (some persons ought not to commit 
some types of violence).  In Chapter 2 I argued that moral terms and judgments 
should not be understood univocally because there are three distinct conceptions 
of how moral value functions: deontologically, hypologically, and evaluatively.  
Based on these distinctions, it is possible for moral judgments to be of only one 
type, and therefore, the moral claims which constitute a version of pacifism may 
be strictly evaluative in nature.  Rather than present the specific normative ethical 
theory underpinning my version of pacifism, I introduced the term “moral health” 
as a placeholder for any normative ethical theory that functions analogously to 
human biological health in ten specific ways.  In Chapter 3, based on that moral 
health model, I advanced and defended four claims all of which are solely 
evaluative in nature and which jointly constitute a universal absolutist pacifism 
that I called moral health pacifism.  Those claims were: (1) violence is bad for 
everyone; (2) in pacifist dilemmas there are morally healthier pacifist alternatives 
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to MCV (morally compelling violence); (3) the ability to perform pacifist 
alternatives is rather morally demanding; and (4) some persons ought to meet that 
moral demand and become moral health pacifists because it is good for there to be 
such persons. 
In this chapter I will present and respond to seven objections commonly 
advanced against pacifism.  In 4.1 I will address what I take to be the most extreme 
objection to pacifism—that pacifism entails a contradiction and is therefore 
necessarily false.  Next, I will cover a string of objections all based on 
interventionist pacifist dilemmas.  All of these involve some claim about the 
necessity of violence in such cases.  There are multiple senses in which violence is 
alleged to be necessary in interventionist pacifist dilemmas, and objectors often 
fail to distinguish those senses.  In 4.2 I will address the objection that violence is 
necessary to aid the victim because, in fact, there simply are no other means by 
which a bystander can intervene.  In 4.3 I will address the objection that even if 
there are other means of intervening, a bystander is nonetheless obligated to 
intervene violently and therefore violence is morally necessary.  In 4.4 I will 
address the objection that if violence were the only way to aid a victim, then the 
bystander ought to commit violence.  In 4.5 I address the objection that violence is 
practically necessary because it may be the only means of aiding the victim so far 
as the bystander can tell.  In 4.6 I will shift focus away from interventionist pacifist 
dilemmas and address whether pacifists are hypocrites.  And I will conclude in 4.7 
by addressing the objection that pacifism does not work. 
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4.1 Is Pacifism Necessarily False? 
 In his 1965 article, Jan Narveson argues that pacifism is self-contradictory 
(Narveson 1965, 259).1  Narveson claims the only form of pacifism of philosophical 
interest is “the doctrine that everyone ought not to resist violence with force” 
(Narveson 1965, 260).   
The pacifist is generally thought of as the man who is so much 
opposed to violence that he will not even use it to defend himself or 
anyone else.  And it is precisely this characterization which I wish to 
show is far from being plausible, morally inconsistent. (Narveson 
1965, 265)2   
Narveson’s case amounts to this: the basic moral claims of pacifism entail certain 
claims about rights because moral claims are connected with rights claims in 
certain ways, but rights claims are necessarily connected to claims about the use of 
violence to prevent rights infringements; therefore, pacifism entails non-pacifism.  
Narveson’s argument depends a great deal on the connection between the terms 
“ought,” “morally wrong,” “obligation,” and “right.”  Narveson’s argument can be 
constructed in the following way: 
NP1:  If x is morally wrong, then persons ought not to do x.3 
NP2:  If persons ought not to do x, then persons have an obligation not to   




 Narveson has written about this argument multiple times (Narveson 1968 & Narveson 
2013).  Despite Narveson’s extensive comments in subsequent articles, I do not think they add 
anything substantive to the original argument.  I will refer to the subsequent articles strictly as 
needed, but I will focus largely on the 1965 piece.   
2
 Some have pointed out that Narveson is not careful to distinguish “violence” from “force” 
(Miller 1971 & Routley 1984).  As I already established in 1.2, they are clearly distinct.  I aim to 
render Narveson’s argument solely in terms of “violence” so that this conflation is less distracting. 
3
 See Narveson’s use of these terms on pp. 259-260.   
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  do x.4 
NP3:  If persons have an obligation not do to x, then persons have a right  
  not to have x done to them.5 
NP4:  If persons have a right not to have x done to them, then persons  
  have a right to whatever is necessary to prevent x from being done  
  to them.6 
NP5:  If persons have a right to whatever is necessary to prevent x from  
  being done to them, then persons have a right to the use of violence  
  to prevent x from being done to them.7 
NP6:  If persons have a right to the use of violence to prevent x from being  
  done to them, then violence (to prevent x from being done to them)  
  is not morally wrong.  
NP7:  If pacifism is true, then violence (even to prevent violence from  
  being done to persons) is morally wrong.8 
NC1:  If violence is morally wrong, then violence is not morally wrong.  
NC2:  Pacifism is self-contradictory. 
According to Narveson, “In saying that violence is wrong, one is at the same 
time saying that people have a right to its prevention, by [violence] if necessary,” 




 Narveson uses the terms “obligation” and “duty” interchangeably and applies both to 
pacifism (Narveson 1965, 260, 263-264). 
5
 See Narveson 1965, 266. 
6
 Narveson claims a right “just is a status justifying preventive action” (Narveson 1965, 
266). 
7
 According to Narveson, “it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might 
be necessary is [violence]” (Narveson 1965, 267). 
8
 Narveson takes this to be definitive of pacifism (Narveson 1965, 263).   
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and “we cannot characterize [violence] as being wrong if preventive violence is not 
simultaneously being characterized as justifiable” (Narveson 1965, 268-269).  If 
Narveson is right, pacifism is not merely false, but necessarily false.   
 Several philosophers have argued (quite correctly in my view) that NP4 is 
false.9  Jay Whitman points out that even if persons have a right not to be lied to, it 
does not follow that persons have a right to whatever means are necessary to 
prevent being lied to (Whitman, 308).  Carlo Filice argues that even if I have a right 
to my shoes, I am not justified in shooting someone dead who means to steal them 
even if that is the only way of preventing the theft (Filice, 136).  According to 
Michael Martin, “The problem with Narveson’s argument is simply that he gives no 
good reason to suppose that the term ‘right’ as it is used in ordinary discourse does 
entail what he says it entails” (Martin, 438).  Martin argues that even if rights 
justify preventative action, there is no reason why constraints on that preventative 
action cannot be built into the concept of a right.   
Legal rights make clear the possibility of built in constraints.  A state may 
commit to preventative action to protect a citizen’s right, but the state has not 
thereby committed to go to whatever conceivable extreme may be necessary to 
protect that right.  In fact, a right recognized by the state may not entail any 
preventative action per se, but only the guarantee that a citizen has recourse to 
state judicial or penal processes against rights violators after a violation has 




 See Whitman 1966, Filice 1992, and Martin 1974.  See also Regan 1972 for a different 
objection.   
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occurred.  That recourse may be characterized as “preventative” in the sense that 
to some degree it deters violations, but it does not constitute any form of 
intervention at the moment the person’s right is under threat of violation.  Thus, 
even if a person has a right not to have x done to her, and even if that means she 
has a right to some means that prevents x from being done to her, it does not 
necessarily follow that she has a right to interventionist violence to prevent x from 
being done to her.  As Martin argues, Narveson merely assumes that the meaning 
of “right” is univocal.  Narveson’s argument is unsound at least for this reason. 
Jenny Teichman’s presentation of Narveson’s argument compresses NP1, 
NP2, and NP3 into just one premise that states something being “morally wrong” is 
a sufficient condition for persons having a right not to have it done to them 
(Teichman 1986, 30).  Teichman rejects this premise, arguing that both boasting 
and snobbery are morally wrong, but neither boasting to people nor being snobby 
to people necessarily violates their rights (Teichman 1986, 31-32).  I think 
Teichman is correct and has shown that Narveson’s argument fails in yet another 
respect. 
Unfortunately, though, none of these authors examines Narveson’s 
assumed connections between “morally wrong,” “ought,” and “obligation.”10  
These connections show how Narveson’s argument fails in a deeper respect.  
                                                 
   
  
10
 Whitman appears to come closest when he argues that Narveson’s case depends on 
“some general contract theory of obligation” (Whitman, 308)—a charge which Narveson denies 
(Narveson 1968, 149). 
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Narveson assumes that “ought” claims are solely deontological in nature.  
Statements like “the Holocaust ought not to have happened,” “someone really 
ought to do something about the graffiti on the wall,” “children ought not to have 
to starve,” and “things ought not to be this way” show there are moral uses of the 
term “ought” that are not deontological and do not entail that anyone has a moral 
obligation.   As I argued in 2.2, there are at least two other moral senses in which 
moral judgments can be understood—hypologically and evaluatively—both of 
which may function normatively and thus both of which can generate “ought” 
claims that do not entail moral obligations.  NP2 is false. 
Narveson concludes by saying: “If [pacifists] attempt to formulate their 
position using our standard concepts of rights, their position involves a 
contradiction” (Narveson 1965, 269).  As noted, Narveson’s conception of rights is 
by no means standard and it is not obvious we have one “standard” concept of 
rights.  But more importantly, Narveson assumes “the doctrine that everyone 
ought not to resist violence with [violence]” can only be formulated using concepts 
of rights.  This is false.  To claim that violence is wrong or that everyone ought not 
to commit violence does not commit a pacifist to any rights-based formulation of 
her doctrine.  Authors have tended to challenge Narveson’s conception of rights 
and rightly so.  But there’s a sense in which beginning the critique at the point of 
rights-talk already gives Narveson’s argument too much credit.   
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Narveson accuses pacifists of “verbal hocus-pocus” and treating language 
like “private property” if they “affirm that we have rights” but “deny that they 
ought ever to be defended” (Narveson 1968, 150).  Arguably, though, Narveson has 
treated the terms like private property.  Pacifism (certainly moral health pacifism) 
neither affirms nor necessarily entails that anyone has rights.11  Neither rights nor 
obligations necessarily follow from the claim that everyone ought not to commit 
violence.  I have argued this not by treating language like private property, but on 
the basis of substantive moral assertions that permeate moral discourse.   
 
4.2 Is Violence Necessary to Aid Victims? 
 Reinhold Niebuhr argues that to have relative peace and social justice, 
someone has to dirty her hands; the pacifist’s refusal of moral compromise can 
only mean foregoing those goals.12  According to John Lewis, by refusing to 
participate in violence, the pacifist attempts to “contract out of a situation” and 
opts to “do nothing” (J. Lewis, 37-38).  While Lewis admits that even defensive 
wars are evils in a sense, attempting to avoid them altogether entails “allowing 
aggression to rage and spread unchecked” (J. Lewis, 66).  In refusing to commit 




 I tend to think there are no such things as rights humans have merely in virtue of being 
humans.  Pre-political rights are a fiction as far as I can tell, and a political “right” seems to me little 
more than jargon which serves as a shorthand way of codifying certain political constraints or 
practices that could also be described without using that term.  But because I hold this view for 
unrelated reasons, I have decided here to make the less committal claim that moral health pacifism 
neither affirms nor denies that persons have rights.  Whether persons ought to commit violence to 
prevent wrongdoing is a matter I hope to make clear in my treatment of subsequent objections. 
12
 See R. Niebuhr 1937. 
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interventionist violence, Lewis assumes the pacifist “refrains from assisting the 
victim” and, in fact, refuses to act at all; thus, pacifism must be false since “surely 
one owes an immediate duty to the victim” (J. Lewis, 83-84).  Tom Regan suggests 
that pacifism entails a woman cannot so much as attempt to free herself from a 
rapist’s grasp (Regan, 86).13  C. S. Lewis, criticizing pacifism, writes, “if a homicidal 
maniac, attempting to murder a third party, tried to knock me out of the way, 
[must I] stand aside and let him get his victim” (C. Lewis, 86)?  Eric Puryear rejects 
pacifism because he “cannot join in the naive and dangerous belief that a person 
should allow a violent criminal to kill them or another innocent person.”  Puryear 
rejects pacifism because he does not “wish to see innocent people suffer and die at 
the hands of a criminal” (Puryear 2009).  Narveson equates the pacifist’s refusal to 
kill or to use force against anyone as “refusing to help when help is needed” 
(Narveson 2003, 159).14   
 Several pacifist authors mention this objection.  Guy Hershberger writes, “It 
is also generally assumed that nonresistance means doing nothing” (Hershberger, 
308).  Thomas Merton writes, “Very often people object that nonviolence seems to 
imply passive acceptance of injustice and evil” (Merton, 40).  Advocating non-
                                                 
   
  
13
 While not using the term “pacifism,” William Marty seems to think that commitment to 
acting nonviolently in all circumstances entails that rapists must simply be allowed to rape (Marty, 
9). 
14
 George Hartmann surveyed 65 American philosophers in 1944 concerning pacifism.  
When asked what they took to be the strongest argument against pacifism, one philosopher wrote, 
“As long as any man or group of men sufficiently ruthless confront full-fledged pacifists they can 
have their way as wolves with a pack of sheep” (Hartmann, 130). 
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resistance around the time of World War 1, Edward Richards says he was 
frequently asked questions like the following:  
Do you mean to tell me that, if you were in a room full of women 
and children, and some of those wild Turks and Kurds from the 
mountains of Turkey should come and begin to break in the door, 
you would stand aside, like a coward, and let them come in, refusing 
to fight to protect the women and children? (Richards, 619) 
In interventionist pacifist dilemmas, so the objection goes, there are, in fact, only 
two options: commit violence against the assailant or do not intervene; since 
pacifism entails one ought not to commit violence and since one ought to 
intervene, pacifism entails non-intervention and must be false. 
 Before addressing the objection, the degree to which these objectors have 
oversimplified interventionist pacifist dilemmas and thus how these objectors 
differ from others who object on interventionist grounds must be made clear.  
Even when moral analysis focuses as exclusively as possible on the bystander, 
there are three distinct factors that allow for distinct analysis and distinct 
problems.  The first factor is the bystander’s actual intervention options versus her 
perceived intervention options.  There may be more actual intervention options 
than she perceives, fewer than she perceives, or only those she perceives.  
Arguably, a bystander could be evaluated differently in all three cases; at issue, in 
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part, is whether actual options or perceived options should be the primary basis on 
which bystanders are morally evaluated.15   
A second factor is a bystander’s capabilities.  Bystanders may differ in ways 
that dictate either or both of their actual and perceived intervention options.  And, 
arguably, a bystander genuinely unable to perceive any intervention options is not 
morally equivalent to a similarly-situated bystander that perceives multiple 
intervention options.    
The third factor is success.  Whether any given intervention option will 
succeed is distinguishable from whether any given bystander ought to believe it 
will.  Even this description of success is an oversimplification in an important sense.  
There is no such option as violence simplicitir.  To say that violence will successfully 
aid a victim must mean violence of a certain form or degree.  A tackle may succeed 
where a punch would not, and a kick with some degree of force may succeed 
where any kick of lesser force would not.  Further, both in-fact success and 
bystander belief about success introduce the issue of probability of success.  We 
may be able to determine that some intervention option, in fact, has n probability 
of succeeding, but this is distinguishable from whether a bystander ought to 
believe that option has n probability of succeeding.  While these three factors are 
distinguishable, they are clearly interdependent. 




 This parallels one fundamental debate in the self-defense literature over whether the 
justification of self-defense is grounded in objective or subjective factors.  See Chapter 3 Footnote 
29 for sources covering each side of the dispute. 
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 Some object that even if a bystander perceives intervention options other 
than violence or even if there are actual intervention options other than violence, 
the bystander still ought to commit violence against the assailant and thus violence 
is morally necessary.  I will address these objectors in 4.3.  Other objectors 
acknowledge there may be both other perceived and actual intervention options, 
but there may be (at least hypothetically) an interventionist pacifist dilemma in 
which violence is the only actual and perceived intervention option.  In such a case, 
a person ought to commit violence.  I will address these objectors in 4.4.  Still 
others object that whether there are multiple actual intervention options, there 
are cases in which violence is the only perceived intervention option.  In those 
cases, persons ought to commit violence.  I will address these objectors in 4.5.  The 
objectors under present consideration claim something different and more 
extreme.  The numerous objectors quoted above assume that in interventionist 
pacifist dilemmas, there are two and only two actual and perceived intervention 
options: violence or non-intervention. 
The ubiquity of this objection is jarring especially when it is so obviously a 
false dichotomy.  I find it incredibly unlikely for there ever to be only two options 
except perhaps in thought experiments that stipulate such constraints.  Having 
only these options is by no means a necessary feature of interventionist pacifist 
dilemmas.  The objection ignores the factor of bystander capability.  Different 
bystanders will have different actual and perceived options and differing option-
perceiving abilities.  Perhaps some bystanders will be unable to perceive more 
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options than violence or non-intervention.  But in most real world scenarios, there 
are other actual options and many agents can come to perceive and perform them.  
The examples of pacifist alternatives I have already presented show as much.  
Thus, not all bystanders in all interventionist pacifist dilemmas have or perceive 
only these two options.   
 Ballou writes that in cases of interventionist violence, “one may nobly 
throw his body as a temporary barrier between the destroyer and his helpless 
victim, choosing to die in that position, rather than be a passive spectator” (Ballou 
2006, 4).  Similarly, Gandhi describes interposing one’s self between assailant and 
victim to willingly suffer the attack (Gandhi 2013, 443).  Leo Tolstoy wrote that a 
child under threat could be protected by “interposing one’s own breast to receive 
the murderer’s blow” (Tolstoy 1909, 58).16  Mark Thomas, a nonviolence educator 
in San Francisco, interposed himself between an elderly lady and a man attempting 
to attack her; he asked the attacker about the conflict, then listened and 
responded sympathetically.  After a few brief sympathetic exchanges, the attacker 
calmed down, and Mark escorted the lady away without further incident (Thomas 
2007).  The old man in the Tokyo train car incident intervened by inviting the 
assailant to speak with him (Dobson, 188).  A person can also attempt to seize the 
victim and flee.17  There is an international organization, the Alternatives to 
Violence Project, in operation since the 1970s, the function of which is to train 




 See also Ryan 1994, 25. 
  
17
 See, for example, Thomas 2008 in which a woman describes being rescued from an 
attacker in this way.   
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people in various milieus how to implement creative strategies for violent conflict 
resolution (in a sense, a third-option training camp).18  Clearly, there are more than 
two options. 
 Why, then, is this false dichotomy between violence and non-intervention 
so widely accepted?  I suspect the objectors themselves perceive no other 
intervention options.  Why is that?  Alfred North Whitehead describes certain 
assumptions characteristic of cultures or epochs of history as so entrenched that 
“people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting 
things has ever occurred to them” (Whitehead, 48).  Duane Cady compares this to 
what he calls “warism”—the view that war is justifiable in principle and often in 
fact (Cady 2010, 17).  According to Cady, warism is so entrenched that “peace 
advocates are not seriously considered because ‘everybody knows’ how patently 
implausible, politically naïve and romantically idealistic peace theorists and 
activists must be” (Cady 1989, 210).  For some, then, perceiving more intervention 
options may require an immense paradigm shift. 
 The objection, then, likely reveals more about the objectors than about 
pacifism.19  As I argued in 3.2.4, persons can be deeply inculcated with social 
interaction scripts.  Inculcation of the violent-conflict script explains in part the 




 See Our Mission.  Research has already demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
Alternatives to Violence Project at reducing violence and recidivism among prison populations and 
in schools (Deeney 2013 & K. Williams 2012). 
19
 It is interesting to reflect that those who cannot think of any more options tacitly or 
uncritically assume that this reveals more about pacifism than about themselves. 
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broad advocacy for the false dichotomy.  The script is so entrenched that persons 
are unaware of how that entrenchment precludes possibilities from their decision-
making.  The problem lies not in the situation itself but in the way it is framed 
(Werhane, 76). 
 Patricia Werhane defines “moral imagination” as the “ability to envision 
and actualize possibilities that are not context-dependent but encouraged by or 
project a fresh schema” (Werhane, 85).  A schema is a cognitive framework 
individuals impose on information or situations to understand them (Gioia & Poole, 
449 – 450).  Scripts, then, are a type of schema.  According to Dennis Gioia, the 
entrenchment of a schema in a decision-making procedure can limit one’s ability to 
make use of one’s own internal resources (Gioia, 385).  It might be said, then, that 
advocates of the false dichotomy do not recognize it as such due to lack of moral 
imagination; they are imaginatively inhibited by violent-conflict script 
entrenchment.   
I am somewhat leery of the terms “fresh” and “imaginative”; they might 
connote that moral health pacifists are doing something new or novel.  But 
hospitality, compassion, and sympathy are neither.  Rather, there are scripts of 
which there ought not to be instances (for instance, violent-conflict scripts).  And 
some scripts are better than others (for instance, hospitality scripts are better than 
violent-conflict scripts).  The practice of moral health pacifism involves 
entrenchment of better scripts and thus the reduction of script constraints.  
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Such actions are “fresh” in that they deviate from the norm.  This is an 
interesting twist given that pacifists are sometimes charged with rigid absolutism 
and refusing to allow for rule-breaking.  John Lewis writes, “Moral responsibility 
implies the ability to break the rules when the occasion demands.  It is the power 
to do the novel and unexpected thing, to escape from the customary and also from 
the rut of moral habit” (J. Lewis, 60).  The “novel,” “unexpected thing” of which 
Lewis writes is an act of MCV.  But in light of widespread failure to recognize a false 
dichotomy, an act of violence would not “break the rules.”  Rather, violence is the 
rule.  The moral health pacifist aims to break out of the entrenchment of the 
violent-conflict script.  Inculcating better scripts more deeply than the violent-
conflict script enables a moral health pacifist to see options others cannot, and, in 
this sense, moral health pacifism is the power to do novel and unexpected things. 
  
4.3 Are Bystanders Morally Obligated to Commit Violence? 
 According to Maria Gel’fond, several of Tolstoy’s critics argued that 
Tolstoy’s offer-one’s-breast-to-the-murderer’s-blow solution did not annul the 
obligation to commit violence against an assailant.  Taking the blow, they argued, 
would simply result in the death of the protector, in which case, the assailant 
would still injure the victim.  Further, refusing to commit violence pays inadequate 
attention to the victim’s interest (Gel’fond, 52).  Thus, no one could refuse to 
commit violence and “at the same time preserve his moral … adequacy” (Gel’fond, 
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50).20  Tolstoy’s critics do not deny that he identifies an intervention option other 
than violence, and therefore they acknowledge there are more perceived and 
actual intervention options than just violence or non-intervention.  But, they argue, 
the bystander is nonetheless obligated to commit violence against the assailant; 
Tolstoy has ignored the importance of the success factor and further, Tolstoy’s 
option fails to acknowledge the important moral difference between victims and 
assailants.  For these two reasons, violence is still morally necessary.  Are they 
correct? 
 First, Tolstoy’s critics are too quick to assume Tolstoy’s method will fail.  
There are examples of success.  In July 2016, as Tomiesha Abraham was being 
stabbed by her friend, Ashanti Daniels, during an argument, Michele Kenny 
(Tomiesha’s mother) interposed herself between them, was stabbed to death by 
Daniels, and Daniels stopped attacking Abraham.21  In June 2016, an Orlando 
mother shielded her son from gunfire aimed at him; she died and the shooter did 
not make further attempt on the son’s life.22  It is not difficult to imagine why 
Tolstoy’s method might succeed.  Killing someone other than the intended victim 
may be jarring even to the assailant—jarring enough to cause her to reframe her 
actions and intentions altogether.  Further, Tolstoy’s critics are too quick to assume 




 Narveson also characterizes the pacifist’s refusal to commit acts of violence as “failing in 
the defense of his fellows” (Narveson 2003, 159). 
21
 See Prendergast et al 2016. 
22
 See Andrews 2016. 
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violence will succeed.  Even a violent intervener can be incapacitated, freeing the 
assailant to resume violence against the victim. 
 Second, I have already presented examples of pacifist alternatives that 
succeeded, and given that in interventionist pacifist dilemmas pacifist alternatives 
aim at preventing harm to the victim and not legitimizing assailants, they clearly 
make a moral distinction between victims and assailants.  Thus, there are 
intervention options other than violence which satisfy Tolstoy’s critics’ conditions 
for favoring violence.  Their objection seems not to apply to moral health pacifism.  
Nevertheless, there is a third and more important critique to be made of their 
objection. 
 Moral health pacifism consists of strictly evaluative claims one of which is 
that persons ought (in an evaluative sense) not to commit violence.  Moral health 
pacifism allows that this could be true while also true that some person ought (in a 
deontological sense) to commit violence.  Strictly speaking, then, even if Tolstoy’s 
critics are correct that bystanders are obligated to commit violence, this is only a 
problem for moral health pacifism if it is assumed that deontological normativity 
always trumps evaluative normativity.  It is not obvious to me that it does, 
especially in a case where a bystander could both succeed and differentiate 
between assailant and victim without the use of violence.  But it is not necessary to 
settle which type of normativity takes priority because the objection should be 
rejected on more obvious grounds. 
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The objection of Tolstoy’s critics depends on obscuring the factor of 
bystander capability.  I have claimed that everyone ought (in an evaluative sense) 
not to commit violence, but that for some bystanders violence is the best 
(evaluatively) action they are able to perform.  So, even though in one sense they 
ought not to commit violence, in another sense they ought to.  I have introduced 
moral health pacifism as a practice one might undertake to be able to perform 
actions that are better (evaluatively) than violence.  Thus, the purview of moral 
health pacifism includes the importance of bystander capability in the moral 
analysis of interventionist pacifist dilemmas.  Tolstoy’s critics’ alleged obligation 
depends on this factor in a clandestine way yet this very factor shows how they are 
mistaken.  
Is any given bystander obligated to commit violence against an assailant?  
Implicit in the objection is the assumption that the agents involved are only of 
certain types or descriptions.23  The hypothetical need for interventionist violence 




 Pacifist writers claim the objection is typically presented with the victim is described as a 
wife, mother, daughter, or child of a bystander who is a male. (See Aukerman 17; Ballou 2006, 171; 
Brown, 159; Fabre, 824; Filice, 125; Hershberger, 308; Richards, 619; Tolstoy 1896, 3-4; and Yoder 
1992b, 81.)  None of these writers cite a published form of the objection.  Among non-pacifist 
writers, nearly all present it without much agent description; some include that the victim is 
“innocent,” “old,” or “weak” and that the assailant is “criminal,” a “brawny thug,” or “a homicidal 
maniac.” (See Gel’fond, 49; C. Lewis, 86; J. Lewis, 83; Narveson 2003, 159; Pinker, 35; and Puryear 
2009.)  Several propaganda posters from World War 1 and World War 2 depicting Japanese or 
German soldiers/leaders attacking American or British women aimed at recruiting male soldiers 
suggest the highly gendered version of the objection was then present in the Western mind. (See 
Destroy This Mad Brute, Keep These Hands Off, Keep This Horror From Your Home, and This is the 
Enemy.)  A study commissioned by the U.S. Government concluded that posters depicting women 
and children in danger were more effective recruitment tools than other poster types (Young & 
Rubicam 1942).  Similarly, I am arguing that the strength of the objection depends at least on a 




presupposes three agents—an assailant, a victim, and a bystander.  The scenario 
provides no details about the agents, but details may reveal whether there is any 
such obligation. 
What if the bystander were an elderly male that required a walking frame, 
a middle-aged blind woman using a white cane, or a woman significantly smaller in 
stature and strength than the assailant?  What if the victim was a young male built 
like a football linebacker who had four years of military combat training and the 
bystander was wheelchair bound?  In these cases, it is less obvious that if 
bystanders so described refrained from committing violence against the assailant, 
they would be morally wrong for having done so.  If altering agent-descriptions 
alters the intuition that bystanders are obligated to commit violence, then the 
objection depends on the assumption of some agent-descriptions and operates on 
the listener’s/reader’s tendency to supply those agent-descriptions.  That is, the 
intuitive obviousness that bystanders so situated are obligated to commit violence 
does not result from considering the bare minimum required to conceive of an 
interventionist pacifist dilemma (a non-descript bystander); rather, it results from 
the arguer or audience considering only certain types of bystanders while under 
the impression that intuitions about any given bystander have been tested.  But is 
it obvious even of bystanders of craftily supplied types that they are obligated to 
commit violence against the assailant?  I do not believe so. 
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Suppose the bystander is Smith—an average-sized male.  Suppose the 
victim is Smith’s child—a three year old female toddler.  Suppose the assailant is 
not a person, but a six hundred pound grizzly bear.  If Smith witnesses the grizzly 
bearing down on his daughter’s location with a grizzly facial expression, is Smith 
morally obligated to commit violence against the bear?  Suppose Smith seizes his 
daughter and attempts to flee.  Surely this is a better response than attempting to 
fight the bear.  If Smith is not obligated to commit violence against the bear, and if 
Smith is not morally wrong for having seized the victim and fled, why would the 
same not be true in the case of a human assailant?  I do not see why Smith is 
obligated to commit violence against an assailant because the assailant is a human 
rather than a bear.  If Smith is not obligated to intervene violently, then bystanders 
in the undescribed-agents version of the scenario are not obligated to intervene 
violently. 
Tolstoy’s critics claimed that his pacifism failed to give due focus to victims’ 
interests—to recognize what Jeff McMahan calls the “critical asymmetry” between 
assailant and victim (McMahan, 274).  David Kopel claims the “profound flaw” in 
Tolstoy’s position is the implication that the lives of the murderer and the victim 
are equivalent (Kopel 2008b, 37).  According to Narveson, pacifism “fails to 
distinguish morally between aggressors and their victims, and so between the 
innocent and the guilty” (Narveson 2003, 159).  According to G. E. M. Anscombe, 
“pacifism teaches people to make no distinction between the shedding of innocent 
blood and the shedding of any human blood” (Anscombe, 58).  But Smith does not 
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fail to distinguish between the bear and his daughter if Smith seizes his child and 
flees; I do not see why this would change if the assailant had been a human rather 
than a bear.24  Thus, violence is not required to make a proper moral distinction 
between assailants and victims.  
 
4.4 Are Bystanders Obligated to Commit Violence If Necessary? 
Some objectors stipulate the condition that violence is necessary to aid the 
victim.  That is, it is assumed that in some interventionist pacifist dilemma, violence 
is the only intervention option that will successfully aid the victim.  George 
Hartmann records one American philosopher’s objection to pacifism as “if there is 
no other way to prevent murder than by using force I ought to use force” 
(Hartmann, 129).  Ihara considers this objection, describing the problematic cases 
for pacifism as “those of failing to use violence when necessary to defend others” 
(Ihara 1978, 371).  Though she is concerned primarily with lethal violence, Cécile 
Fabre argues that some bystanders are obligated to commit violence against 
aggressors assuming that violence is the only way to save the victim’s life (Fabre 
2007, 364).  So the objection goes, in a case where violence is necessary to aid the 




 Someone may object that in virtue of being non-human, the bear does not count as 
“guilty” or an “aggressor” in the moral sense and that this is an important difference.  But this 
objection entails either that a bystander is obligated to do more than merely aid the victim (prevent 
harm to the victim) or that when the assailant is human, aiding the victim necessarily includes 
injuring the assailant.  Neither seems plausible. 
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victim, a bystander is obligated to commit violence; inasmuch as pacifism entails 
refraining from violence even in such cases, pacifism is false. 
Craig Ihara offers two responses to this objection.  First, a pacifist may have 
a special obligation to refrain from violence due to some previous action.  Perhaps 
a man who has led a violent life promises his dying mother to renounce violence.  
Or perhaps upon joining a monastic community a person takes vows that include 
renouncing violence.  Such persons have an obligation to refrain from violence that 
others do not have (Ihara 1978, 371-372).   
Ihara’s first response fails for two reasons.  First, it entails the pacifist’s 
special obligation is arbitrary.  The obligation has nothing to do with violence as 
such.  If the man had worked an oppressive job at a shoe factory, he might have 
promised his mother never to wear the factory’s shoes in protest.  Someone may 
join an eccentric monastic community the vows of which include consuming thirty-
seven marshmallows per day.  A person could have an agent-specific obligation to 
do or not do anything on this basis.  At best, Ihara illustrates that persons are 
obligated to keep promises.   
The second reason Ihara’s first response fails is that persons cannot 
promise their way out of moral obligations.  The claim is that persons so situated 
are obligated to commit violence.  Ihara’s response is basically “not if they 
promised not to.”  This response assumes that obligations to keep promises take 
priority over other moral obligations.  But making a bizarre promise to torture 
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children does not give me a special moral obligation to do so nor does it abrogate 
my obligation not to do so.   
Ihara offers a second response to the objection.  Ihara argues that the duty 
to aid victims does not entail going to any conceivable extreme to do so (Ihara 
1978, 372).  At issue is whether pacifists are required to go to the extreme of 
foregoing their moral principles.   
Everyone has not only a right to life, but a right to live it in a manner 
of his own choosing, provided that his way of life does not actively 
harm others (like the life of an assassin).  The pacifist is one who 
chooses a way of life … To undertake such a life is, for him, not a 
matter of frivolity or ''mere taste" but a matter of ultimate 
seriousness and concern for an ideal more important than his life or 
his property. … According to this way of looking at the matter, 
requiring a pacifist to act violently is equivalent to forcing him to 
sacrifice that which is both most precious to him and that to which 
he has at least a prima facie moral right. The case against the 
pacifist gains in plausibility when we focus our attention on the 
harm that might befall others if he does not use violence.   The case 
on his behalf, I am suggesting, is more understandable if we shift 
our focus to include the rights of the pacifist himself. (Ihara 1978, 
373-374) 
I find Ihara’s move here deeply unsatisfying.  Pleading for pacifist’s rights 
when victims are injured or killed seems morally hollow.  Such pacifism is “a pious 
luxury, something [the pacifist] can indulge in if he wants to feel himself to be 
exceptionally virtuous” (Merton, 40).25  Ihara claims that pacifism is a “moral ideal” 
to which a person may “aspire” (Ihara 1988, 269).  The pacifist, then, ought to be 




 Arguably, this would be an example of what Tony Lynch and A. R. J. Fisher call “pure 
hypocrisy”—a person so sincerely convinced in her status as a “force for good” that she can thereby 
justify any of her actions as part of that cause (Lynch & Fisher, 39-41). 
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someone who would forego her rights for the sake of doing good.  Ihara’s focus on 
pacifist rights suggests pacifism is not a moral ideal but something for which the 
pacifist needs an excuse. 
Interestingly, though, Ihara never directly challenges whether persons so 
situated are obligated to commit violence, only whether the pacifist is exempt.  
Eric Reitan argues that whether there is such an obligation is a key difference 
between the pacifist and the non-pacifist (Reitan 2000, 33-34).  Strictly speaking, 
whether persons so situated are obligated to commit violence is not a problem for 
moral health pacifism since, as noted throughout chapter 3, its claims are 
formulated to allow for genuine exceptions.  One of moral health pacifism’s 
significant contributions to the pacifist/non-pacifist debate which I will advance 
both in this section and in 4.5 is to challenge the ways non-pacifists assume that 
there are far more genuine exceptions than there actually are.  Because this 
assumption is so rarely exposed, I tend to think that Reitan is correct and that the 
appropriate pacifist response is to challenge whether persons so situated are 
obligated to commit violence.  I will argue that the current objection fails, but that 
even if it succeeds, it gains the objectors far less ground than is typically assumed.  
As Daniel Statman argues, necessity conditions like the one the objection 
stipulates presuppose a success condition.  Statman, concerned with self-defensive 
violence, formulates his success condition in the following way:  
Assume that Aggressor is posing an illegitimate threat to Victim, say, 
a threat to Victim’s life, body, property, and so forth, and that by 
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carrying out some defensive action, A, which would otherwise be 
immoral, Victim can prevent Aggressor from carrying out the threat.  
According to the success condition, Victim is justified in carrying out 
A only if, by so doing, Victim is likely to stop Aggressor from realizing 
the threat. (Statman, 660) 
Statman points out that at first blush the term “likely” is misleading.  It seems to 
some that, especially in hindsight, justifiability depends on actual success 
especially if necessity conditions are under consideration (Statman, 661).  Whether 
an act of self-defense is justified, then, depends on whether justification is 
grounded in objective or subjective factors, and therefore Statman’s success 
condition is ambiguous since it can be interpreted on objective or subjective 
grounds (since even events that are certain are also likely).   
 This ambiguity is also present in the objection currently under 
consideration and is strongly linked to my earlier distinction between actual and 
perceived options.  According to the objection, it is stipulated that violence is 
necessary to aid the victim.  This may be interpreted objectively, meaning that 
violence of a certain form and degree will, in fact, prevent or curtail harm to the 
victim, which entails that violence of a certain form and degree is an actual option 
for the bystander, and this is true regardless of what the bystander perceives her 
options to be or is justified in believing.  It may also be interpreted subjectively, 
meaning that violence of a certain form and degree is the only intervention option 
the bystander is justified in believing will succeed and that violence of a certain 
form and degree is among the bystander’s perceived options.  The stipulation may 
also be interpreted on both grounds, meaning violence will, in fact, prevent or 
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curtail harm to the victim, violence of a certain form and degree is the only 
intervention option the bystander is justified in believing will succeed, and that 
violence of a certain form and degree is among both the bystander’s actual and 
perceived options.   
I believe that of the three interpretations, the strictly subjective 
interpretation least likely represents the intention behind objections like those 
mentioned by Ihara and Hartmann.  So, I will not consider this interpretation until 
4.5 where I address different objectors whose objections more closely resemble 
this interpretation.  The strictly objective interpretation is a somewhat better 
representation of the objection, but should likely still be dismissed.  The strictly 
objective interpretation allows for bystanders who are utterly unaware that they 
could or should commit violence against assailants even though, in fact, that is the 
only intervention option that will prevent or curtail harm to the victim and those 
bystanders ought to do it.  Thus, this interpretation may allow us to test who has 
failed to keep their obligations, but it lacks any action-guiding function for 
bystanders.  The most likely interpretation is the objective-and-subjective 
interpretation.  And even if some objector insisted on the strictly objective 
interpretation, any analysis of the objective-and-subjective interpretation would 
also apply to the strictly objective interpretation.   
In view of the objective-and-subjective interpretation, I believe Statman’s 
self-defense success condition can be commandeered for present purposes.  The 
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self-defense scenario will need to be replaced with the interventionist pacifist 
dilemma, which involves three parties instead of just two.  And while Statman is 
concerned with the justifiability of self-defense, at issue in the interventionist 
pacifist dilemma is whether the bystander is obligated to commit violence.  
Changing the purview from one of permissibility to obligatory-ness also involves 
changing Statman’s use of “only if” to just “if.”  That is, the objection under 
consideration involves the claim that if violence against an aggressor is the only 
means to aid the victim, then a bystander is obligated to commit violence against 
that aggressor.  So, the way in which violence is necessary is allegedly a sufficient 
condition for the obligation.  Further, the term “likely” should be retained since it is 
compatible with both the objective (again, certain events are likely) and subjective 
interpretations.  In light of these changes, Statman’s success condition can be 
reformulated to cover the interventionist pacifist dilemma in the following way:  
Assume Assailant poses an illegitimate threat to Victim (say, to 
Victim’s life or body), and that by carrying out some act, A, an act of 
violence of some form and degree, Bystander can prevent or curtail 
Assailant from carrying out that threat.  According to the success 
condition, Bystander is obligated to carry out A if, by so doing, 
Bystander is likely to stop Assailant from realizing or continuing the 
threat. 
In the interventionist pacifist dilemma, the necessity condition presupposes the 
success condition for the same reason Statman provides in the self-defense case:   
Not having anything else to do except A in order to achieve some 
goal already assumes that doing A can achieve that goal; otherwise 
this would be no argument for A.  For some course of action to be a 
last resort, it must first be a resort, as it were.  When people say 
things like “I had no choice but to do x (in order to achieve y),” they 
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mean not just that x was the only means of achieving y but also that 
x was a means of achieving y. (Statman, 663) 
Given that necessity conditions presuppose success conditions, if there is an 
obligation to commit violence against assailants, it would apply only to bystanders 
who meet the success condition according to the objective-and-subjective 
interpretation.26   
 Is it the case that bystanders who meet the success condition are obligated 
to commit violence against assailants?  Consider a case from the television series 
As Time Goes By.27  A young adult woman, Sandy, enters the house after walking 
home at night and exclaims, “He’s followed me home again!”  Upon hearing this, 
Lionel, the upper-middle-aged “man-of-the-house,” immediately tears out the 
front door looking for Sandy’s stalker.  Sandy and Jean (Lionel’s wife) stand at the 
front door begging Lionel to come back inside.  Later that night Jean tells Lionel it 
was “silly” to have run outside, and he should have acted “more responsibly.”  
When Lionel is dumbfounded by Jean’s analysis, Jean exclaims, “He could have 
been young!”—a comment Lionel receives with wounded expression.  The next 




 Statman is keen to argue that it is permissible for a person to act in self-defense even 
when that person does not meet the success condition (Statman, 666ff).  Similarly, someone may 
object that even bystanders who do not meet the success condition are nevertheless obligated to 
commit violence against assailants; even the unsuccessful violence would still be a gesture of 
recognition of the victim’s value or the wrongness of the assailant’s actions.  I think this attempt to 
rescue the objections fails.  Is a feeble, unarmed, elderly lady in a wheelchair obligated to punch or 
scratch a brawny thug attempting to attack an NFL linebacker, justifiably believing that her attempt 
at violence will likely do more damage to her than the assailant, just to show the linebacker she 
recognizes he is an innocent victim?  I do not believe so.   
  
27
 See Larbey et al 1997. 
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morning Judith (Jean’s adult daughter) tells Lionel she thought what he did was 
very brave but a bit “foolhardy.” 
 The scenario is illuminating.  Suppose Lionel reasonably believed he could 
nab the assailant, and suppose he could, in fact, have done so.  Does it follow that 
he was morally obligated to do so and that the other characters were simply 
mistaken in their moral judgments that his act was silly, irresponsible, and 
foolhardy?  Given that the scenario is not, strictly speaking, an interventionist 
pacifist dilemma, perhaps whether he was obligated is not in dispute.  But the 
scenario illustrates that some agents may meet the success condition and yet may 
be persons who ought not to engage assailants violently.  That is, even if the 
objectors’ claim that a bystander so situated is obligated to commit violence seems 
intuitive, this objection, like the previous, operates on the covert assumption that 
the bystander is only of a certain type.    
Recall a bystander described earlier: the elderly man with a walking frame.  
In some interventionist pacifist dilemmas, he may, in fact, meet the success 
condition and reasonably believe that he does.  Is he morally obligated to commit 
violence against the assailant?  It is not obvious to me that he is and for reasons 
resembling the characters’ reactions to Lionel’s attempt to apprehend Sandy’s 
stalker.  If you were the man’s spouse, child, or grandchild, should you recommend 
that he intervene violently?  Would it be unreasonable as a witness or in hindsight 
to judge that his act was silly, irresponsible, or foolhardy?  If “no” to either, then 
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either you ought to recommend that he fail to meet a moral obligation, or else 
your elderly walking-frame-dependent grandpa is not morally obligated to commit 
violence against the assailant even if he meets the success condition.  The latter is 
more plausible than the former.  And it shows that even when it is stipulated that 
violence is necessary to aid the victim, the objection still obscures important 
differences between bystanders. 
 Even if I am mistaken and the elderly man is obligated to commit violence, 
the objection still fails due to the existential fallacy.  Even if in all cases where 
violence is the only means of aiding the victim, the bystander is obligated to 
commit violence, it does not follow that there are, in fact, any such cases.  The only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that if there are such cases, then there is such an 
obligation.  If there are no cases in which the necessity condition holds, there are 
no bystanders who are so obligated.  And if there are no such cases, then no 
pacifist fails to meet her obligations merely by refraining from violence in 
interventionist pacifist dilemmas. 
How is it possible to determine whether there are such cases?  If a 
bystander stops an assailant with violence, it does not follow that violence was 
necessary to aid the victim.  Some other course of action might also have 
succeeded.  If a bystander attempts to stop the assailant nonviolently but fails, it 
does not follow that violence would have succeeded.  For a bystander to 
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determine that violence is necessary would require exhaustive knowledge of all 
options available to her and their outcomes.   
Even if there were cases in which the necessity condition holds, we would 
never know it.  So, we would never know whether a bystander was obligated to 
commit violence.  Ignorance does not entail there are no such cases.  But it does 
mean that even if successful, the objection achieves far less than it seems.  The 
objection fails to show that any actual bystander is, in fact, obligated to commit 
violence.  If the objection succeeds, it succeeds only against pacifisms that entail 
that even in principle no one is ever obligated to commit violence.  Many pacifisms 
(including moral health pacifism) include no such claim.  Interestingly, the 
objection does not even show that pacifisms of the type that maintain that all 
bystanders are morally obligated not to commit violence against the assailant are 
false.  As Richard Routley points out, the objection can only achieve this provided 
an additional claim—that moral obligations never truly conflict (Routley 1984, 
124).  At best, this objection shows only that some strictly hypothetical bystander 
is obligated to commit violence.  And, in view of Lionel or the walking-frame 
dependent grandfather, I maintain that it does not even achieve this much. 
  
4.5 Is Violence Ever Practically Necessary? 
 Some objectors argue that violence is necessary in interventionist pacifism 
dilemmas because for some bystanders, the only perceived options are violence or 
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non-intervention and violence is the only intervention option the bystander is 
justified in believing will succeed in preventing or curtailing harm to the victim.  
Granted, for all the bystander knows, there are other actual options and one of 
them might succeed.  But a bystander so situated must make a decision about 
what to do.  So, as far as some bystanders can tell, violence is necessary to aid the 
victim; such bystanders ought to commit violence against the assailant.  
Aaron Fortune, for example, acknowledges that persons are irreducibly 
social; so, acts of violence against others always constitute acts of damage to 
oneself (Fortune, 185).  Violence is self-perpetuating (Fortune, 186).  Thus, many 
pacifists correctly observe that unmerited suffering can stop a violence cycle 
(Fortune, 189).  Fortune argues that even so, pacifism is untenable in a world 
where violence exists because “there are times when the loving act is to sacrifice 
one’s person and end violence violently” (Fortune, 184).  Some assailants are 
insatiably violent like rabid dogs, in which case “it is better to shoot the dog than 
let it eat everyone” (Fortune, 189).  Fortune does not argue that violence is 
sometimes a practically necessary evil.  Rather, it can serve as a moral high 
ground—another way in which persons, like pacifists, can morally sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of peace.  “[Pacifists] are wrong to limit artificially the 
possible modes of self-sacrifice” (Fortune, 189).   
 Similarly, David Kopel acknowledges the uncertainties in intervention cases.   
The bystander cannot be certain whether the assailant will follow through or 
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whether the victim will escape or survive (Kopel 2008b, 36).  The bystander can 
merely judge the likelihood of outcomes (Kopel 2008b, 38).  But Kopel argues that 
pacifists like Tolstoy grossly misuse these uncertainties.  Tolstoy argues that killing 
the assailant means “killing for certain,” whereas the bystander is not certain of 
the outcome of the scenario; therefore, the bystander ought not to kill the 
assailant (Tolstoy 1896, 4).  Kopel argues that the bystander still ought to protect 
the victim violently; the bystander has no obligation to the assailant because the 
assailant qua assailant forfeits the right to life (Kopel 2008b, 37).  Kopel concludes 
that the moral action is for the “Good Samaritan” to shoot the assailant (Kopel 
2008b, 38).   
According to Kopel, Tolstoy mistakenly treats these cases as hypothetical.  
When William Jennings Bryan asked Tolstoy about such cases, Tolstoy remarked he 
had never personally seen such a criminal (Kopel 2008b, 34).  In a letter to Ernest 
Howard Crosby, Tolstoy writes, “No one has yet seen the imaginary robber with 
the imaginary child” (Tolstoy 1896, 5).  In response, Kopel recounts three cases in 
which children were attacked or kidnapped by assailants and in which the 
assailants were not stopped until shot or held at gunpoint (Kopel 2008b, 34-35).  
Contrary to Tolstoy’s claims, such cases do occur, and such cases show that 
sometimes bystanders ought to commit violence.  
 These objections largely do not apply to moral health pacifism.  Moral 
health pacifism is consistent with the claim that sometimes violence is practically 
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necessary.  As Gandhi writes, “If the capacity for non-violent [defense] is lacking, 
there need be no hesitation in using violent means” (Gandhi 1948, 260).  
Elsewhere he writes, “Where there is only a choice between cowardice and 
violence, I would advise violence…But…non-violence is infinitely superior to 
violence” (Gandhi 2013, 442).  The last claim is the crux of moral health pacifism.  It 
ought (evaluatively) not to be the case that some persons ought to commit MCV.  
Everyone ought (evaluatively) to be able to perform acts morally healthier than 
MCV.   
But bystanders have different capabilities, and those capabilities are 
determined by a range of factors that determine moral health.  Some of those 
factors may be under a bystander’s control.  Some may not.  The mental states, 
actions, conditions, and states of affairs of one bystander may enable her to 
perform intervention options morally healthier than MCV.  The same factors of 
another bystander may restrict her now but make it possible for her to perform 
morally healthier intervention options at some future point.  For now violence is 
practically necessary for that bystander to aid a victim, but she ought (evaluatively) 
to do what she can to orient her trajectory toward a level of moral health sufficient 
for having morally healthier intervention options.  Of course, she may never do so, 
and so she may never have those options, in which case, for her, violence is 
practically necessary.  For other bystanders, those factors may bring about a 
permanent moral health trajectory ceiling; for such bystanders, MCV is the morally 
healthiest intervention option they will ever have.  For them, violence against the 
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assailant is practically necessary.  Such bystanders ought (evaluatively) to commit 
MCV against assailants; they are doing their best.  
 Despite immunity to the objection, it is imperative not to leave the matter 
here.  Moral health pacifism allows for a significant analysis of such objections—an 
analysis the seeds of which Kopel misses in his interpretation of Tolstoy.28  Tolstoy 
told William Jennings Bryan he had never seen such a criminal “but he had seen 
wars in which millions of people were killed.”  Concerning the imaginary robber 
and child, Tolstoy continues, “and all the horrors, which fill history and 
contemporary events, have been produced only because men imagine that they 
can know the consequences of the possible acts” (Tolstoy 1896, 5).  To Ernest 
Crosby, Tolstoy writes: 
It is generally assumed… there can be no other answer to the 
question than that the robber ought to be killed in order to save the 
child.  But this answer is given so emphatically and so quickly only 
because we are not only in the habit of acting in this manner in the 
case of defending a child, but also in the case of expanding the 
borders of a neighboring state to the detriment of our own…or in 
the case of defending the fruits of our garden against ravage by 
passers-by… Such imaginary cases and the conclusions drawn from 
them prove only that there are men who know that it is not right to 
steal, to lie, or to kill, but who are so loathed to stop doing these 
things that they use all the efforts of their mind in order to justify 
their acts. (Tolstoy 1896, 4-5) 
In a newspaper article, Tolstoy writes,  




 In Kopel’s defense, Tolstoy is easy to interpret uncharitably.  As Gel’fond points out, 
Tolstoy is partly to blame for misinterpretations because of his indulgent use of “sharp words” and 
a “sarcastic and peremptory tone” (Gel’fond, 50). 
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They are greatly interested and disturbed by the question of how to 
deal with a man who slays a child before their eyes.  …  In reality, 
however, what concerns these people who wish to justify violence is 
not the fate of the imaginary child at all, but it is their own fate, 
their own way of life, supported by violence, and not maintainable if 
violence is repudiated. (Tolstoy 1909, 58) 
Hidden under Tolstoy’s uncharitable rhetoric is this: focus on hypothetical 
or rare cases obscures that at issue is violence as a lifestyle.  Fascinatingly, in three 
different places, Kopel takes for granted that “Good Samaritans” will be armed 
(Kopel 2008b, 35-37).  No one just happens to be carrying a gun by accident.  A 
range of contingencies and choices over time determine what people will be like 
and what they will likely do in such cases.  Becoming a violence-skilled bystander is 
a process that involves a significant number of choices and practices.  Even if Kopel 
is correct that there are exceptional cases in which violence is practically 
necessary, he does not sufficiently acknowledge that this tends toward the 
justification of a great deal more violence (and violent-ness) than just the 
practically necessary kind.  When Kopel lists real instances of what Tolstoy 
cavalierly dubs “imaginary,” the effect is not merely that Tolstoy’s claim is false, 
but that a great many other choices and practices related to becoming a violent 
bystander are in no need of further moral scrutiny.  
This is the danger of exceptions.  As Andrew Fiala argues, even if there may 
be exceptions, arguing for them can have a normalizing or precedent-setting effect 
on the exceptional act or practice (Fiala 2006, 127).  Failing to recognize the tragic 
nature of these cases makes them easier to regularize (Fiala 2006, 140).  This may 
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lead to “exceptional thinking” in which persons have a tendency to grant 
exceptional status to non-exceptional cases (Fiala 2006, 138-139).   
When we spend most of our time trying to justify exceptions to the 
general rule … we end up forgetting that the most important thing is 
the rule and not the exceptions. … The long-term goal is to 
transform the conditions that make … peace difficult or impossible. 
(Fiala 2014b, 39-40) 
Focus on exceptions obscures the importance of what I have called 
trajectory.  Moral health is dynamic and directional.  The goodness a person 
instantiates has a flow.  If one’s primary concern is best conceptualized as a matter 
of direction, talk of “exceptions” is simply out of place.  Exceptions operate against 
a background conception of rules and therefore treat the claims in question as 
deontological in nature.  Exceptions talk suggests the original claims are juridical or 
legal in character.  Against that background, arguing for exceptions amounts to 
carving out space that demarcates exemption from the status of rule-breaking—
“Here are the conditions under which persons who act thusly are exonerated.”  But 
even if this is in some sense true, this method of moral analysis is inept. 
Consider the case of limb amputation.  Amputation suggests that 
something tragic has become practically necessary.  No other means of saving the 
limb appear available to the doctor.  But the tragic-ness motivates relevant parties 
to find alternatives to amputation.  The tone with which Kopel advocates self-
defensive and interventionist gun violence is like a recommendation to acquire the 
skill and equipment necessary to perform amputations without any further 
concern for discovering alternatives because amputation works just fine as far as it 
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goes.  I concede to Kopel that violence can bring about desirable states of affairs.  
So can amputation!  But Kopel fails to recognize the badness of violence as such, 
the tragedy involved in its use, the tragic direction which it takes persons, and 
therefore, the importance of finding ways to do without it.  And this failure is in 
part because Kopel examines the issue solely through a legal framework.29 
Fortune, however, recognizes the problem.  He argues that his conception 
of violence as self-sacrifice is superior to exceptional or “necessary evil” 
conceptions because it places greater limits on the use of violence (Fortune, 189).  
Fortune, though, argues that sometimes amputation is necessary, or, to use his 
metaphor, the rabid dog must be shot.  And so, someone must do the shooting.  
Fortune takes the danger-of-exceptions point seriously, recognizing that exception 
advocates likely “fail to capture the bitterness of their medicine” (Fortune, 184).  
Even so, he may not take it seriously enough. 
For Fortune, an act of violence constitutes self-sacrificial violence only if it 
ends the assailant’s violence, it does not provoke retaliation, and it ends one’s own 
violent response to the assailant (Fortune, 190).  To meet these conditions, a 
person would have to prepare by acquiring the degree of skillful use of violence 
necessary to neutralize aggressive violence in a way that sufficiently disables the 
assailant from retaliating.  Frankly, this sounds like a significant degree of violence 




 Kopel’s paper is essentially an indirect defense of gun ownership rights.  Kopel makes no 
direct application of pacifist philosophies to the issue of gun control.  Rather, Kopel examines 
several modern version of “compulsory pacifism” and concludes that their basic philosophical 
grounds are unsound (Kopel 2008b, 12).   
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training.  And that calls into question whether the third condition could ever be 
met.  Could a self-sacrificially violent person refrain from becoming more violent 
generally or avoid Fiala’s “exceptional thinking”?  Fortune briefly considers the 
problem: “Could a violent agent willingly put down the sword and wait for others 
to decide when to take it back up?  I do not know” (Fortune, 190). 
I tend to think that violent persons cannot “put down the sword,” at least 
not easily.  Consider again the case of Terry Dobson on the Tokyo train.  Dobson 
mentions that his years of martial art training included significant stress on the 
need to use that training only as a last resort; engaging in an altercation was 
treated as proof the martial artist had already failed as a conflict-resolver (Dobson, 
188).  Nevertheless, as Dobson tells the story, when the raucous drunkard entered 
the train car, Dobson’s first inclination was to use violence against him, yet the old 
man’s kind and sympathetic words showed that violence was unnecessary.  
Dobson’s training led him to Fiala’s “exceptional thinking.”30 
That aside, my contention is that a person who aimed to make use of 
pacifist alternatives could not also be a person who made preparations to commit 
self-sacrificial violence.  The preparations necessary for the effective use of self-
sacrificial violence is inimical to the preparations necessary for the effective use of 
pacifist alternatives.  In trajectory language, they constitute different directions 




 Consider Grossman’s treatment of the process by which Vietnam soldiers became 
significantly more effective killers than soldiers in previous wars and the kind of psychological 
damage that this entailed in their postwar years (Grossman, 251-299).   
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and flows.  Thus, even if there are the exceptions Fortune claims, those exceptions 
determine an entire trajectory for a person—a trajectory significantly different 
from the nonviolence Fortune respects.  Thus, even on Fortune’s suggestion, in 
practice, the exception will take priority over the rule. 
Acts and persons do not exist in a vacuum.  Persons’ acts are in part the 
products of nature, nurture, or previous choices.  Acts require persons to have the 
internal or external resources necessary to perform them.31  Hypothetical, 
exceptional cases can obscure this point and therefore obscure a point of 
contention between pacifism and non-pacifism.  Even if the hypothetical bystander 
ought to commit violence, real persons have to decide what kind of bystanders 
they will become.  They cannot be effectively-violent bystanders without 
previously having become violent.32 
For both Fortune and Kopel, some ruthless assailants make it practically 
necessary for some persons to become violent.  Both Fortune and Kopel mention 
Hitler as a significant problem for pacifism (Fortune, 184; Kopel, 14ff).  Fortune and 




 Alasdair MacIntyre argues that a flowing narrative is necessary for any act a person 
commits to be intelligible (MacIntyre, 214-215).  I take MacIntyre’s point to be an epistemological 
one.  My claim is metaphysical.  Acts as such are not isolatable, but are what they are in virtue of 
their connections to previous events including previous choices.  
32
 Narveson likewise misses the importance of trajectory when he writes, “The intelligent 
firefighter knows that in some cases fire is his best weapon.  Not to use it in those cases would 
defeat the purpose of firefighting, rather than subtly promoting it by promoting ‘good habits.’  The 
habit of not starting fires is not a good one in those cases where that’s the only way to stop the 
major fires one is trying to stop.  Yet the danger of turning people into firebugs thereby is also 
small” (Narveson 1992, 487).  Narveson fails to acknowledge that fighting fires without starting fires 
is, ceteris paribus, still always preferable to fighting fires by starting them.  And if a person is 
habituated into using fires to fight fires in some cases, that person will likely develop exceptional 
thinking with respect to that technique and never attempt to discover alternative techniques let 
alone acquire the capacity to implement them. 
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Kopel are not alone.  Narveson also uses the Nazis as a counterexample to the 
effectiveness of pacifism (Narveson 1965, 263).  George Hartmann records one 
philosopher’s objection to pacifism as “successful pacifism would introduce a 
Fascist world” (Hartmann, 132).33  Robert Brimlow’s book defending a version of 
nonviolence is entitled “What about Hitler?” (Brimlow 2006).34  Do such 
international threats make it obvious that pacifism should be altogether 
abandoned? 
I do think a group of persons could make effective use of pacifist 
alternatives.  For example, in 1875, citizens of Monterey, California used a 
welcoming parade to deter seven Chinese war vessels from attacking in retaliation 
for the town’s poor treatment of Chinese immigrants (Fry, 85-86).  I also think 
pacifist alternatives could be effectively performed by state agents.  Many police 
agencies require officers to learn de-escalation techniques some of which may be 
forms of pacifist alternatives.35  The point I have attempted to make in multiple 
ways is that the flora and fauna of moral agents is diverse.  This is most obvious, I 
think, at the interpersonal level.  Morally speaking, some persons can do more and 
be more than others; and even among equally moral persons, their moral-ness can 
                                                 
 
33
 Hartmann’s paper, a summary of a questionnaire sent to several dozen philosophers 
about the strengths and weakness of pacifism, was published in 1944; surely the respondent 
quoted here has a particular set of fascists in mind. 
34
 I am reminded of “Godwin’s Law” which states, “As an online discussion grows longer, 
the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” (Godwin 1994).  Godwin’s 
law apparently applies to discussions of pacifism as well. 
35
 See Sweeney 2016.  Interestingly, a police policy of favoring de-escalation is ineffective 
without officers being trained in de-escalation techniques (Griffith 2016), and de-escalation training 
is often resisted by officers who already have significant training and experience in the effective use 
of violence (T. Williams 2015).   
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vary stylistically.  There is no rigid line or cut off point between the interpersonal 
level and the level of groups or states where that diversity is no longer apparent.  
The reason is that, as noted in Chapter 1, to speak of state action is unintelligible 
without speaking of the individual persons carrying out certain actions.   
However, I do think there is an important dividing line between the 
interpersonal and the state level, and that dividing line exists because of the nature 
of states as such.  As Steven Pinker writes, states are “almost by definition in the 
violence business” (Pinker, 317).  The individuals that comprise “the state” are 
essentially persons to whom has been granted a monopoly on the use or direction 
of violence against domestic and foreign threats.  In fact, Charles Tilly (among 
others) argues that concerning the historical origins of states, the explanatory 
power of organized crime syndicates that succeeded among competitors far 
exceeds the explanatory power of social contract theories.  
Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger 
scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from 
their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from 
neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other 
organizations. (Tilly, 173)36    
Inasmuch as states can be thought of as agents, they are violent agents qua states.  
States can certainly be more or less violent, and, on the whole, less violent states 
are better than more violent ones.  But so far as I can see, Guy Hershberger is quite 
correct that if a state were to become the kind of entity that could practice the 




 See also Rothbard 1975. 
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kind of pacifism I describe, “Such a state would be so different in character from 
any state which we know today that it should have another name to describe it” 
(Hershberger, 311-312).37 
Given their very nature, then, states have moral health trajectory ceilings 
that largely preclude pacifist alternatives as options.  Some forms of violence are 
the morally healthiest options states have.  Moral health pacifism is consistent with 
the claim that in some cases states ought to commit violence and with the claim 
that some persons ought to act as agents of the state.  Moral health pacifism, then, 
is essentially an interpersonal practice, and in that sense it is a project separate 
from political and state life.  As John Middleton Murry observes, pacifism in an 
important sense cannot be “translated into political terms.”  Its aim is “not to 
prevent war, but to create individuals for whom war is impossible as an activity” 
(Murry, 33-34). 
Since states are by nature violent agents and since the practice of moral 
health pacifism is a practice of becoming a non-violent agent, moral health pacifists 
ought not to become agents of the state (at least when that entails being the agent 
through whom the state commits violence).  Those two types of agents have moral 
health trajectories with discordant directions or flows.  This does not mean that 
moral health pacifism is politically inert.  A thorough practice of moral health 




 Interestingly, Richard Routley argues that becoming such an entity is likely not in a 
state’s self-interest, not because of likelihood of defeat from foreign threats, but because of the 
domestic threat of its own citizens undermining its use of force to impose order by implementing 
those very nonviolent means (Routley 1984, 132). 
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pacifism may be subversive—a form of what Dorothy Day describes as “gentle 
sabotage” against various political, cultural, or social power structures that depend 
in important ways on violence (Day, 6).38  But it does mean that the moral health 
pacifist cannot deny that perhaps the state she inhabits ought to engage in a 
defensive war or that its police forces ought in some cases to engage in certain 
forms of violence.  The moral health pacifist’s criticism is that such exceptional 
forms of violence are often grossly misused by non-pacifists to justify all manner of 
unnecessary violence—especially at the interpersonal level.  Non-pacifists like 
Kopel and Fortune fail to recognize the tragic nature of such cases and thus fail to 
recognize the need to discover better means to better ends. 
 
4.6 Are Pacifists Hypocrites? 
 John Lewis writes that the pacifist “does not realize that his pacifism can 
only exist in a society protected by force from being overwhelmed by a paganism 
that would not tolerate it for a moment” (J. Lewis, 113).  Reinhold Niebuhr writes, 
“Let such pacifism realize that it is a form of asceticism and that as such it is a 
parasite on the sins of the rest of us, who maintain government and relative social 




 A lovely illustration of such subversion takes place in the film Babette’s Feast (Alex et al 
1987).  A former French chef is transplanted to a small Danish village to live among a group of 
austere and conflict-ridden Protestants.  The female chef finds incredible ways to operate within 
the rigid and patriarchal social structure of the village in a way that subverts its oppressive features 
without ever acting coercively or stirring conflict.  The climax of the story occurs when she uses her 
lottery winnings to cook the Protestants a traditional French feast, the hospitable experience of 
which overwhelms them and causes them to resolve their conflicts. 
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peace and relative social justice” (R. Niebuhr 1937, 1391).39  According to Paul 
Gallant, pacifists would all be killed “if not for the protection provided for many 
generations by the Anglosphere’s soldiers and sailors” from tyrants like “Hitler, 
Tojo, Stalin, and bin Laden,” and thus “if you’re a pacifist who hasn’t been 
murdered or enslaved, thank a soldier” (Gallant 2003).  George Hartman records 
one philosopher’s objection to pacifism as “One cannot dare be a pacifist except on 
assurance either that everybody else is one or that someone will fight to guarantee 
him the right to be one” (Hartman, 128).  According to Andrew Fiala, “Critics of the 
war-system are viewed as hypocrites, since it is the material reality of the war-
system that makes it possible for intellectuals to freely criticize the war system” 
(Fiala 2014b, 34).  Brian Orend writes,  
The pacifist, it is said, refuses to take the brutal measures necessary 
for the defense of himself and his country, for the sake of 
maintaining his own inner moral purity.  It is contended that the 
pacifist is thus a kind of free rider, gathering all the benefits of 
citizenship while not sharing all its burdens. (Orend, 4)40 
The objectors do not concur on precisely what it is the pacifist depends on 
others’ violence for or whether this makes pacifists parasites, hypocrites, or free-
riders.  But I believe these objectors’ comments are similar enough to represent 
them as forms of a single objection that consists of four basic parts.  First, there is a 
counterfactual dependency between violence committed by others and some state 




 Niebuhr wrote during escalating international relations that led to World War II.  By 
“such pacifism,” Niebuhr partly has in mind his own brother who had previous argued that in the 
case of Japan’s aggressive moves against China in the late 1930s, the absolute pacifism of 
Christianity required Christians to invoke “the grace of doing nothing” (H. Niebuhr 1932). 
40
 Arguably, any citizens of a country with a volunteer military are guilty of unfairly off-
loading social burdens onto others to some degree.  See Robillard & Strawser 2016. 
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of affairs.  That is, if it were not the case that persons other than the pacifist 
committed some violence, some state of affairs that does obtain would not obtain.  
For some objectors like Lewis and Gallant, the relevant state of affairs is the 
pacifist’s own safety or survival.  For other objectors like those represented by 
Hartmann and Fiala, it is the pacifist’s legally protected and violently defended 
right and freedom to be a pacifist.  And for objectors like Niebuhr and Orend, the 
relevant state of affairs is the fulfillment of social responsibilities especially those 
related to the defense or maintenance of justice.   
Second, the counterfactual dependency of that state of affairs on violence 
shows that the pacifist is reaping benefits at the expense of or to the detriment of 
others without any symbiotic or off-setting contribution.  The pacifist is thus a kind 
of parasite or free-rider.   
Third, there is an assessment of what Neal Tognazzini and Justin Coates call 
the pacifist’s “moral standing,” which concerns whether a person who advances a 
moral claim is in an appropriate moral position to do so (Tognazzini & Coates, 2.2).  
Being a parasite or a free-rider in the nature of the case undermines the moral 
standing of one’s moral judgments.  This is the basis of the pacifist’s alleged 
hypocrisy.  The pacifist is not guilty of pretense or insincerity, nor is she guilty of 
what Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton call “hypocrisy of blame,” in which a 
person castigates others for deeds which she herself commits unremorsefully or 
while being guilty of greater faults than those for which she criticizes others (Crisp 
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& Cowton, 344).41  Rather, there is an allegedly acute conflict or inconsistency 
between the pacifist’s moral judgment against violence and the fact that she 
benefits from states of affairs brought about by violence—what Dan Turner calls a 
“disparity pair” (Turner, 265). 
Fourth, pacifism is rejected as moral-standing self-undermining.  Because 
any given person depends on some violence, anyone morally critical of that 
violence is already in some sense parasitic or free-riding on others committing 
violence.  Adherence to pacifism necessarily involves a person in depending on the 
very activity of which she is morally critical, and therefore pacifism necessarily 
involves a person in a disparity pair that constitutes hypocrisy.  
 This objection seems to pose a particular problem for the moral health 
pacifist, since I have argued that states ought to commit some violence but moral 
health pacifists ought not to be agents of the state.  I have claimed that moral 
health pacifists are relatively-ideally morally healthy agents, yet they appear to be 
the very hypocritical free-riding parasites the objectors condemn.  Is this true?   It 
is not as obvious to me as it must be to the objectors that the various 
counterfactual dependency claims are true.  But this ultimately does not matter 




 John Lewis’s version of the objection may include this characterization of hypocrisy.  
Pacifism, he argues, “may actually involve the infliction of suffering upon multitudes of non-
pacifists” since, metaphorically speaking, in order for the pacifist to be a “saint,” he has to “crucify 
others to save himself” (J. Lewis, 53, 113).  I believe my responses to the characterization of 
hypocrisy more common to the other objectors will also address Lewis’s charge. 
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since even if they are true, none of them entails that a pacifist is a hypocrite, free-
rider, or parasite.  
 First, a political freedom or right to be a pacifist is not a necessary condition 
for the belief in or practice of pacifism.  Pacifists can be pacifists even under 
political oppression.  Inhabitants of any state are capable of adhering to ideologies, 
holding beliefs, and engaging in practices their state has declared illegal.  This is not 
news.  And history contains examples of beliefs and practices to which persons 
ought to have adhered despite lacking legal protection (for example, racial 
equality).  Whether adherence to pacifism is a legally protected right or freedom 
only affects the potential consequences of being a pacifist, it does not determine 
whether a person may or ought to be one.   
 Second, even if a pacifist’s freedom or right to be a pacifist depends on 
others’ violence, it does not follow that she is a hypocrite.  A person may rightly 
criticize the activities that brought about a state of affairs that benefits her.  If 
Smith were a white male, he may recognize that his current professional success is 
to some degree due to white male privilege.  Smith may be grateful for his job and 
intend to keep it.  It does not follow that Smith is hypocritical if Smith morally 
judges white male privilege to be a bad thing.  Suppose Smith receives the shocking 
news that his grandfather who had long suffered from a terminal disease died by 
doctor-assisted suicide.  Smith may be grateful and relieved that his grandfather is 
no longer suffering.  It does not follow that Smith is hypocritical if Smith still 
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morally opposes euthanasia.  If it is hypocritical for a person to benefit from a state 
of affairs brought about by means to which that person is morally opposed, most if 
not all early 18th and 19th century U.S. and British abolitionists would be hypocrites; 
they likely could not escape at least the indirect benefits of an economy and 
society that profited from slavery. 
 Certainly, there are benefit receiving arrangements that seem 
straightforwardly hypocritical—a prohibitionist receiving income as part owner in a 
liquor store or a person morally opposed to fossil fuels owning stock in oil and coal 
companies.42  What then is the relevant difference between these cases and the 
cases above?  At least one important difference is the degree to which the person 
actively sought or had the ability to refuse or avoid the benefits.  Becoming part 
owner in a liquor store or buying stock in oil companies suggests a level of active 
participation in that which the prohibitionist or environmentalist morally opposes 
sufficient to constitute a disparity pair.  To be morally consistent, it seems 
incumbent on the prohibitionist or environmentalist either to refuse these benefits 
or not to have sought them in the first place.  But neither Smith nor the 
abolitionists actively sought the benefits they received, and it is unclear to what 




 I find the case of Karl Marx to be unclear in an interesting way.  Marx was a fervent critic 
of capitalism—particularly the working conditions of industrial factory workers in light of the wealth 
of factory owners.  Marx often depended for financial support on his colleague Friedrich Engels.  
Engels’s money largely came from his stake in two different industrial factories (Brown & Fee, 1248-
1249).  Whether this makes Marx a hypocrite may depend on the nature of his criticisms; it is 
unclear to what degree Marx intended his criticisms to be moral.  Supposing his criticisms were 
moral, was Marx a hypocrite?  Accepting financial help from a friend does not seem hypocritical, 
but if he were aware of the source of that money, that awareness does make Marx’s acceptance of 
it seem suspect. 
205 
 
degree they could refuse or avoid them.  The precise ways in which Smith benefits 
at any given time from white male privilege may be inscrutable or perhaps 
unavoidable.  If Smith attempted to exploit or insist on benefitting from white male 
privilege, or if Smith failed to refuse certain benefits obviously and acutely brought 
about by white male privilege (for instance, if Smith was offered a job by a white 
boss who told him, “the other candidate was black, and white people take care of 
their own”), then Smith would be a hypocrite.   But Smith is not a hypocrite merely 
in virtue of happening to be a white male born into and consequently benefitting 
from a society that systemically privileges white males. 
 Similarly, the pacifist is not a hypocrite merely in virtue of inhabiting and 
thereby benefitting from a society that uses violence or threat of violence to 
secure those benefits.  As with Smith, the pacifist ought neither to demand 
violence-caused benefits nor fail to refuse benefits obviously or acutely brought 
about by violence on pain of hypocrisy.43  But surely the pacifist’s moral standing 
cannot be suspect if the pacifist did not participate in the violence that brought 
about the benefits, does not insist on receiving the benefits, and cannot for all 
practical purposes refuse or avoid them.44  If a pacifist can be charged with 




 A pacifist ought not to insist or request that police, military personnel, or other agents of 
the state commit acts of violence in her defense.  This may entail in some cases not dialing 911, not 
taking anyone to court, not serving on juries in at least some types of cases, and never serving as a 
judge at least in some types of cases (Tolstoy 1902, 26-27, 31).  If such moral consistency or non-
hypocrisy results in a pacifist’s death or injury, so be it; that is a risk of being a pacifist.  Further, it 
seems to me a pacifist ought not to insist on exemption from penalties a state may impose on 
persons who refrain from such activities (for example, jail-time for conscientious objectors). 
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hypocrisy on these grounds alone, it seems very difficult for someone ever to 
oppose any feature of her state or regime without incurring the hypocrisy charge.  
For the same reason, pacifists cannot rightly be called parasites since unlike 
parasites they do not actively pursue a host in hopes of extracting benefits at that 
host’s expense.  Whatever benefits the pacifist cannot practically refuse or avoid 
can hardly be said to be gotten parasitically.   
 Third, the pacifist cannot be a free rider merely in virtue of non-
participation in police or military services because not all of a state’s inhabitants 
are expected to participate, and those not expected to participate are not thereby 
free riders.  Narveson writes, “The true test of the pacifist comes, of course, when 
he is called upon to assist in the protection of the safety of others persons” 
(Narveson 1965, 269); John Lewis writes that the pacifist fails “to face as a 
neighbor and comrade the demands made upon him by the needs of his fellow-
men” (J. Lewis, 51).45  Narveson and Lewis are two examples among many, but it is 
nonetheless jarring that neither recognizes the significance of his use of masculine 
pronouns.  Narveson’s and Lewis’s objections are problems for pacifism only if 
pacifism requires being the type of person one’s society expects to participate in 
defensive violence; otherwise, Narveson and Lewis succeed, at best, in showing 
only that pacifists of a certain type shirk their responsibilities.  But they do not 




 The extent to which a pacifist ought to attempt to avoid participation fuels debates 
among pacifists about whether to pay taxes or even work in certain industries that indirectly benefit 
a war effort (Hershberger, 100, 317). 
45
 Recall also Narveson’s previous quote, “The pacifist is generally thought of as the man 
who…” (Narveson 1965, 265 emphasis mine). 
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succeed in showing even this much since it is not the case that social 
responsibilities can only be fulfilled by committing violence.  There are 
contributions a society needs from its citizenry other than soldiering.  As 
Hershberger points out, there are a variety of civilian public services by which a 
person may contribute societally, including relief work for war sufferers 
(Hershberger, 203f, 268).46  Surely, persons who engage in such activities are not 
shirking their civic responsibilities during wartime. 
Most importantly though, moral health pacifists neither fail to defend 
fellow citizens nor fail to contribute socially.  The practice of moral health pacifism 
includes implementing pacifist alternatives to prevent assailants from harming 
victims, thereby defending the victim.  Even Niebuhr admitted that it was good to 
have pacifists inasmuch as it is good to have those who aim to model moral ideals 
(Niebuhr 1937, 1391).  Tolstoy held that part of pacifist practice included works of 
service and charity to those in need (Tolstoy 1902, 217 – 218).  As I argued in the 
previous chapter, pacifist alternatives may consist of acts that are preemptive of 
violent conflicts—acts of mercy, kindness, and hospitality.  Through pacifist 
alternatives, the moral health pacifist aims to undertake a curative mission that 




 Hershberger insists that such service should never consist in any form of military 
participation; “noncombatant” or “service unit” participation is as much a part of the machine of 
violent destruction as is soldiering (Hershberger, 267).  I am sympathetic to Hershberger’s position, 
though I am not convinced that every possible military-related service would be inconsistent with 
practicing moral health pacifism; perhaps positions like chaplain or medic would be consistent with 
adherence to moral health pacifism, though I have not explored this carefully. 
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reduces violence in the immediate world around her; such acts constitute social 
contribution and responsibility.   
None of the ways in which the pacifist is alleged to depend on violence 
show that she is a parasite, free rider, or hypocrite.  It is interesting to consider, 
though, whether violence or the threat of violence may be a systemic form of 
hypocrisy. 
The whole system of our social life, the complicated mechanism of 
our varied institutions, which all have violence for their aim, bear 
witness to the degree to which violence is contrary to human 
nature.  Not a single judge will consent to strangle with a rope the 
man whom he has condemned to death in his court.  No one of 
higher rank will consent to snatch a peasant from his weeping family 
and shut him up in prison.  No general, nor soldier, save in 
obedience to discipline, to his oath, and in time of war, would kill 
hundreds of Turks or Germans and destroy their villages; he would 
not so much as wound one of them.  These things are due to that 
complicated machinery of Society and the State, which makes it its 
first business to destroy the feeling of responsibility for such deeds, 
so that no man shall feel them to be as unnatural as they are. 
(Tolstoy 1902, 46-47) 
Maybe Tolstoy exaggerates (or maybe not), but he suggests a telling thought 
experiment.  Suppose a judge could only issue a death sentence on the condition 
that she personally conducts the execution.  Suppose a prosecutor could only 
request a death sentence on the condition that she personally conducts the 
execution.  Suppose political leaders could only vote in favor of going to war on the 
condition that their vote required them to fight on the front lines.  Suppose citizens 
could vote in favor of war only if that vote constituted automatic combat 
enlistment.  Would such conditions reduce the number of executions and wars?  If 
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so, then at least some who advocate violence depend on others to commit it for 
them, and arguably in a hypocritical manner. 
   
4.7 Is It True That Pacifism Does Not Work? 
 Paul Gallant argues against pacifism based on the history of the Moriori 
tribe of the Chatham Islands (Gallant 2003).  The Moriori were likely Polynesians 
that migrated from New Zealand to the Chatham Islands around the 1300s.47  They 
were so bellicose and cannibalistic that eventually a blood-weary chief prohibited 
all violence.  This prohibition was never rescinded, not even when Europeans and 
the Maori (a rival tribe) invaded the islands.  Between the early 19th and 20th 
centuries, the Maori nearly exterminated the Moriori tribe.48  Gallant argues that 
all pacifists would be as doomed as the Moriori if not for military forces ready to 
defend them violently.  Thus, pacifism does not work because pacifists either do 
not survive or they survive despite their pacifism.  David Kopel argues against 
pacifism on the same basis, and both Gallant and Kopel concur with Michael King’s 
assessment of the Moriori that the best hope pacifism has of working is “against an 
adversary who shares your conscience” (Michael King, 75).  Have Gallant and Kopel 
shown that pacifism does not work? 




 See Michael King 1989.  Gallant and Kopel both rely solely on King as a source, but 
apparently there is dispute about the origin of the Moriori, though there does not appear to be any 
significant dispute over the Moriori’s refusal to resist 19
th
 century invaders violently.   
48
 The Moriori were exterminated as an extant tribe and culture as early as the 1870’s.  The 
last full-blooded Moriori, Tommy Solomon, died in 1933.  But persons of mixed Moriori ancestry 
survive to this day and have worked to revive Moriori culture.  See Davis & Solomon 2014. 
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 One case does not establish that pacifism does not work.  I have provided 
several cases in which it did work.  There are more.  Charging, bayonet-drawn 
soldiers have been deterred with as little as a hug and a smile (Yoder 1992b, 91-
94).  Under William Penn, Colonial Pennsylvania was largely occupied by pacifist 
religious groups and remained virtually unarmed for 70 years despite being 
surrounded by hostile native tribes who were aggressive to other colonists (Brock 
1998, 31).49  Despite a language barrier, an elderly woman prevented a Russian 
soldier from raping Heinz Kraschutzki’s daughter when the woman touched the 
soldier’s cheek and said, “You are not a bad follow.  I know you are not!  You will 
not do any harm to this girl, will you?” (Fry, 87).  A son once stopped his drunken, 
axe-wielding father from attacking his mother by quietly whispering, “You know 
you oughtn’t to do that, dad” (Yoder 1992b, 60).  British soldiers were deterred 
from carrying out orders to burn down a suspected American rebel house by a 
simple invitation to tea (Gummere, 306).  According to Alfred Page, the Maori (the 
very tribe that nearly wiped out the Moriori) prevented a British attack by overt 
displays of welcome and hospitality toward British soldiers (Hunter, 122-123). 
  More importantly, arguing against pacifism on the basis of one failed case 
is a straw man.   It only establishes that pacifism does not always work.  The same 
can be said of violence.   People have been slaughtered in genocidal fashion 




 See also H. Hodgkin, 254-255. 
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despite their violent resistance.50  Some persons commit self-defensive or 
interventionist violence yet fail to prevent death or injury.51  Violence does not 
always work.  So what?  No pacifism of which I am aware depends on the claim 
“violence never works” or “pacifism always works.”  Rather, some pacifisms claim 
to work better than violence in important respects.  Kopel concedes that 
sometimes they do, but not often (Kopel 2008b, 21).52 
 But the claim that pacifism does not “work” compared to violence can 
obscure what is at issue.  The comparison suggests there is one and the same end 
the achievement of which constitutes “working,” MCV is a means of achieving that 
end, and pacifist alternatives ought to be evaluated merely as alternative means to 
that end.  My own comparison of pacifist alternatives to MCV and the very use of 
the term “pacifist alternatives” may suggest this notion.  But it is an 
oversimplification.  Something significant is lost in discussions of whether pacifism 
“works.” 
 One loss is the relation between means and ends.  Suppose a state of affairs 
S is good.  S may be quantitatively good (good in virtue of the amount of good it 
instantiates), qualitatively good (good in virtue of the kind of good it instantiates), 




 In what some have called the first genocide of the 20
th
 century, German General Lothar 
von Trotha ordered troops to annihilate all men women and children belonging to the Herero tribe 
of German South-west Africa (present day Namibia) in 1904; but this edict came in response to the 
Herero’s armed revolt against the Germans’ oppressive rule and took place during that armed 
conflict (See Ball 2011).  
51
 A Virginia man was killed by home invaders despite firing gun shots in self-defense (See 
Covil 2016). 
52




or resultantly good (good in virtue of the combination of quantity and quality of 
good it instantiates).53  Part of being resultantly good may be the means by which S 
was brought about.  Suppose a person was awarded an educational degree or 
professional certification.  Whether the degree or certification was obtained 
through bribery or through diligent study and training clearly affects the resultant 
goodness of that state of affairs.  If a magic pill granted Smith instant optimum 
health and fitness, Smith’s optimum health and fitness seems less resultantly good 
than, say, Jones’s optimum health and fitness achieved by healthy diet and 
exercise.  The same end is resultantly better when achieved by better means.54  
Another point lost is whether “working” amounts to achievement of one and the 
same end.  Pacifist alternatives do aim at death-and-injury reduction.  But, unlike 
MCV, the practice of moral health pacifism aims also at the redemption of formerly 
violent persons, the reduction of violent intentions, and the remedy of underlying 
causes of violence.  
MCV, then, differs from pacifist alternatives as amputation differs from 
attempting to save the limb.  Suppose Smith, a potential amputee, considers a one-
legged or prosthetic-legged life to be better than dying from gangrene and 
considers the available methods for trying to save the limb too arduous, painful, or 
risky.  Smith’s friend, Jones, implores Smith to reconsider.  Jones points out that 




 See Regan, 78ff for how this distinction poses problems for Narveson’s arguments 
against pacifism. 
54
 Or perhaps different means result in distinctly different ends: end E-brought-about-X-ly 
is arguably not the same end as E-brought-about-Y-ly. 
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Smith could one day run marathons, be a professional athlete, and have overall 
greater mobility if only Smith would consent to lengthier, more painful courses of 
treatment and persevere through some arduous physical therapy.  Smith retorts, “I 
don’t want to be an athlete or run marathons; I enjoy my sedentary lifestyle!  It’s 
true, I might like those things if I tried them, but given how strongly I feel about 
them now, I doubt it.  So, I’m willing to forego those options, especially if it means 
avoiding the intense pain and hard work of trying to save the limb, which definitely 
sounds worse than the pain of losing it.  Besides, so far as I can tell, amputation 
works just fine, whereas it’s not clear trying to save the limb will work.” 
The pacifist and non-pacifist differ not primarily over whether pacifism is an 
efficient, reliable means to non-pacifist ends; rather, the pacifist and non-pacifist 
envision different ends as worthy of achievement.  The moral health pacifist does 
not claim the non-pacifist can preserve her life, property, and lifestyle without the 
aid of guns, knives, or street-fighting prowess.  Rather, the moral health pacifist 
claims that significant parts of common lifestyles need remedying.  There are 
better lifestyles worth attaining even at apparently significant risk.  Those better 
lifestyles likely involve very different views and practices regarding property, 
safety, community, and other persons (even potential perpetrators).55  (They may 




 John Lewis argues that for consistency’s sake, “[pacifists] must cast off all fear and anger, 
and have no need for these material things for which men fight” (J. Lewis, 52).  Lewis is likely right.  
Gandhi says that tenants should evacuate lands belonging to tyrants, robbers should be willingly 
given more than they intend to steal, and possessions should be made easily accessible to robbers 
with doors and windows unlocked (Gandhi 1961, 375; 1910, 49).  Martin Luther King Jr. writes, “I 
know where we can store [surplus] food free of charge—in the wrinkled stomachs of the millions of 
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even involve different dietary practices.56)  The non-pacifist may examine pacifist 
alternatives and conclude, “on the whole, I don’t think pacifism will work.”  But if 
by that assessment, the non-pacifist means that pacifism is not an effective way to 
preserve a non-pacifist lifestyle, the pacifist can reply unfazed, “guilty as charged.” 
 Gallant and Kopel fail to consider that MCV works only if potential 
assailants have less violence-prowess than potential victims.  If persons aim to rely 
on MCV to work, they must, in effect, be willing to be or become more violent than 
their would-be assailants.  For Gallant and Kopel, perhaps this is a limb worth 
severing.  “Sure it is,” they might say, “our violence is justified whereas assailants’ 
is not, and, by our lights, MCV works just fine; if assailants need to be lethally 
injured to secure our rights to home, property, and family, so be it.”   
I do not dispute that rights may be secured in this fashion.  But Gallant and 
Kopel do not fully appreciate the question: is violence really working?  Should 
persons have to own guns or other deadly weapons to secure themselves?  Should 
persons have to prepare themselves to be willing and able to make effective and 
perhaps lethal use of those weapons against others—to engage in mental 
rehearsals of injuring, maiming, and perhaps killing other persons just to secure 
                                                                                                                                         
God’s children in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even in our own nation, who go to bed hungry at 
night” (M. L. King, 254).  Saint Maximus the Confessor writes, “Because we are attached to 
[material] things we fight against other men, whereas we ought to prefer love for our fellow man to 
every visible thing and even to love for our own body” (quoted in Merton, 37).  Hershberger holds 
that views about violence are inextricably bound to views about economic practices and material 
goods (Hershberger, 225).  I do not offer these quotes with full endorsement.  But they show that 
swaths of pacifism have recognized a significant connection between violence and property, safety, 
and social unity.   
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themselves, their families, or their material possessions?  Should persons have to 
bar their windows or avoid going out at night?  Should persons have to avoid 
“shady” parts of town or walking on certain streets?  Should people have to think 
of every stranger at the door as a threat?  Should people have to live this way? 
“No, but that’s just the way things are,” the non-pacifist might retort; so, 
pacifists are just “refusing to acknowledge reality” (Kopel 2008b, 36).57  I do not 
deny that this is the way things are.  I affirm what some non-pacifists do not take 
seriously enough: things ought not to be that way.  If all this fear, suspicion, 
alienation, anxiety, mobility inhibitions, and willingness to maim and kill is the state 
of affairs that constitutes violence “working,” then so much the worse for 
“working.”  For the pacifist, either violence is not working, or else the value of what 
non-pacifists consider “working” is dubious.   
Even if that is the way things are, things do not have to be that way.  As 
Martha Nussbaum observes, “Many tragedies are produced not by natural 
necessity … but simply by habit and tradition, treated as natural and inevitable. … 
That is just the way life is, and it cannot be otherwise” (Nussbaum, 1015).  That 
someone should be willing to put a bullet in the skull of someone else’s son or 
daughter to prevent that son or daughter from stealing a plasma screen television 
is tragic.  That in order to prevent someone else from putting a knife in the throat 




 Consider also Frederick Wilhelmsen who argues that pacifism represents “a principled 
refusal to look at reality” (Wilhelmsen, 3).  George Hartmann records objections to pacifism by 




of my son or daughter I should become a person willing (if need be) to put a knife 
in the throat of someone’s son or daughter is tragic.  It does not have to be this 
way.  It can be otherwise.  The moral health pacifist recognizes the tragedy and 
makes rigorous efforts to become a person on a curative mission, aiming to make 
things the way they ought to be.  And to that end, violence does not work. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 According to Stephen Pinker and other social scientists, violence is 
declining; in fact, we live in the least violent period in history.  According to Pinker, 
two major factors led to this decline: the consolidation of state power and the 
spread of free trade (though Pinker suggests many other factors have played small 
parts in the decline).58  By consolidation of state power, Pinker largely means 
something like Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan story.  Due to human nature and scarcity 
of goods, humans have strong incentives to commit violence against one another.  
But the establishment of strong states changed people’s social incentive structures 
so that otherwise violent persons became more and more deterred by state 
enforced penalties from committing violence.  Similarly, establishing larger 
networks of trade relationships eliminated the incentive to acquire goods from 
those parties by violence.  While Pinker aims to show that violence has declined 
dramatically and test various explanations for that decline, James Gilligan makes 
several proposals for further reducing current levels of violence, all of which, 




 See Pinker 2011. 
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though, are as “top-down” as Pinker’s.  For example, Gilligan suggests changes to 
structures of employment, education, gun laws, and media portrayals of violence 
(Gilligan 2001, 91ff).  Despite Gilligan’s diagnoses and analysis of the causes of 
violence seeming so personal and interpersonal, Gilligan’s prescriptions are largely 
political and collective. 
 I consider my project in a sense the interpersonal, “bottom-up” counterpart 
to Pinker’s and Gilligan’s.  Further, Pinker’s and Gilligan’s works appear to me to 
manifest degrees of what Thomas Sowell calls the “constrained” vision of human 
nature.  According to the constrained vision, to some degree, human beings are 
tragically limited, but their selfish and dangerous impulses can be contained by use 
of social contrivances “which themselves produce unhappy side effects” (Sowell, 
35).  The key is to determine which trade-offs between contained impulses and 
unhappy side effects are worth making.  While I agree that humans are constrained 
in important ways, I have tried to argue in numerous ways that not all humans are 
equally constrained.  And so I also see moral health pacifism as the unconstrained 
vision counterpart to Pinker’s and Gilligan’s constrained visions.   
If we want there to be less violence and less threat of violence, then people 
need to become less violent and less likely to threaten violence.  As one high 
school student remarked concerning metal detectors in schools to prevent school 
shootings, “The only way to get kids not to hurt each other is to get kids not to 
want to hurt each other” (Leblanc, 4).  Throughout his book, Pinker argues that as 
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governments consolidate power more, people want to hurt each other less.  
Unfortunately, this means only that people want to hurt each other less than they 
want to suffer being hurt by the state.  This is quite different from people not 
wanting to hurt each other simplicitir.   
To achieve the latter, someone needs to do it.  Someone needs not to want 
to hurt anyone—not even those who want to hurt her.  Someone needs to become 
less violent.  And she needs to do so in a way conducive to others becoming less 
violent.  Thus, instead of the violence or threat of violence from potential 
assailants infecting her with the need to become more violent, her peaceableness 
could infect others, disarming potential assailants and targets alike. 
 My worry is that reliance on MCV makes us persons less worth being and 
tends to get us stuck in that condition.  Trouble is, becoming persons more worth 
being is hard.  Very hard.  So far as I can see, I am not one of these people.  I am at 
best a moral health pacifist who is, as some Catholics say, “non-practicing.”  
Perhaps this means little more than I have good pacifist-like intentions about which 
I am not doing a whole heck of a lot.  Even so, the point is I do not have to settle 
for oversimplifying the moral life.  I can aspire to brave its messiness, with its 
multiple types of value judgments, and aspire to be a person whose aim is, as Joan 
Baez describes, “to build a floor, a strong new floor, beneath which we can no 
longer sink.  A platform which stands a few feet above napalm, torture, 
exploitation, poison gas, A and H bombs, the works” (Baez, 34).  Whereas Baez 
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seems concerned with inter-state violence, I am primarily concerned with “the 
works”—interpersonal violence.  On my view, some persons ought to consider 
what kind of persons they ought to be and accept the difficult training necessary to 
rid themselves of “the presumption that violence is necessary for living life well” 
(Hauerwas, 101-102).  Pacifism, then, does not proceed from the naïve assumption 
that everyone is trustworthy or good.  Quite the opposite.  The pacifist recognizes 
the human condition and thus recognizes the need for pacifism.  As professor of 
theological ethics Stanley Hauerwas says, “I’m a pacifist because I’m a violent son 
of a bitch” (Colman, 24). 
In my view, in the realm of interpersonal violence, non-pacifists have 
settled.  And sometimes, persons just should not settle.  A drug addict may manage 
to be “high-functioning,” but however high-functioning she is, she ought not to 
settle for a life of addiction.  Spouses may learn to manage a rather emotionally 
toxic relationship, but, however well-managed, neither ought to settle for an 
emotionally toxic relationship.  Hartmann records one philosopher’s objection to 
pacifism: “It is better to die in defense of liberty than to live as a slave—or to live in 
indifference to the enslavement of others” (Hartmann, 129).  These sentiments 
seem clear and noble.  There are some things better to die for than live with.  
Funny thing is, I believe those very sentiments favor pacifism. 
It is true—non-pacifists make clear by their preparations to use MCV that 
they will not tolerate the violence of assailants; and in many cases, by committing 
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MCV, non-pacifists prevent or quell assailants’ violence, saving themselves and 
others from injury and death.  Nevertheless, they have acquiesced.  They have 
allowed assailants, real or imaginary, to determine too much—their choices, 
attitudes, lifestyles, and, to a significant degree, who they are.  And even if non-
pacifists acknowledge the morally tragic nature of this state of affairs, inasmuch as 
they oppose pacifism, they have concluded there is no need to try for better.  This 
is just the way things are; “it cannot be otherwise.” 
The practice of moral health pacifism is a refusal to settle.  Things ought not 
to be this way and do not have to be this way if only someone would swim against 
the current hard enough to create a wake.  It is precisely because of the messiness 
of moral life that I can so believe and so aspire without implying that persons who 
rely on MCV are wrong, bad, blameworthy, impure, value-less, ill-intentioned, 
poorly-motivated, or any other morally negative inference that depends on a 
unitary conception of normativity.  I admit that what I am describing sounds so 
“against the current” and normal flow of things that it is still just plain hard to 
believe.  As Robert Stevenson writes, “The program of [pacifism] is far too 
strenuous for the bulk of mankind” (Stevenson, 443).   
This is precisely why there ought to be moral health pacifists—change 
agents that model concretely how things ought to be.  Often, the significance of 
explaining and understanding how it could be done cannot compare to seeing it 
done.  Some non-pacifists are so convinced they can thrive only by waging war; 
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persons both near and far ought to be viewed as potential rivals, assailants, 
enemies, and threats within a Hobbesian trap of mutual animosity—an animosity 
only kept at bay by threat of greater retaliatory animosity.  I cannot help but think 
this is at least in part because they have yet to see or recognize someone clearly 
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